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Abstract
Selecting the ‘right partner’ to form international joint ventures (IJVs) is a 
critical strategic choice for companies entering foreign markets. The poor choice 
of local partners may lead to IJV failures and even more often at the stage of 
negotiation. Many prior studies within the IJV literature have developed a set of 
selection criteria for evaluating potential IJV partners in developed economy 
contexts. However, little knowledge has been provided relating to how to choose 
IJV partners in the context of the high-end equipment manufacturing (HEM) 
sector in China. Geringer (1991) contended that the partner selection criteria 
differed extensively not only across heterogeneous contexts but also across 
different industrial sectors. The main objective of this exploratory study is to 
address this critical knowledge gap by investigating what criteria should be used 
by foreign HEM investors when selecting their IJV partners in China.
To achieve the research objectives, an inductive, qualitative and 
comparative case study methodology is employed within an interpretive 
research paradigm. Two recent IJV projects (one failed project and one 
successful project) of setting up aircraft final assembly line (FAL) facilities in 
China are selected as the empirical basis of this research. The case study 
evidence, collected from documentary data, semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation, identifies that HEM investors should seek local Chinese 
partners with six important criteria, including the confirmed sales orders, the 
governmental approval, the product-related industrial experience, the past 
business cooperation experience, the ability of providing suitable land and 
buildings and the ability of offering favorable tax policies.
The presented findings provide managerial implications for practitioners 
involved in the IJV formation process in China, especially for the directors and
managers in HEM sector. By learning from those who have previously 
succeeded and failed in China, practitioners will be able to understand the new 
investment environment of the Chinese HEM sector, recognize the appropriate 
characteristics which any local partner company must possess, and find the right 
the partners in less time and with lower cost involved in order to achieve the 
strategic goals of IJVs and improve the chances of IJV success. On the other 
hand, the Chinese government and local potential partners should also try to 
make these criteria available to attract more stable and profitable foreign 
investment in China's HEM sector.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The first chapter is an introduction to the study. It firstly provides an outline 
of the research context, followed by a discussion of the research gap within 
existing literature and the research objectives of this study. Lastly, the structure 
of the study is described.
1.2 Research Background
Having experienced rapid growth in the past 30 years, China replaced 
Japan as the second largest economy with a share of a global GDP from 6.3% in 
2007 to close to 15.4% in 2013. The development of China’s manufacturing 
industry has contributed the most to the economic growth due to the internal 
growth, the marketization reform and China’s entry to the WTO. According to the 
statistics from Deloitte (2011), China became the largest industrial 
manufacturing country in the world in 2010 with manufacturing output accounting 
for 19.8% of the global total. Such successful achievements have been primarily 
driven by China’s 30-year old economic model of manufacturing cheap and 
labour-intensive products for the export markets.
Surprisingly, the competitiveness of China’s low-cost and labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry in recent years has been losing its edge due to rising 
labour costs, which is estimated to grow over 80 % by 2015. Moreover, the 
appreciation of the Chinese currency, RMB, rose against the USD by 32 % since 
the exchange rate reform in 2005 (Kroeber, 2013). At the same time, the decline 
in demand from developed countries due to the recent global financial crisis has 
dramatically impacted China’s manufacturing sector, which has been strongly
relying on export markets and consignment-based manufacturing. Under 
such circumstances, both the Chinese government and enterprises found that 
the old economic growth model is not sustainable and felt the need to switch 
China's manufacturing sector from a labour-intensive “Made in China” industry 
supported by export-led demand to a technology-intensive “Created in China” 
industry supported by China’s domestic 1.3 billion consumers (Zhou, 2012).
In the country’s 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2011-2015) promulgated in 
2010, the Chinese government clearly outlined its ambition and specified seven 
strategic Emerging Industries (SEI), which include energy conservation and 
environmental protection industry, new generation IT technology industry, 
high-end equipment manufacturing (HEM), new biotechnology industry, new 
energy industry, new energy vehicles industry, and new materials industry as 
new directions to upgrade and develop the manufacturing industry. Chinese 
central government is prepared to spend over RMB 4 trillion in these SEI 
industries in order to increase the GDP contribution of SEI from currently around 
3% to 8% by 2015 and 15% by 2020 (Tolkamp, 2012).
The HEM industry, which includes six sub-industries, such as aviation 
equipment industry, satellite industry, smart-grid equipment industry, marine 
engineering equipment industry, railway transportation equipment industry and 
intelligent manufacturing equipment industry, is a complex technological industry 
that produces high-end, technology-intensive and sophisticated products. It 
requires a highly skilled workforce, extensive research and development 
capacity. It is also regarded as an important foundation for the further 
development of other focus industries, such as new energy and the automotive 
sector. Foreign HEM investors entering China are encouraged and supported by 
the Chinese government with preferential policies in terms of finance, land and 
tax, because China still lags behind developed countries in HEM sector with a
shortage of technology, poor independent innovation ability, a small industrial
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scale and weak infrastructure. Much China's high-end manufacturing equipment 
has to rely greatly on imports from developed countries, while the manufacturing 
equipment made by local Chinese manufacturers mainly meet the demand of 
the low and medium end market. Many Chinese enterprises in this sector are 
eager to learn about advanced technologies, which they need for transforming 
and upgrading by either joining an IJV with foreign investors or acquiring 
companies with technologies in developed countries.
On the other hand, while the developed countries are still feeling the 
impact of the economic downturn, many businesses in the HEM industry, which 
used to invest in labour-intensive manufacturing in China and ship cheap 
“Made-in-China” products back to developed markets, are now looking into 
setting up manufacturing facilities in the growing Chinese market in order to 
expand their sales in China and other parts of Asia. They also aim at offering 
quicker delivery, better after-sales service and closer technical support to the 
Chinese clients. Although the advantage of low cost production has been 
gradually disappearing in certain areas of China, the rise of a huge domestic 
demand from 1.3 billion consumers, especially demand from the growing middle 
class, in housing, transportation, communication, education, entertainment and 
other human activities, caused by intensive large-sale urbanization, have 
provided huge opportunities for the foreign HEM investors to set up 
manufacturing facilities in China. Moreover, China's ability to compete with 
international technology firms has improved faster than what has been 
anticipated. In order to support the HEM sector, the Chinese government has 
promulgated special policies to provide the HEM projects in China with tax 
reductions, government subsidies and preferential financing from 
state-supported banks. All of these supporting policies can push Chinese 
companies up the value chain and create new competitors for international 
companies. Therefore, many foreign investors are forced to occupy the Chinese 
market at a faster speed before their advanced technology loses advantages in
3
China.
Despite wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOEs) being used more often 
to set up manufacturing companies in China due to the easier protection of 
intellectual property rights, the international joint ventures (IJVs) entry mode into 
China remains a popular alliance strategy for foreign HEMs to enter the Chinese 
market. Defined in this study as jointly owned entities formed by two or more 
legally separate bodies headquartered in different countries to conduct business 
activities together (Geringer, 1988; 1991), IJVs with Chinese companies enable 
foreign HEM investors to pool knowledge, expertise, and resources from local 
partners in order that the IJV projects can achieve economies of scope and/or 
scale, strengthen or protect the business of parent companies and develop new 
products more reliably, cheaply and faster than either parent companies act 
alone or through acquisition (Beamish and Lupton, 2009). In addition, local 
Chinese partners can help foreign investors to make investments in restricted 
industries possible, establish good relationships with local governments, reduce 
operational uncertainty and sometimes increase the credibility of the foreign 
companies in the eyes of local consumers (Beamish, 1994; Shenkar and Zeira 
1990; Teagarden and Von Glinow, 1990).
Although cooperating with local partners brings a great number of 
advantages, forming a manufacturing joint venture in China is a difficult process, 
because the complex nature of IJVs at both cultural and organizational level 
does result in high instability, high propensity for failure, complex governance 
structures and the need for coordination between partners (Killing, 1983; Morris 
and Hergert, 1987; Parkhe, 1993; Schaan, 1983). It is also widely known that the 
failure rate of such partnerships in China is high (Groot and Merchant, 2000), 
and joint ventures in China have achieved a reputation for being difficult to 
manage. Many IJVs only last for a short time after millions of dollars of losses 
occur and some of them even cease at the early stage of negotiation.
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Chowdhury (1989) stated that lack of complementary between IJV partners is 
one of the main factors behind IJV failures, because the strategic and 
organizational traits of local partners affect the degree of resource 
complementary or indivisibility and influence of the extent of strategic and 
organizational fit between IJV partners (Buckley and Casson 1988; Shenkar and 
Zeira 1990). There have been many joint venture failures in large part due to the 
poor choice of IJV partners (Hamel, 1991; Lambe and Spekman, 1997; Shah 
Swaminathan, 2008). In order to increase the likelihood of IJV success in China 
and avoid millions of dollars of losses, it is critically important that managers who 
intent on following the IJVs mode of entering the Chinese market should make 
an appropriate choice of Chinese IJV partners.
1.3 Research Questions and Literature Gap
Despite prior IJV literature has been developed for the strategic motives of 
IJV formation from various theories, including transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1985; Buckley and Casson, 1988), resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), organizational learning theory (Hamel, 1991), 
strategic choice theory (Porter and Fuller, 1986) and institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), past research has devoted relatively little efforts in 
the issue of partner selection within IJV formation. A limited number of past 
studies regarding this issue focus on which criteria companies apply when 
selecting IJV/ISA partners and the relative importance of each criterion (Chen 
and Glaister, 2005; Dong and Glaister, 2006), but the majority of the existing 
literature seems to merely agree that the availability and access to skills and 
resources for the IJVs determined the choice of partner selection (Killing, 1983; 
Harrigan, 1985; Nielsen, 2003). Geringer (1991) ’s two-fold typology of partner 
selection criteria, which is comprised of the task-related criteria referring to 
operational skills and resources required by IJV projects and the partner-related 
selection criteria related with the efficiency and effectiveness of the IJV partners,
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has been extensively used in the extant literature to evaluate the potential IJV 
partners when companies from developed countries establish IJVs in other 
developed countries (Glaister, 1996; Glasiter and Buckley, 1997) or emerging 
economies (Al-Khalifa and Peterson 1999; Tatoglu and Glaister, 2000).
Furthermore, it has been argued by past scholars that partner selection is 
also a decision making process, which involves matching different resources 
and skills across companies, contexts and time, because the criteria used for IJV 
partner selection are largely case-specific (Geringer 1988; Nielsen, 2002; Varis
2004). Nielsen(2003) argued that the prior research has never identified and 
agreed on a complete list of partner selection criteria, which may reflect the 
complexity and dynamism of the social and strategic context of IJVs and their 
parent companies.
Another stream of research stresses that the contextual factors effecting 
said criteria can be distinguished and the relative importance of IJV partner 
selection criteria will be different under various contextual factors, which can be 
roughly divided into three groups: foreign-partner-specific factors,
location-specific factors and investment-specific factors (Rumpunen and 
Viljamaa, 2008). The issues of country's environment, one of the IJVs 
location-specific factors, are of great importance for understanding the strategy 
of IJV projects and the antecedents and outcomes of IJV partner selection 
process, especially under the context of developing countries (Steensma et al.,
2005), because foreign investors are more likely to face higher entry barriers and 
elevated uncertainty (Child, 1994; Luo, 1997). Research findings from past 
studies based on the cases of IJVs in developed countries may not be sufficient 
to explain partner selection issues in developing countries. Although Hitt et al. 
(2000) compared the partner selection activities in developed countries with 
those in developing countries, there is a lack of literature, which particularly 
addresses the partner selection criteria in China. By indicating three groups of
criteria, namely, strategic, organizational, and financial traits, the Luo's (1997) 
research is one of the few studies, which focus on what resources and skills of 
local partners are significant to overall success of IJVs in China in the late 1990s, 
when the Chinese economy focused on cheap, labour-intensive and export-led 
manufacturing (Luo, 1998; Yan and Luo, 2001).
Nevertheless, China has developed into a new era of knowledge-oriented 
economic structure after the global financial crisis in 2008. Empirical studies of 
how foreign investors should select Chinese local partners under such new 
country environment conditions remain limited. Moreover, both Hitt et al. (2004) 
and Glaister and Buckley(1997) contended that the relative importance of the 
partner selection criteria is different according to the nature of the IJVs industry 
and the partner selection criteria for IJV formation differ tremendously across 
industrial sectors. There has been very little existing literature examining IJVs in 
China's HEM sector and even much less research systematically and 
specifically explaining how HEM investors select IJV partners in China. 
Moreover, there is an important oversight that empirical studies have not 
investigated the impact of “poor” or “right” choice of local IJV partners on the 
subsequent success of the IJV negotiation process towards signing contracts. 
Although China's HEM sector, with the growing importance of FDI, plays a 
critical role in the technology-led economic growth of China, the paucity of 
research on partner selection criteria in this industry represents a significant gap 
in the current literature. Another knowledge gap also lies in that most prior 
studies regarding partner selection criteria have adopted deductive quantitative 
methods to test the hypothesis and identify appropriate partners. However, such 
a methodology neglects the rich details and deep insights of IJV partner 
selection.
In order to justify these research gaps, this exploratory study extends the 
recent surge in scholarly attention directed towards examining how foreign
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investors should choose local partners in China's HEM industry by an inductive 
qualitative case study approach based on two empirical cases (a failed project 
and a successful project) of setting up aircraft final assembly line (FAL) facilities 
in China. Guided by the insights from theoretical frameworks on IJV partner 
selection (see exhibit 1.1), the following seven research sub-questions are 
presented:
Research Question 1
Why do foreign high-end equipment manufacturers invest in IJVs in China? 
Research Question 2
Why do Chinese partners have interest in forming IJVs with foreign 
high-end equipment manufacturers?
Research Question 3
What are the contextual factors influencing the partner selection process in 
China's HEM sector?
Research Question 4
How should potential IJV partners in China's HEM Sector be identified? 
Research Question 5
What are the partner selection criteria foreign high-end equipment 
manufacturers use to evaluate the potential Chinese IJV partners?
Research Question 6
What are the obstacles in the partnership during the IJV negotiation 
process in China's HEM sector?
Research Question 7
How should HEM investors select local IJV partners in China?
1.4 Structure of the Study
To achieve the research objectives, the remainder of this thesis is set out 
in the following seven chapters: introduction, literature review, research design
and methodology, overview of cases, data analysis, research findings, 
conclusions and implications. The first chapter outlines the research background 
and highlights the research gap and objectives of the study. Chapter 2 of this 
study provides a theoretical framework of the study by critically reviewing past 
IJV partner selection literature and offering a summary of the gaps in prior 
research. Chapter 3 responds to the literature review and details the overall 
research design and methodology, including the paradigm of the study, 
qualitative case study research design, a discussion of rationale, limitations of 
the methodology, the researcher’s resolution of the limitations, the data 
collection and analysis methods, ethical considerations, as well as the validity 
and reliability of the paper. Chapter 4 provides the research context with insights 
of the development of the Chinese aviation industry and an introduction of two 
case study organizations and their decision-makers. The empirical research 
data collected from four types of sources, namely, written documentation, 
transcribed interviews, meeting minutes and project reports, are analysed via 
coding in Chapter 5, which reports the qualitative findings from this study. 
Chapter 6 progresses to a presentation of the findings for each of the questions 
and integrates the existing literature with the research findings. Chapter 7 
comprises the summary and conclusions of the study. In addition, this chapter 
provides contributions of this research for both theory and practice. Limitations 
of this thesis and opportunities for future research are also discussed. The last 
part of the dissertation contains the list of references and according appendices, 
which provide supporting materials for this dissertation.
Exhibit 1.1 Theoretical Framework of this Study 
(Resource: present author)
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
in order to provide a detailed explanation of the research gaps addressed 
by this study, the second chapter of this study reviews the past and current IJV 
literature by firstly drawing on the international business theory developed by 
Dunning (1977) and Rugman (1981), because this thesis mainly focuses on the 
entry model of doing international business. Then the literature review is 
narrowed down to emphasize the importance of IJV partner selection research 
and then to present several broad theoretical propositions from both economic 
and social perspectives for explaining the motives behind the IJV partner 
selection decision. This chapter further discusses the existing literature on IJV 
partner selection from a criteria-oriented approach built on Geringer’s (1988) 
two-fold typology. Subsequently, a number of contextual variables, which 
influence the relative importance of criteria used in IJV partner selection, are 
examined. This chapter is then followed by a discussion of new insights of IJV 
partner selection research from a process-oriented approach. Next, the existing 
studies relating to IJV partner selection criteria in developing countries are 
reviewed with an emphasis on China. The chapter finally provides a conclusion 
with a summary of identified research gaps, which this study aims to fill.
2.2 International Business Theory (IB)
Studies have shown that multinational companies (MNEs) have been 
facing many challenges arising from entering into foreign markets and can be 
disadvantaged in many aspects in comparison to domestic companies (Caves 
1982; Nachum 2003; Voss, et al. 2010). One explanation for domestic company 
competitive advantage is 'Liability of Foreignness' (LOF), initiated by Hymer
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(1960), who suggested that foreign companies face increased transaction and 
information costs from either a lack of familiarity with the new environment or a 
lack of accessing resources which are more readily available to their domestic 
counterparts (Buckley and Casson ,1976; Dunning, 2000). Hymer’s contribution 
in IB theory is famous for his recognition of the MNE’s possession of Firm 
Specific Advantages (FSAs), which are required to offset the LOF when 
operating business in foreign market (Zaheer, 1995). However, Rugman and 
Almodovar (2011) argued that Hymer (1960) exaggerates the MNEs’ potential 
abilities to take advantage of their FSAs as monopolists by exerting efforts to 
close markets and exercising excessive market power.
Since the early 1980s, two new framework-concepts regarding the model 
of entry into foreign markets have crystallized in IB theory. The first one was an 
all-encompassing framework concept, ‘eclectic paradigm’, which was initiated 
and subsequently extended into five versions by Dunning (1977, 1980, 1981, 
1985, 1988) and has been dominating the IB theory for more than 30 years to 
explain alternative foreign entry modes and the economic efficiency implications 
thereof. According to this paradigm, the entry model of international business is 
determined by three sets of advantages as Ownership(O), Location(L), and 
Internalization(l) advantages (OLI) (Dunning, 1977). In response of the criticisms 
against his early works, Dunning further explored the concept of ownership 
advantages by arguing that the most successful MNEs are those that are best 
able to nurture and exploit both asset ownership advantages (Oa) and 
transactional ownership advantages (Ot) (Dunning, 1981, Dunning and Rugman, 
1985). Moreover, a new category of ‘institutional assets advantages’ (Oi) was 
added by Dunning and Lundan (2008) to this paradigm. Further compounding a 
company's unfamiliarity with foreign market, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) 
developed the principle of the 'Liability of Outsidership' (LOO) by contending that 
companies cannot easily build networks or linkages with other companies to
share information or essentially unable to become an insider as a result of LOF.
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Brouthers et al. (1999) explained that the reason why prior research favors the 
OLI framework is because it is a synthesis of the internalization theory by 
combining several factors, such as transaction costs, ownership and 
location-specific variables (Dunning, 1981; Rugman, 1981). In addition to its 
contribution as a synthesizing framework, this eclectic paradigm highlights the 
key location advantages of four types of international production: natural 
resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset 
seeking (Dunning, 1998). In contrast to the Hymer's approach, Dunning focuses 
more on some managerial issues, such as the complex trade-offs to be 
considered when weighing alternative modes of entry into foreign markets. 
(Rugman et al. 2011) Despite of the above contributions, Dunning’s paradigm 
has received long-standing criticism from the proponents of internalization 
theory (Rugman, 1981), which mainly argued that the OLI paradigm is only 
limited in the context of outward FDI into host countries and not relevant for the 
study of domestic versus cross-border transactions (Rugman and Verbeke, 
2002). The strongest criticism of OLI paradigm may come from Itaki (1991) who 
claimed that an (O) advantage could actually be derived from an (I) advantage 
and the (O) advantage is inseparable from the (L) advantage.
The second framework concept is developed by Rugman (1981) who 
contended that the company’s motivations for going overseas should be based 
on a matrix of both firm specific advantages (FSAs), such as technologies, 
knowledge, managerial or marketing abilities etc., and country specific 
advantages (CSAs) including natural resources, the quality and size of the labor 
force, cultural factors, tariff and non-tariff barriers, public policies etc. According 
to the recent work Hennart (2009), the boundary between CSAs and FSAs in 
many cases becomes somewhat blurred, because MNEs may require a type of 
location bound (LB) FSA with powerful local actors to open up access to the 
desired CSAs, which are actually not freely accessible due to closed distribution 
networks or local monopolies on natural resources ownership. In the point of
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view from Eden (2005), Rugman’s most important contribution to internalization 
theory comes from his closing the gap between internalization theories with 
strategic management thinking, by developing the concepts of location bound 
(LB) and non-location bound (NLB) firm specific advantages (FSAs) (Rugman 
and Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 2003). However, Rugman et al. (2011) argued that 
the internalization theory approach may neglect two critical elements: the nature 
of the MNE FSAs and the presence or absence of natural and 
government-imposed market imperfections. Although the paradigm OLI and the 
matrix FSA-CSA represent two contrasting schools of thought in IB theory, 
Oehler-sincai (2011) claimed that there is the following correspondence between 
two framework concepts: FSA=0, and CSA= (L and I), which may be used as 
the mechanism of tracing the borders of the MNE, based on the company 
specific advantages and the host-country specific benefits.
More recently, a new debate focusing on regionalization versus a broader 
multinational spread has started in IB theory. It was initiated by Rugman (2001), 
who contended the ‘end’ of global strategy is coming. Further, a new concept: 
liability of inter-regional foreignness (LOIF) was pointed out by Rugman and 
Verbeke (2007) based on the negative returns found from greater interregional 
diversification. Rugman and Verbeke (2004) argued that largest MNEs are not 
globally diversified in terms of their international sales and tend to draw 
disproportionately more sales from their home regions through intra-regional 
diversification, because the control and coordination costs of global 
diversification will more than offset its benefits for subsidiaries outside the MNE’s 
home region (Yamin and Forsgren, 2006). Some criticism of the regionalization 
thesis underlined the point that the regionalization hypothesis is a 
semi-globalization phenomenon (Rugman and Verbeke, 2007), which does not 
offer support for anti-globalization or nationalist movements and is in fact 
consistent with global liberalization by using a new regionalism setting (Proff, 
2002). The critics of regionalization also suggested that regionalization can
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either be considered as the first best solution of a firm’s internationalization 
process by providing local country-specific advantages (CSAs) or a learning 
process from regional economic expansion towards globalization.
From these basic springs of the IB theory, either those generated by 
Hymer or the OLI paradigm or the internalization theory or regionalization thesis, 
research streams have developed into many different categories (antecedents 
or drivers, processes or operations, and outcomes or consequences, etc.) for 
studying the mode of entry into foreign market. Since this study is concerned 
with partner identification and selection during IJV formation process, the 
literature review will focus on the importance of IJV partner selection research 
and theoretical propositions underpinning the motives behind the IJV partner 
selection decision in the following sections.
2.3 Importance of IJV Partner Selection Research
The issues related with IJVs in the global economy have been widely 
discussed by both academics and practitioners. Joint ventures (JVs) are usually 
defined as two or more entities providing tangible and intangible assets to 
establish a legal business entity, which is a distinct company with its own shares, 
offices, employees, board of directors and financial resources (Koslow, 1996). In 
this study, the term “joint venture” is limited to equity joint ventures, because 
non-equity joint ventures are often labelled as contracts instead of JVs (Hennart, 
1988).
The advantages of JVs can not only provide partners with a greater 
production capacity, easier access to new technologies and bigger markets, but 
can also be effectively used to achieve growth while minimizing risk levels, as 
recent findings of Pajot and Graviere (2010) indicated. Therefore, JVs are of 
critical strategic importance for international business cooperation and may well
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be seen as an alternative to a merger, acquisition or even organic growth, 
especially in periods of market or financial uncertainty. However, JV formation 
involves additional costs because JV partners have to share decision making in 
order to achieve coordination between them (Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983). 
McPheat (2009) demonstrated that companies only establish JVs when the 
expected extra benefits of adopting the IJV option outweigh its perceived 
additional costs (Geringer, 1991; Beamish and Banks, 1987).
When the parties of a joint venture are based in different countries or the 
business venture itself is spread over different countries, Sayer (1999) defined 
them as international joint ventures (IJVs), which are more difficult to coordinate 
and manage when both national and organizational cultures greatly differ. 
Because the literature with regard to partner selection of international strategic 
alliances (ISAs) is significantly richer than that of IJV partner selection studies 
and the findings concerning the two fields are largely compatible, this study 
assumes that IJVs and ISAs are interchangeable acronyms in the partner 
selection literature.
As mentioned by Rumpunen and Viljamaa (2008), Wong and Ellis (2002) 
outlined three categories within IJV research, including (1) formative stages of 
IJVs, which include evaluating the strategic motives for creating the IJV, 
selecting suitable partners and negotiating the conditions of cooperation towards 
signing IJV contracts (Tallman and Shenkar 1994); (2) outcomes of IJVs, which 
are mainly in relation to failure or performance of IJVs (Makino and Delios 1996); 
and (3) specific management issues in the operational stage of IJVs, such as 
control and conflicts (Yan and Gray 1994). Past IJV literature has merely 
focused on the outline of the motives for IJV formations and/or how such an IJV 
is then operated after being established. Identifying future directions by critically 
evaluating the current research becomes of vital importance in enhancing 
knowledge for the field of IJV studies.
16
Beamish and Lupton (2009) argued that although there are less 
opportunities to conduct research in the formative stages of IJVs, studies of IJV 
partner selection are arguably a pre-eminent stream of research among all IJV 
and ISA literature, because selecting the right partner is one of the most 
important factors for accomplishing strategic objectives of joint ventures. 
Moreover, the compatibility of selected partners determines the success or 
failure of IJVs (Lorange and Roos, 1993). The failure rate of IJVs is widely-cited 
as being high and some past research indicates that no more than half of all IJVs 
can be said to perform satisfactorily (Varis and Conn, 2002; Das and Teng,
2000). Although there are many potential causes leading to these failures, the 
poor choice of IJV partners is undoubtedly one of the main causes. It has been 
argued by many prior scholars that enhancing the understanding of the partner 
selection process and providing suggestions to assist foreign investors in finding 
right IJV partners may gradually reduce the high failure rate of IJVs (Harrigan, 
1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Johnson et al., 1996).
2.4 Theoretical Approaches for IJV Partner Selection Studies
The motivations of IJVs have been fiercely debated and approached by 
existing theoretical paradigms from various facets. Based on Barringer and 
Harrison's (2000) theoretical approaches of explaining the creation of ISAs, this 
study combines the contributions of other scholars and seeks to examine the 
phenomenon of IJV partner selection from different perspectives of the following 
organizational theories, which includes the transaction cost theory(TCT), 
resource-based views(RBVs), resource dependency theory(RDT), strategic 
choice theory(SCT), network theory(NT), organizational learning theory(OLT), 
institutional theory (IT)and social psychology theory(SPT). These organizational 
theories present different ways of explaining motives for establishing IJVs from 
economic, organizational and sociological perspectives (Exhibit 2.1). The 
partner selection criteria, which are considered during the partner evaluation
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stage, may be consequently influenced by these motives in different contexts.
It can be argued that the backbone of this study is formed by this typology 
of paradigms. However, Varis and Conn (2002) argued that each of these 
theoretical approaches has its limitations and no single theory on its own is able 
to fully interpret the complicated issue of partner selection. Therefore, a 
combination of several theoretical paradigms included in this discussion may 
provide a holistic and exhaustive understanding of how foreign investors 
evaluate and select local prospective partners (Owens et al, 2012). These 
popular theories offer insights into partner selection and are reviewed in the 
following, starting with the transaction cost theory (TCT).
Exhibit 2.1: Theoreticai approaches of explaining IJV partner selection 
(Resource: adapted from Barringer and Harrison, 2000)
TCT RBV RDT SCT NT
Economic Organizational
OLT IT SPT
Sociological
2.4.1 Transaction Costs Theory (TCT)
TCT, developed by Williamson (1985), predicts that IJVs, as alternative 
arrangements, are designed to achieve the minimization of the costs of 
production and transaction. Hennart (1991) suggested that companies shall 
adopt such an alternative arrangement when the coordination costs incurred are 
expected to be lower than that involved in the activities of existing hierarchical 
corporate structure. Tallman (2005) pointed out that an IJV is an attractive option 
when it can minimize the costs of governance in a particular transaction.
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According to the TCT economists, when confronted with the partner selection 
choice, an IJV investor should select its optimal partner candidate based on the 
lowest but the most controllable transaction costs (Varis and Conn, 2002). Prior 
studies have also found that IJV investors should minimize the chances of 
opportunism while considering transaction costs during the partner selection 
process, because one partner seeking to fulfil its own set of motives may 
increase its partner’s transaction costs at the same time (Owens and Quinn,
2007).
TCT has been one of the most popular theories among IJV research 
(Parkhe, 1993; Hennart, 1988), and is often regarded as the principal theoretical 
approach to studying IJV formation and development (Robson et al., 2002). 
However, TCT has been criticized for its tendency to solely emphasize the 
efficiency and cost-minimizing rationales for alliances. Thereby it neglects the 
other relevant opportunities and advantages, such as value creation, which is 
one of the major outcomes joint ventures aim to achieve (Alexander and Young, 
1996). The latter might actually be more appropriate to the alliance scenario 
(Varis and Conn 2002). Another similar critique by Barringer and Harrison (2000) 
suggested that TCT emphasizes a strongly economic analysis of the IJV 
decision and ignores other human elements of an IJV relationship and partner 
selection criteria, assuming that IJV partners and different corporate cultures will 
work well together (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Moreover, research 
conducted by Faulkner (1995) found that TCT per se may not even play a critical 
role as the motive for IJV formation. Therefore, Parkhe (1993) concluded that 
IJVs are a “mixed motive game” and that TCT is ought to be applied in 
conjunction with other theories rather than as a stand-alone explanation of the 
IJV partner selection process (Williamson, 1988).
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2.4.2 Resource-based Views (RBVs)
As TCT understates the motives for IJV formation, prior scholars 
developed an alternative explanation, RBVs, to emphasize strategic resource 
needs and opportunities instead of transaction cost and efficiency during the 
partner selection process (Hamel, 1991; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Das and Teng (1999) noted that RBVs seem to be particularly suitable for 
studying motives for IJV formation, because companies possessing tangible and 
intangible resources (Wernerfelt, 1995) can build core competences through 
fostering sustainable and hardly to be copied capabilities (Barney, 1991). 
Moreover, IJVs may enable companies with deficient resources to gain access 
to the valuable resources of other companies.
Based on two important assumptions regarding resources, heterogeneity 
and immobility (Solesvik and Westhead, 2010), RBV-based theorists provide 
insights relating to the resources that may be required as the basis for an IJV. 
They also suggest that companies should conduct a comparative evaluation of 
resource bases of potential complementary partners and subsequently select 
the strongest partner which will enable the development, structuring, or 
combination of resources that is most durable and difficult to copy (Overby, 
2005).
Although the strategic and operational RBVs underpin much of Geringer’s
(1991) two-fold selection criteria typology, it has received three main points of 
criticism within the range of IJV literature. Firstly, Christensen (1997) argued that 
it is too simplistic to match strong resources in the relevant market with attractive 
partners, because the failure of leading companies proves that the best strategic 
partners to have an IJV with may not always be the companies with the 
strongest resources. Secondly, RBVs are regarded as not very context-sensitive
by Overby (2005), but context factors are critical for an IJV partner selection
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process. Lastly, it has been suggested that the focus on obtaining critical 
resources as a major reason and even prerequisite for IJVs is at the expense of 
alternative parameters, such as partners sharing a strategic vision for the IJV 
(Luo, 1997; Barringer and Harrison, 2000).
2.4.3 Resource Dependency Theory (RDT)
Complementing the perspectives of RBVs, resource dependency theorists 
posit that organisations must depend on critical resources of other organizations 
to sustain growth and cannot develop or internally acquire all resources needed 
for competitive operation within a specific environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). RDT suggests that every company has its specific resources, such as 
technology, product distribution, global service support, local knowledge, 
management know-how, and material procurement (Yan and Gray, 2001), but 
few of them are self sufficient in these resources (Glaister 1996) and therefore 
must be dependant on other companies for critical resources. As Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) showed, a company can either obtain control over critical 
resources in order to minimize the dependency on other companies or acquire 
control over the resources, which may maximize other companies' dependency 
on it. This can be done by accessing and maintaining linkages with needed 
resources from the network in which the companies are embedded.
Compared with the RBV perspective, which is more internal, RDT focuses 
mainly on resources which must be acquired from external resources for 
sustaining the growth of company (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). In their 
studies of IJV formation, Chen and Chen (2003) demonstrated that RDT is an 
appropriate theoretical approach to examine IJVs because parent companies 
take advantage of IJVs to acquire critical resources, which they do not have. 
Also the level of interdependence between parent companies will increase the 
probability of a new IJV (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Therefore, it can be argued
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that firms should choose IJV partners with a high level of dependency on the 
critical resources in order to increase the survival rate of IJVs. However, as one 
partner accumulates key resources from the other, the joint venture may 
become unstable (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
Although RDT is well suited to explain the phenomenon of partner 
selection, the pitfalls of RDT's assumptions have been clearly recognized by 
prior scholars. From the perspective of RDT economists, companies within the 
same industry have heterogeneous resources and capabilities and all of their 
assets cannot be bought or sold in the market. Furthermore, the decision makers 
of companies are subject to bounded rationality (Peteraf, 1993). An additional 
weakness of RBT is that it does not shed much light on how companies' 
competencies are developed and how transfers of competencies between 
companies actually take place (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).
2.4.4 Strategic Choice Theory (SCT)
The SCT distinguishes itself from economic arguments by claiming that 
companies form IJVs to enhance organizational competencies or market power 
(Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) defined a 
competence as “capability to manage available resources in a manner, which 
allows a company to achieve its goals or objectives and to sustain its competitive 
advantage”. Strategic choice theorists suggest that companies with competency 
deficiency may expect IJV partners to provide a competency which is required to 
maintain their competitive advantages in existing and new markets (Solesvik and 
Westhead, 2010).
Porter and Fuller (1986) argued that IJV formation in an international 
context is often considered as an entry model into foreign markets and is usually
dependant on five forces including the threat from new entrants, the bargaining
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power of suppliers, the bargaining power of customers, the threat from substitute 
products, and rivalry among firms. Furthermore, in order to outperform 
competitors, the five forces can be used together with three generic strategies, 
such as cost leadership, product differentiation, and focus. Barringer and 
Harrison (2000) pointed out that choosing a right partner should be based on not 
only specific resource dependency requirements or transaction costs 
considerations, but also the company’s long-term competitiveness in a foreign 
market.
Additionally, certain industries or products often have to meet the 
specific requirements of host governments, and companies operating in those 
industries should seek IJV partners with important local knowledge, such as 
distribution channels, market knowledge, or government connections, to enter 
into the targeted market (Ouchi and Bolton, 1988). Powell (1990) also 
demonstrated various other strategic motives of IJV formation including 
benefitting from economies of scale in joint research and/or production, gaining 
fast access to new technologies or new markets, strengthening market position 
by neutralizing or blocking competitors, obtaining sources of knowledge outside 
the company's boundaries, as well as sharing the risks of business activities 
which are beyond the capabilities of a single organization (Powell, 1990: P315).
Although SCT has a very broad and all-encompassing nature, Barringer 
and Harrison (2000) criticized that organizations might have a plethora of 
various strategic reasons to enter into IJVs and a fragmented nature of studies 
linking strategic choice with IJVs (Lowensberg, 2010).
2.4.5 Social Network Theory (SNT)
Despite the fact that the IJV partner selection process can be explained 
under economic, resource-based (internal and external) and strategic paradigms,
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some extant theories view the motivation of IJV formation from social network 
perspectives, following Granovetter’s (1985) critique of static efficiency theories 
in terms of “under-socializing”. SNT considers organizational outcomes as a 
function of the social relationships between organizations or individuals in an 
organization (Jones et al., 1997). Gulati (1995) argued that it is the social context 
formed by the existing network of relationships that makes the partners aware of 
alliance opportunities. Furthermore, it is the existing network in which a firm is 
embedded that influences decision making regarding IJV and alliance formation. 
Moreover, Walker et al. (1997) maintained that such an existing network of 
relationships constitutes social capital, one type of intangible assets of the firms, 
and therefore, companies have to continuously renew existing relationships to 
preserve this social capital.
SNT has further been explained as having two critical elements, density 
and centrality (Rowley, 1997). Density describes the relative number of ties in 
the network which link actors together. Network centrality measures the position 
of an individual organization in the social network and its ability to control the 
flow of information (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, 1994). Gulati and Gargiulo
(1999) suggested that the network position of the firm influences its access to 
information, the availability, quality, and reliability of partners, as well as its 
attractiveness to potential partners and the probability of a new alliance between 
two specific firms. They also argued that this probability grows together with their 
interdependence, common third parties, their prior ties and their centrality in the 
alliance network. In addition, prior scholars of SNT (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1996) 
pointed out that past cooperative network relationships between IJV partners 
can reduce the uncertainty of evaluating unfamiliar partners.
However, the network theory has its limits in explaining the IJV partner 
selection, because most of IJV cases in new geographically distant markets or 
new product/market sectors are moving beyond existing networks and are
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engaging with new partners with few previous direct ties and merely insignificant 
indirect ties from different industries (Owens et al., 2012).
In addition, many social network theorists have devoted prior attention to 
the importance of Guanxi in Chinese context. Fang and Kriz (2000) argued that 
there is a striking similarity between social networks, one of key success factors 
for Western business world and the Chinese belief, Guanxi, which is an 
important means of developing business relationship in China. Shu (2004) 
contended that Guanxi serves, to some extent, to compensate for the poor 
framework of economic institutions to be found in China and is critically 
important supporting factor throughout the whole process of customer 
assessment (Zolkiewski and Feng, 2005). Despite the similarity, Guanxi, 
compared with social networks in the West, has its unique features in four 
perspectives. Firstly, the most distinctive characteristic of Guanxi is that it is 
completely personal. So and Walker (2006) claimed in their research that no 
corporation-to-corporation relationship can be found as far as Guanxi is 
concerned, even if Li and Wright (2000) provided a different point of view, 
arguing that group connection is not excluded in Guanxi. In contrast, Luo (2000) 
proposed that social networks mainly refer to organization-to-organization 
relationships. Secondly, Lee et al. (2001) pointed out that Guanxi is a kind of 
relationship requiring exchange of personalized favors. So and Walker (2006) 
also claimed that not only the people who one knows but also the favours one 
has given are important to the person in China. However, no social obligation 
and further exchanges of favors are expected in Western networks, because 
they are firm-to-firm relationships rather than personal connections (Lee et al., 
2001). Thirdly, compared with social networks in Western cultures, Guanxi is not 
established for immediate gain but for more long-term orientated expectation for 
benefits in the future. Lastly, Guanxi with Chinese government, in particular, is 
perceived a necessary condition for MNEs to do business successfully in China, 
because good Guanxi with government may influence government policy
25
decision making in order to reach business objectives (Gao and Tian, 2004) and 
may also help to get access to scarce resources for business development. On 
the other hand, developing or maintaining Guanxi with government officers may 
be associated with bribery and corruption (Luo, 2000; Norton 2006) and the 
association with corrupt behavior is the main negative aspect of Guanxi in China 
(Lee et al., 2001). To sum up, Guanxi, as special social networks in Chinese 
context, is definitely important for those international enterprises which are 
looking for IJV business partners in China, given the fact that multinational 
companies can derive many benefits from Guanxi and they may also be 
negatively affected by Guanxi when they are dealing with state-owned business 
partners.
2.4.6 Organizational Learning Theory (OLT)
As the sixth paradigm, OLT is important in the IJV literature (Guidice, 
2001) and can be considered as an extension to the more general RDT (Varis 
and Conn, 2002). Organizational learning theorists suggest that firms, especially 
those in knowledge intensive industries, can obtain valuable knowledge (Powell 
et al., 1996) to achieve a competitive advantage and improve organizational 
performance (Leventhal and March, 1993) by establishing joint ventures with 
other strategic partners. The learning process was defined by Child and Yan 
(2003) from three aspects: (1) learning a relevant knowledge from previous 
experience of IJVs from parent firms; (2) learning a knowledge from seeking and 
negotiating terms with new partners during IJV formation; and (3) learning a 
knowledge of how to work efficiently and effectively with local parent companies 
in subsequent operation of an IJV.
Much existing research shows that acquiring knowledge from a JV 
partner in various aspects of JV operation is one of the top ranking partner
selection criteria for companies in developed country (Glaister and Buckley,
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1997, Glaister et al., 2005). Hitt et al. (2000) found out that OLT is connected to 
both the RBV and the RDT and as a combination can offer theoretical 
explanations for IJVs, which are formed between partners from developed and 
emerging countries. Companies with large resource endowments in developed 
markets try to leverage their resources by not only seeking local market 
knowledge and access, but also selecting alliance partners with complementary 
capabilities and unique competencies (Hitt et al. 2000).
However, OLT theorists often are confronted with a dilemma that 
companies might have different intents to learn, seek knowledge with a different 
degree of transparency (willingness to share knowledge) and possess diverging 
absorptive capacities during organizational learning process. At the same time, 
companies entering into IJVs risk the loss of proprietary information (intellectual 
property rights), which is out of the intended scope of the alliance. Hamel (1991) 
concluded that such a dilemma will lead to different learning outcomes and harm 
the equilibrium of an alliance.
2.4.7 Institutional Theory (IT)
Institutional theory (IT), an emerging perspective of organization theory and 
sociology, suggests that institutional environments impose pressures on 
organizations to seek legitimacy with respect to institutional constituents and 
conform to institutional rules, regulations, norms and values (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1990). From an institutional perspective, IJV formation can 
be viewed as a result of a quest of firms to attain legitimacy in host country 
contexts (Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Oliver, 1990). Barringer and Harrison
(2000) argued that the legitimacy, which can be achieved by forming an IJV with 
another complementary organization, may act as the key to open the doors for 
companies to enter into other relationships which help them gain access to 
critical resources and expertise.
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Institutional arrangements can create both barriers and opportunities for 
strategic investors. The relative proximity of countries across institutional 
dimensions impacts IJV investors’ decision on "where" and "what" to operate 
abroad (Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008). Also, the greater institutional 
differences are between home and host country, the more difficult integration, 
legitimacy and performance become for foreign investors (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999). With few notable exceptions, the impact of institutional differences on 
partner selection has received relative little attention. Hitt et al. (2000) proposed 
different explanations for firms from developed and developing nations based on 
their institutional characteristics. Similarly, Hitt et al. (2004) contrasted 
institutional characteristics underlying strategic decisions of Chinese mangers 
from those of their Russian counterparts. Furthermore, Roy and Oliver (2009) 
presented the impact of the legal environment (rule of law and control of 
corruption) of host countries on partner selection in the IJVs of Canadian 
multinational companies (MNCs).
However, institutional theory has not escaped the criticism from Barringer 
and Harrison (2000), who argued that institutional theory is a narrow, 
behaviourally oriented paradigm. Although it provides a general aim or direction 
for establishing an alliance, it does not provide specific enough details for the 
creation of a strategy on its own. Lowensberg (2010) pointed out that institutional 
theory might also only contribute to the formulation of appropriate alliance 
objectives through the interplay with other paradigms
2.4.8 Interpersonal Psychology Theory (IPT)
Besides economic and organizational theories, another theory-driven
approach, the interpersonal psychology theory, has increasingly been studied as
a driving factor behind partner selection. The research findings of Varis and
Conn (2002) showed that many factors from social psychology, such as trust,
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reputations, personal chemistry, history and interpersonal affinity might be 
playing a great role in partner selection. Kanter (1994) approached the partner 
selection process in greater details from three fundamental social psychology 
factors: “1) Self-analysis -  relationships benefit when the partners know 
themselves; 2) Chemistry -  deals often turn on the rapport between chief 
executives, and it is equally important that the managers in the lower levels get 
along; and 3) Compatibility -  companies' cultures, philosophies and fundamental 
ways of doing business tested by the courtship process” Kanter (1994: P91).
As Saxton (1997) showed, IJV partners which had prior relationships may 
understand one another in a better way, which may lead to less potential for 
conflicts during the alliance and may increase the probability of a successful 
alliance. Moreover, Al-Khalifa and Peteson (1998) found out that the critical 
factors for IJV partner selection criteria are related to the reputation, experience 
and personal knowledge of the partner organizations, as well as to some of the 
personal characteristics of their Chief Executive Officers (CEO). Several studies 
have also been carried out to show that trust between partners is widely viewed 
as a precondition for successful long-term collaboration between firms 
(Browning et al., 1995; Gulati, 1995; Madhok, 1995; Lane and Bachmann, 1998; 
Cullen, Johnson and Sakano, 2000). It has been argued that IJV partners have 
more confidence in each other and the probability of opportunism decreases, 
when trust among partners is high. However, some scholars also pointed out 
that too much emphasis placed on the trustworthiness of a partner may lead 
foreign investors to form an alliance before a rationale for strategic fit is 
developed. Bierly III and Gallagher (2007) noted that IJVs will have a high 
possibility of falling apart, when the rationale for strategic fit is forced, not 
thoroughly analysed.
In summary, this section (2.3) has identified eight applicable and 
explanatory organizational theories, which offer a valuable source of theoretical
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underpinnings for exploring and investigating research within the range of IJV 
partner selection. Each of the eight theoretical paradigms provides a unique 
perspective on partner selection in an IJV formation process. Although they are 
all limited in certain ways, Barringer and Harrison (2000) argued that blending a 
mix of economic and behavioural paradigms together may provide a more useful 
method for understanding such a complex process. Also the combination of 
multiple approaches might prove to be a more robust foundation upon which 
managers can select IJV partners (Varis and Conn, 2002). However, 
Lowensberg (2010) suggested that not all those theories are necessarily applied 
to every IJV scenario.
2.5 Criteria-oriented IJV partner selection research
Grounded on those above eight paradigms, which have provided a 
theoretical foundation for explaining the phenomenon of IJV partner selection 
from different angles, past IJV partner selection research has inspired an 
important research area which specifically focuses on the criteria of partner 
selection, which may be used to guide the evaluation and selection of a right IJV 
partner when establishing an IJV. Although early studies seem to agree about 
the importance of partner selection, few past academic research have attempted 
to analyse which specific criteria can predict a good partner fit or the relative 
importance of these criteria.
Varis and Conn (2002) claimed that two series of past studies can be 
identified relating to partner selection criteria. The first series of studies before 
Geringer’s cutting edge paper in 1988 are limited to providing unordered lists of 
partner selection criteria with little measure of frequency or importance of criteria, 
while the later series of research, based on Geringer’s (1988) typology, are 
presented with ordered lists of contextually contingent criteria. These may 
clearly guide what a firm may look for in their potential partner candidates.
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The literature before the 1970s seems too simplistic to explain partner 
selection criteria and the study by Tomlinson (1970) is unanimously regarded as 
the first study in this coherent stream of IJV literature. Tomlinson (1970) grouped 
IJV selection criteria into six categories, among which “favourable past 
association” was the most important criterion and “local identity” was the least 
significant. The majority of joint ventures were identified based on prior 
association or relationships with past customers or suppliers. Four other 
categories, “resources'”, “facilities", “partner status" and “forced choice" were 
regarded as being roughly equal. His paper also examined eight specific 
contextual variables in order to identify certain factors affecting the 
characteristics that a company may look for in their potential IJV partner 
candidates. Those groups of variables representing the most powerful affinity 
with selection criteria were parent size, the stated motives behind IJV formation 
and nature of business, such as chemicals, oil, engineering, electricals, vehicles, 
metals and tobacco/food. Tomlinson's study can be seen as a useful general 
base for further research, however, Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) put doubt on 
the methodology of Tomlinson's (1970) research by arguing that the results may 
not be accurate, because the information was received from those workers, who 
had never been directly involved in the partner selection process. Furthermore, 
another drawback of his research is that some of the IJV cases in his research 
had been established more than 20 years before he interviewed his informants.
During the 70s and early-to-mid 80s, there were some prominent studies, 
which offered further insights to what companies may seek for regarding their 
potential partners by introducing relevant selection criteria. Daniel's (1971) study 
on manufacturing IJVs in the USA made a limited investigation of investment 
through IJVs and concluded that firms should look for partners of similar sizes, 
which would then be set in relatively equal positions of bargaining strength. 
Moreover, Renforth (1974) rated eleven possible criteria, which might be used 
for selecting foreign IJV partners, in order to examine whether the process of IJV
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formation between American multinational corporations and local family or 
non-family firms in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago behaved differently. In his 
study, the only contextual variable was the family variable and he did not expand 
upon any other contextual variable that might have a bearing on the ranking of 
specific partner selection criteria. Furthermore, Adler and Hlavacek (1976) listed 
typical criteria, such as distribution system, technology improvement, or 
complementarities, which were used in the context of product innovation of IJVs 
between large and small firms. However, the listing was unordered and gave no 
indication of the criteria's relative importance or frequency of use. Tomlinson and 
Thompson (1977) undertook a further study, which dealt with firms in Canada 
and Mexico and suggested that organizations from markets at different stages of 
development might enter into alliances for different reasons, and also use 
different selection criteria.
However, one of the limitations of their study was that it did not analyse 
how often or how earnestly certain partner characteristics were looked for by 
either sides or any particular variables which might have a bearing on the criteria 
used (Al-Khalifa and Peteson, 1998). Further, the research of Tomlinson and 
Thompson (1977) related to hypothetical IJVs, which might be established in the 
future, but it did not examine actually implemented IJVs.
In his examination of 40 manufacturing IJVs in the US, Awadzi (1987) 
claimed that a positive relationship exists between IJV performance and four 
selection criteria including: complementary resources contributions, past 
association between partners, links between businesses and relatedness of 
foreign partners' and IJVs business. However, one of the major drawbacks to 
this study is that Awadzi neither identified differences in priority among different 
resource contributions or contextual variables, which might influence these 
priorities, nor specifically stated what contributions would be acceptable as 
complementary resources.
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Having surveyed previous studies during the 70s and early-to-mid 80s, 
Geringer (1988) noted that existing research does demonstrate that partner 
selection is a critical variable in the formation and operation of IJVs and past 
studies further show that the mix of skills and resources, operating policies and 
procedures and overall competitive viability of an IJV is partly determined by the 
partner selected. However, Geringer (1988) appeared to have noticed the 
shortcomings of these previous studies by arguing that success has been limited 
in identifying the relative importance of the various selection criteria used by 
companies or in finding out those variables which might explain why or how the 
importance of criteria can be expected to vary among IJVs. Rumpunen (2011) 
also summarized that existing research of joint ventures before Geringer’s 
typology lacks of a soundly based and systematic handling of partner selection 
criteria. Geringer’s (1988,1991) own contributions by developing a coherent and 
sharply-defined typology of partner selection criteria and offering a 
methodologically defensible study of selection criteria, may be regarded as the 
milestone of IJV partner selection research. Based on a total of 27 different 
criteria identified in his study of US-based IJVs, Geringer (1988, 1991) 
suggested that despite the almost unlimited range of alternative partner 
selection criteria that might exist, a simple yet thorough two-fold typology of 
partner selection criteria can be developed: task-related (operation-related) and 
partner-related (cooperation-related). This typology has since proven “specific 
enough to provide meaning and give order to lists of selection criteria, whilst also 
being general and flexible enough to avoid long meaningless lists of 
context-irrelevant selection criteria” (Varis and Conn 2002, p.11).
According to Geringer’s (1988) study, many of the researched firms at the 
first stage of partner selection emphasized initial screening based on 
task-related selection criteria, associated with the operational skills and 
resources which a venture requires for its competitive success, such as patents, 
financial resources, technical know-how, experienced managerial personnel and
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access to marketing and distribution channels. Tatoglu and Glaister (2000, p. 60) 
argued that “the prospective local partners have to satisfy these task-related 
criteria first, and then they will be upgraded to the second stage where 
prospective local partners have to fulfil partner-related expectations, which 
describe the potential partners' capabilities or complementary abilities. Those 
abilities impact the efficiency and effectiveness of a cooperation between the 
firms, such as the national or corporate culture of a partner, compatibility or trust 
between the partners' management teams, the degree of favourable past 
association between the partners, partners’ size or corporate structure, 
combined with the quality of production facilities and personnel.”
Another critical contribution by Geringer (1988) was the identification and 
estimation of the correlations of the major variables which influence the relative 
importance of some of the selection criteria (Glaister and Buckley 1997). 
Although Geringer (1991) did succeed in creating a useful typology of 
categorized partner selection criteria, his study merely considers task-related 
criteria in empirical studies, while recognizing the importance of both 
task-related and partner-related criteria in the partner selection process.
Luo (1997, p.650) claimed that “an IJV partner with superior strategic 
traits but lacking strong organizational characteristics can make the joint venture 
unstable. On the contrary, the possession of desirable organizational attributes 
without corresponding strategic competence leaves the joint venture 
unprofitable”. Therefore, both operation-related criteria (strategic traits of 
partners) and cooperation-related criteria (organizational traits) are critical for 
IJV performance. In the recent research of Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999), 
partner-related factors are considered as being more important than task-related 
factors with regard to IJVs, because partner-related criteria are more related to 
strategic fit between partners. This argument has been supported by Roy and 
Oliver (2009), who contended that executives' appropriation concerns
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(originated from perceived contracting obstacles and pervasive behavioural 
uncertainty) and coordination cost concerns (derived from the anticipated 
interdependence with another firm) will play a significant role in determining 
partner-related criteria, but will not be expected to exert a significant influence on 
task-related criteria. According to Varis and Conn (2002), subsequent studies 
have mostly reiterated the partner-related nature of criteria - often under the title 
of “fit” - and failed to establish a meaningful method of organizing task-related 
criteria, which are often cited as being unique to every situation.
In the later studies based on Geringer’s (1988, 1991) research, similar 
categorizations of the task- and partner-related selection criteria have been 
applied with modifications by five works regarding IJV partner selection criteria 
(Glaister, 1996; Ah no et al., 1997; Glaister and Buckley, 1997; Tatoglu and 
Glaister, 2002; and Nielsen, 2003). These studies have confirmed both the 
pragmatic value and academic popularity of Geringer’s (1991) research. 
Appendix K (Roy and Oliver, 2009, P800) provided a summary of those 
categorizations, however, these five studies used slightly different definitions of 
task-related and partner-related criteria in comparison to the original definitions, 
making the comparison of results more difficult (Rumpunen, 2011).
Luo (1998) extended Geringer’s (1988) typology by adding a third category 
of criteria measuring the financial fit (financial traits) of IJV partners (Yan and Luo,
2001). Moreover, by identifying the serious shortage of customer factors in the 
partner selection studies. Pan (2010) proposed customer-related factors as 
additional and critical factors beyond conventional task and partner factors, 
because considering customer-related factors well in advance in the partner 
seeking stage may not only guarantee a market-oriented subsidiary, but also a 
highly motivated team leading to better IJV performance (Kirca et al., 2005). 
Zutshi and Tan (2008) further found out that Geringer’s “partner-related” criteria 
were actually composed of two independent factors. One set of criteria reflected
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cultural distance (national and organizational), while the other set was 
concerned with commitment and trust. Das and He (2006) concluded that criteria 
under each category differ between studies, and some task-related items in one 
study became partner-related in another. For example, reputation, financial 
resources and marketing system, were task-related criteria in the work of 
Geringer (1991), but became partner-related in Glaister's (1996) research. 
Another example adding confusion is that “distribution channels” was a 
task-related criterion (Glaister, 1996, p. 17), while “established marketing and 
distribution system” was partner-related (Glaister, 1996, p. 21) in the same study.
Despite a respectable amount of traditional IJV partner selection literature 
based on Geringer’s (1988) typology, providing valuable contributions towards 
an improved understanding of the partner selection process and how companies 
proceed in selecting partners, critics attack four aspects of prior studies on IJV 
partner selection criteria. Firstly, due to lack of clarity and solid empirical 
evidence, the past literature has failed to identify and agree on a comprehensive 
list of the criteria (Nielsen, 2003). Most of the prior studies have used 
quantitative methods to identify an appropriate partner, but Rumpunen (2011) 
argued that there is no evidence of such systems being operationalized. 
Secondly, a vast majority of partner selection studies has focused on the 
selection criteria from the point of view of either the foreign partner or the local 
partner. Although Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) differed from the others by 
analysing the views of both the foreign and the local partner, little research has 
been conducted to compare the criteria from the views of both parties. Thirdly, 
the traditional IJV partner selection literature seldom considers the connection 
between partner identification and partner evaluation. Wong and Ellis (2002) 
argued that the performance of the eventual IJVs may be more affected by the 
identification process than the evaluation process. Lastly, the selection criteria 
originally identified by a company may be quite different from those that are 
applied in the end, if suitable top partner candidates are unavailable or unwilling
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to participate in the proposed IJVs (Geringer, 1988). This argument suggested 
that partner selection may be a recursive process involving modification of 
criteria and acquisition of further information and existing literature fails to 
consider potential partners' abilities to respond to contingencies (Rumpunen, 
2011). This critique has further been supported by Cummings and Holmberg 
(2012), who suggested that success or failure is more the result of motivated 
and technically competent managers “making it work”, than coherence between 
static pre-alliance criteria.
During the 90s and 2000s, various other criteria-based partner selection 
studies, which are not based on Geringer’s (1988) typology, have been explored 
and debated. Brouthers et al. (1995) presented a “4Cs” framework 
(complementary skills, cooperative cultures, compatible goals and 
commensurate levels of risk) to analyse the likely success of IJVs based on 
partner attributes. By contrast, Medcof (1997) grouped prior researched 
selection criteria into five pragmatic categories: 1) strategic fit, 2) alliance role 
capability, 3) operational compatibility, 4) commitment to the alliance and its 
strategic aims, 5) existence of appropriate control arrangements. In the study of 
Dacin et al. (1997), they explored 14 criteria for selecting IJV partners and 
suggested a long-term observation and sufficient understanding of the 
expectations of the partner to ensure the success of IJV formation. Furthermore, 
as Chang and Tsai (2000) showed, complementary resources, symmetrical 
position, and extension of social resources are necessary criteria for becoming a 
partner of an alliance. Consistent with this argument, Kim and Lee (2003) have 
the argument that partners of an alliance must have mutual trust and should be 
willing to share complementary resources to enhance the competitiveness of 
each other. Shah and Swaminathan (2008) also shed light on the partner 
selection criteria by arguing that trust, commitment, complementarity and value 
or financial payoffs play a vital role in IJV partner selection. Despite the 
enormous attention that these issues have received, and still do, in the current
37
debate regarding IJV partner selection criteria, the bulk of existing literature in 
this field seems to narrowly reveal non-generalizable in-use criteria appropriate 
to unique situations and neglect many links in the chain of reasoning and other 
falsifiable or reliable variables (Varis and Conn, 2002).
All in all, the right selection of local partners is critical to a cooperative 
relationship between partners, which not only improves structural 
complementarity and interdependence between partners (by task-related 
criteria), but also reinforces their social interactions and trust-based cooperation 
(by partner-related criteria) (Liang, 2008). Although criteria-based partner 
selection research has long been recognized in the extant literature, it can be 
argued that little significant progress has been made in IJV partner selection 
literature since Geringer’s (1991) typology, which has become a regular feature 
of the alliance partner selection literature and continues to shape current 
research.
2.6 Context Effects on IJV Partner Selection Criteria
Prior studies provide valuable insights on which criteria firms apply when 
selecting IJV partners. However, partner selection criteria are largely case 
specific (Varis and Conn, 2002) and partner selection does not take place within 
an organizational vacuum (Hitt et al., 2000). Pan (2010) claimed that the extant 
literature has not been able to identify and agree on a comprehensive list of 
criteria used by companies for selecting partners for IJVs. He also stated that it is 
the complexity and dynamism of the political, economic and social factors, in 
which these IJVs and companies are embedded, that determines the relative 
importance of these generalizable, fairly specific, actionable partner selection 
criteria on a contingency basis. Therefore, another important stream of partner 
selection research, relating to the context effects on the selection criteria, has 
grown significantly in the past three decades. Tomlinson (1970) found out that
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parent firms of different sizes (larger and smaller), in different industries (e.g. oil, 
electricals, vehicles, tobacco/food), and with different reasons for entering into a 
joint venture, seem to use different partner selection criteria. Other contextual 
factors previously studied by various scholars have included Geringer’s (1988) 
“perceived task environment uncertainty” and “diversity of line functions”, Bailey 
et al.’s (1998) form of agreement, objectives of the project, type of collaborator, 
and the characteristics of the selecting company as well as “size and experience 
of the company and the education and experience of the CEO” in Al-Khalifa and 
Peterson’s (1999) research. Rumpunen (2011) categorized those contextual 
factors into four groups: strategic motivation, foreign-partner-specific, IJV 
location-specific and investment-specific factors. These were all seen to explain 
a substantial proportion of the observed variance in the relative importance of 
the selection criteria. Exhibit 2.2 illustrates previous research results regarding 
the impact of context factors on IJV partner selection.
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Exhibit 2.2: Pervious results concerning the impact of contextual factors on IJV partner 
selection
(Resource: adapted from Rumpunen, 2011)
Contextual factor
Results in previous studies
Strong effect on 
selection criteria
Moderate or limited effect on 
selection criteria
Motives for IJV formation Nielsen (2003) Glaister (1996), Tatoglu and Glaister 
(2000), Tomlinson (1970), Chen and 
Glaister (2005), Dong and Glaister 
(2006), Demirbag, Mirza & Weir (1995)
Foreign-partner-specific
factors
Firm size Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1998), Glaister 
and Buckley (1997), Tomlinson(1970)
Nationality of the foreign 
partner
Nielsen (2003) Buckley and Glaister (1997), Dacin 
(1997)
Operation characteristics 
(family/non-fam.owned)
Renforth (1974)
Prior int.alliance 
experience
Nielsen (2003)
Admin.gov.form of the 
alliance
Nielsen (2003)
International experience Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999)
IJV experience Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999)
Location-specific factors
Geographic location of the 
IJV
Buckley and Glaister (1997)
Host country legal 
environment
Roy (2006)
Industry of IJV Buckley and Glaister (1997)
Level of development of 
IJV host country
Hitt et al. (2000)
Investment-specific factors
Purpose of the IJV Buckley and Glaister (1997)
Initiation of the IJV Buckley and Glaister (1997)
Nature of business Tomlison (1970)
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2.6.1 Strategic Motivation Factors
Firstly, the criteria used for choosing a specific partner tend to vary 
extensively, depending on the specific strategic context of the venture and the 
parent firm. Moreover, particularly investment motivation is the most common 
research area of strategic context relating to IJV formation. In other words, both 
foreign and local partner companies should be able to identify what criteria to 
adopt in selecting partners according to their goal accomplishments (Luo, 1998). 
Koza and Lewin (2000) argued that one of the most common reasons for IJVs to 
fail is the lack of recognition of the close interplay between the overall strategy of 
the company and the role of an alliance in that strategy. Nielsen (2003) also 
highlighted that there is a strong relationship between motives and the relative 
importance of selection criteria. Also the companies may be expected to value 
the capabilities of a potential partner differently depending on the motives for the 
investment. As Overby (2005) has shown, the priority of motivations for forging 
alliances with other enterprises affects the relative weights set for the criteria 
when evaluating the suitability of candidate partners.
Ramachandran et al. (2011) summarized the IJV motives in three 
categories, including efficiency seeking, market seeking and knowledge seeking. 
When many efficiency-seeking companies seek to form IJVs to spread 
investment costs and risk, transfer production to low cost markets and increase 
economies of scale (Glaister and Buckley, 1996), the importance of selection 
criteria, such as access to raw materials, access to low-cost labour and realizing 
economies of scale, should be considered. In cases where many 
market-seeking companies plan to expand their operations in a new market and 
establish a presence in the foreign market primarily through the formation of an 
IJV (Luo and Park, 2001), such criteria as links to buyers and suppliers, 
business relatedness, and access to distribution channel are likely to be valued 
higher. In other knowledge-seeking IJVs, selection criteria such as
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product-specific knowledge, knowledge of local markets and culture are likely to 
be preferred. The relationship between motivation for alliance formation and 
selection criteria is supported by the research findings of Dong and Glaister 
(2006), suggesting that the task-related selection criteria are significantly more 
strongly determined by the strategic IJV motivations than the partner-related 
criteria.
Although the strategic context of IJV formation greatly influences partner 
selection criteria, due to the constraints of bounded rationality, Oyert and March
(1992) claimed that a company seeking for a fast entry into the target market 
might select the first identified strategically adequate partner, rather than invest 
time and resources in a comprehensive process of identification and evaluation 
of all potential partner candidates, which might fulfil the maximum number of 
desired criteria. This argument has been further supported by Bierly and 
Gallagher (2007), who suggested that top managers can only use a rational, 
analytical process to evaluate strategic fit among alternatives when they have 
access to all relevant information and are not under time constraints. On the 
contrary, when companies must make rapid decisions with limited information, 
the selection of potential partners is based on trust or strategic expediency, 
rather than as a result of conducting a rigorous analysis of their potential fit as 
alliance partners.
2.6.2 Foreign-partner-specific Factors
Secondly, the IJV partner selection criteria is also influenced by 
foreign-partner-specific factors, such as size, ownership structure and 
experience of the foreign partner, including experience on foreign direct 
investment (FDI), experience on forming IJVs, and target-country-specific 
experience of the foreign partner (Ramachandran et al., 2011). Al-Khalifa and 
Peterson (1999) contended that the ranking of various criteria for the selection of
42
IJV partners is not based so much on the strategic purposes or objectives of the 
proposed venture and the parent company, but on the corporate personalities of 
the partners. Regarding company size as a contextual variable to partner 
selection, Glaister and Buckley (1997) argued that smaller companies are 
obviously more likely to, for example, be more limited in financial and managerial 
resources, and be more motivated to reach economies of scale through the IJVs. 
Meanwhile, larger companies may be more strongly motivated to diversify their 
operations or to block competition, especially in saturated industries. As a 
contingency variable, relative partner size may also produce concerns relating to 
bounded rationality, which influences investors' perceptions of core or in-imitable 
resources. Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) noted that the importance of criteria 
relating to local standing, marketing and technological competence decreases 
according to the size of the company (measured by the number of employees). 
However, Rumpunen (2011) claimed that earlier studies offer very limited 
empirical evidence on the role of the size of the foreign partner regarding the 
relative importance of various selection criteria.
Ramachandran et al. (2011) argued that the ownership structure of an IJV 
partner in emerging economies influences IJV partner selection. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), by definition, owned by local, provincial, or central 
governments, often present unique environments for IJVs, because these 
enterprises often have a privileged status and are thus granted government 
financial subsidies and preferential lending rates. However, most research on 
IJVs has focused on privately owned enterprises (POEs) as partners (Miller et al,
2008). Despite obvious privileges held by some SOEs, they often have 
ambiguous goals which shift with changing political agendas and operating 
inefficiencies compared with privately owned firms (Vernon, 1981). On the other 
hand, Reuvid and Yong (2006) argued that a private enterprise partner is not 
disadvantaged by being in connection with the authorities and has the support 
and encouragement of local government up to the provincial level.
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In terms of experience of foreign partners, Mothe and Quelin (1998) stated 
that the experience gained from prior international alliances may influence 
subsequent international strategic decisions, because alliances are often viewed 
(from resource-based and organizational learning perspectives) as vehicles to 
acquire knowledge and learn new skills. Moreover, Al-Khalifa and Peterson 
(1999, p.96) also found that
“firms with no prior experience from prior international aiiiances 
may pay more attention to partner-related criteria associated 
with complementarities and partner fit, and may favour a 
partner with international experience, favourable reputation and 
ability to negotiate with foreign governments. In contrast, firms 
with experience in international strategic alliance activities firms 
may have overcome the initial problems pertaining to early 
states of internationalization (particularly in terms of 
partner-related criteria) and may place more emphasis on 
task-related criteria associated with technology development 
and local production (latter stages of internationalization)”.
However, Nielsen (2003) argued that the researching results of Al-Khalifa and 
Peterson (1999) should be treated with caution due to the moderate support for 
the hypotheses, which have been found from the studies.
2.6.3 Location-specific Factors
Thirdly, the importance of location-specific factors, such as cultural and 
geographic distance between home and host countries of the IJV partners, 
economic development level of the target industry, country and institutional 
settings, may also be viewed to have an influence on the relative importance of 
various selection criteria (Dong and Glaister, 2006; Hitt et al., 2000). In previous
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studies, Hitt et al. (2000) found out that developed market companies tried to 
leverage their resources to gain competitive advantages by searching for 
partners with unique competencies, local market knowledge and access, 
whereas firms from emerging markets were looking for partners with financial 
capabilities. Among other studies, findings by Glaister and Buckley (1997) 
indicated that the relative importance of partner-related criteria differed at 
different levels of distance, but no variation was found for the relative importance 
of task-related criteria regarding distance. Buckley and Glaister (1997) also 
suggested that the relative importance of partner-selection criteria will depend 
on the nature of the industry of the joint venture and on the respective industries 
of the venture partners. They further offered an example by arguing that the set 
of selection criteria relevant to companies in the manufacturing sector may differ 
from the selection criteria considered to be important in the tertiary sector.
Corporate and national culture has been found to influence the partner 
selection, the complementarity between partners and partners' abilities to work 
together (Swierczek, 1994). It has been argued that various features of culture 
might affect the development of joint ventures. In their research, Swierczek and 
Hirsch (1994) concluded that it is important that future partners understand the 
impact of differences in culture before they begin to establish joint ventures. 
They also added that IJVs are often characterized by problems of 
misunderstanding and limited effectiveness, because of the lack of compatibility 
of the cultures represented in the joint ventures. Moreover, Beamish and Inkpen 
(1995) argued that the life cycles of many manufacturing IJVs are short, because 
many foreign investors are unable to understand the local culture, economy and 
politics.
Being one of the most critical location-specific factors, the institutional 
arrangements, as reflected in government legislation, the nature of property 
rights and the presence or absence of professional and commercial norms of
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behaviour, have been found to be particularly important drivers of strategic 
choices (Brouthers and Nakos, 1998; Delios and Henisz, 2003). Institutional 
arrangements can produce entry barriers or create opportunities for IJV actions. i 
Of the various institutions which exist within the host-country institutional 
environment, rule of law and control of corruption appear to be particularly 
important elements of influencing IJV partner selection criteria. Therefore, Delios 
and Henisz (2003) argued that foreign investors must adapt their strategies 
accordingly.
2.6.4 Investment-specific Factors
Lastly, although previous studies help to shed light on the relative 
importance of partner selection criteria in specific contexts, such as motivation, 
nature of partner and type of market, they provide only limited evidence as to 
how these criteria may differ with key characteristics of the IJV sample. 
Investment-specific factors, such as related ness of the operation and the 
initiation for the IJV partnership, are applied to the specific IJV project type, 
rather than the location and environment, or traits of a specific parent in the IJVs 
(Rumpunen, 2011). Shah and Swaminathan (2008) suggested that the criteria 
managers use in selecting IJV partners will vary by specific characteristics of IJV 
projects. However, the analysis of the influence of various investment-specific 
factors on partner selection has been very limited so far and earlier studies 
include fairly limited empirical results concerning the influence of 
investment-specific factors on partner selection.
According to Shah and Swaminathan (2008), an IJV can be classified to 
be either related or unrelated to the business of the present operation of the 
foreign partner. In a related IJV, the foreign partner, which has obtained previous 
knowledge and experience from the field, may pursue to expand towards a new 
geographic area, increase power and/or to block competition via the IJV. By
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contrast, in an unrelated IJV, the foreign partner, which lacks earlier knowledge 
or experience from the field, pursue to diversify in order to expand its product 
portfolio. Moreover, they also stated that differences in the importance of 
particular selection criteria are likely to exist between initiating and non-initiating 
partner companies, because partners are either proactive by making the initial 
proposal or reactive by reacting to the other partner’s approach in respect to the 
initiative for the IJV. However, the empirical results by Glaister and Buckley 
(1997) did not indicate to give support to this view, but argued that the relative 
importance of the selection criteria was virtually independent of which partner 
company initiated the IJV.
In the studies of Nielsen (2003), the distinction between a non-equity joint 
venture (NEJV) and an equity joint venture (EJV) should not be left out when 
investigating partner selection criteria for alliances, because companies forming 
EJVs may have used different selection criteria than companies establishing 
NEJVs. The underlying assumption is that there is a correlation between alliance 
form and resource commitment, because EJVs typically involve considerable 
financial investment and managerial time, and therefore are assumed to offer a 
longer-term commitment than NEJVs.
To sum up, prior studies have proved that it is impractical to identify a 
universal or exact list of partner selection criteria and their corresponding relative 
importance for all enterprises during the complex reality of IJV partner selection 
decision processes. Instead, the processes tend to be context-dependent with 
the constraints of bounded rationality and the scarcity of information, time and/or 
resources, the content of criteria, as well as their priority and weightings may 
vary with different kinds of contextual factors, such as the strategic contexts, 
firm-specific factors (e.g. the size and experience of the firm and its decision 
makers), location-specific factors (e.g. physical and cultural distance between 
the home and host countries, level of development) and investment-specific
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factors (e.g. initiator, form of investment) (Chen and Wu, 2008). To put it all into 
a nutshell, Chen and Wu (2008) concluded that the partner selection criteria 
should reflect the operational environment being investigated from the 
perspectives of motivation, nature of partner, type of market and characteristics 
of each IJV individually.
2.7 Process-oriented IJV Partner Selection Research
Although a great number of existing studies focuses on which criteria 
firms should apply when choosing IJV partners and the contextual factors 
affecting said criteria and their order of priority, little efforts have been made in 
studying the partner selection as a process. The decision-making process 
associated with selecting an alliance partner is complex and challenging, 
especially considering the high failure rate of IJVs (Bierly and Gallagher, 2007). 
Previous studies following the steps of Geringer (1988) have focused only on the 
evaluation of prospective IJV partners with a set of selection criteria, but have 
not represented the whole complexity of selection. It is often stressed in the 
literature that the process of partner selection forms its own decision making 
entity within the whole process of IJV formation (Tomlinson, 1970; Geringer, 
1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1997). Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) supported 
Tomlinson's (1970) original statements by arguing that establishing an IJV and 
selecting an IJV partner are two separate decision processes. However, some 
scholars argue that the process of partner selection is not a universally 
independent decision making process and it involves a linear path: identifying, 
screening, evaluating, and finally selecting partners (Geringer, 1988, 1991).
As identified by Young et al. (1989), the process of partner selection 
involves the following four stages: 1) drawing a profile of the desired partner 
attributes; 2) identification and screening of potential partner candidates; 3) 
preliminary contacts and negotiations; and 4) final selection. However, the
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authors did not present empirical evidence or thorough argumentation to back 
up the process description. Duisters et al. (2011) presented a synthesis of 
previous partnering models, ending up with 16 possible stages (Exhibit 2.3) in 
the partner selection process.
Exhibit 2.3:16 possible stages in formal, structured partner selection process 
(Resource: Duisters et ai., 2011)
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Furthermore, it can be concluded that certain stages (developing a partner 
selection team, negotiating the alliance with the prospected partner, screening of 
short-listed candidates against specific selection criteria) are most critical with
49
regard to a successful alliance after examining empirical evidence. Their 
quantitative results also suggested that successful companies applied a more 
structured approach to the partner selection process compared to lower 
performers. Bivainis (2006) presented another integrative approach to business 
partner selection, aimed at increasing economic validity of decision-making. The 
proposed model, consisting of six interrelated components of different contents 
(searching for partners, their preliminary selection, complex assessment, 
negotiating with potential partners, signing of contracts, and monitoring of 
contract implementation) covers the overall cycle of business partner selection. 
Wiliams and Lilley (1993) took Geringer’s criteria for partner selection and 
placed them in chronological order within the general process of partner 
selection. Although their research admitted that certain criteria will be more 
important to some companies than others, the model listed in Exhibit 5 does 
offer a framework for what and when nine perspectives of selection criteria 
should be taken into account by any company before an IJV partner is selected. 
Although both partner identification and negotiation have been identified by the 
above studies as critical stages of a general partner selection process, few 
attempts have been made in these two areas of partner selection research.
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Exhibit 2.4: Partner selection process 
(Resource: Williams and Lilley, 1993)
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According to Williams and Lilley (1993), a foreign investor can only start 
to choose partners after, firstly, deciding that an IJV/ISA is desirable and then, 
identifying a number of potential partners. It can be assumed that the efficacy of 
the evaluation process is contingent upon the prior identification process. If 
partner identification is conducted in an ad hoc and unsystematic fashion, there 
is little justification for a comprehensive screening. Furthermore, if the potential 
partner identified is familiar to the evaluating company, there might be less need 
for a thorough evaluation; in either case, the performance of the eventual IJV 
may be more affected by the identification process than the evaluation process 
(Wong and Ellis, 2002). Traditional research on partner selection follows a linear 
process, whereby a large number of candidates are systematically screened via 
market research. However, Wong and Ellis (2002) found out that few companies 
employ formal search procedures in practice and most of foreign investors try to 
identify partners by heavily leaning on existing social networks, which are 
defined in terms of business, familial and friendship ties. Killing (1988) stated 
that one of the first questions to be addressed in IJV partner selection is whether 
or not firms that have spent more time and effort in the search process do in fact 
end up with more “suitable” partners.
Another overlooked stream of process-oriented IJV partner selection 
research is related to the relationship between partner selection and IJV 
negotiation process. Munroe et al. (2004) defined IJV negotiation as the key to 
resolving conflicts, allocating resources and establishing cooperation in systems 
of self-interested agents. Faure (2000: PI 67) argued that “although nowadays 
quite widespread, negotiating joint ventures has received only limited attention 
from researchers partially because of the difficulty in capturing such a complex 
organizational phenomenon from a methodological point of view”. Dupont (1994) 
identified two basic types of joint venture negotiations, which include being 
cooperative and long-term oriented, as well as being competitive and short-term 
focused. However, his study did not consider the external structures of the
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complex negotiation reality. Based on field observations made in China, Faure 
(2000) argued that understanding the complex negotiation processes will help 
the observer to size up the difficulties of negotiation, explain them, and make a 
diagnosis in case of deadlocks, even of a break off. However, Faure (2000: 
P166) admitted that “taking into account the scarcity of Chinese feedback and its 
tenuous character, the negotiation in its moments of protracted stillness may 
become a riddle to be solved”. Although many scholars, such as Munroe et al. 
(2004), claimed that poor selection of partners can result in failure or in 
inefficient outcomes of IJV negotiation, the relationship between partner 
selection criteria and IJV negotiation processes/outcomes is far less in the focus 
of the current debate of IJV partner selection research.
To summarize, general IJV partner selection is a complicated 
decision-making process, which can be broken down to four stages: partner 
search and identification, partner evaluation process, negotiations with potential 
partners, and selecting the IJV partners. Previous research in the area of 
IJV/ISA partner selection has generally focused on the step of partner evaluation 
and neglected the research area regarding both partner identification and 
subsequent negotiation processes. It can be argued that understanding the 
whole four steps of partner selection, and the connections among those stages 
may offer foreign investors a full picture of how to select the right partners for IJV 
projects.
2.8 IJV Partner Selection Criteria in China
When forming IJVs, selecting the right partner is of paramount importance, 
but it becomes more critical in IJVs between firms based in different countries. 
The overall failure rates of strategic alliances have been reported to be quite 
high and they are even higher for alliances between firms with home bases in 
different countries (Hennart and Zeng, 1997). Anderson and Paine (1975)
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asserted that companies of different national origin (and different types of 
business) will put different weight upon different partner selection criteria, 
because a significant amount of economic action is embedded in cognitive, 
cultural, structural and political factors that shape company's behaviour (Zukin 
and DiMaggio, 1990). Although the important impact of national origin on partner 
selection criteria has long been recognized by scholars, few attempts have been 
made to analyse the difference between partner selection criteria used in 
developed countries and those adopted in newly emerging economies, such as 
China.
2.8.1 Partner Selection in Emerging Economies
The literature indicates that much prior work on alliance partner selection 
examined the selection decisions made by foreign entrants, commonly from 
developed nations (Geringer, 1988). Disappointingly, very little research has 
been carried out in the context of emerging economies. Business opportunities 
in newly emerging economies are both promising and challenging. These rapidly 
expanding economies, characterized by an exploding demand previously stifled 
by ideologically-based government interventions, provide tremendous business 
opportunities which foreign investors can pre-empt (Luo, 1997). However, Nee 
(1992) argued that foreign investors face the challenges of structural reform in 
such economies, combined with a weak market structure, poorly specified 
property rights, higher barriers and institutional uncertainty. The more promising 
the industry appears, the more restrictions or interventions the host government 
is likely to impose (Shenkar, 1990). Even where some economic sectors have 
been decentralized and privatized, governments still hinder industrial and 
structural market adjustments in those newly emerging economies. It has been 
argued that foreign investors participating in such economies need to collaborate 
with local partners in order to facilitate market access, improve government 
relations, achieve political advantages, acquire culture specific knowledge and
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gain access to, or secure at a low cost, locally-scarce production factors, such 
as labour force, capital or land (Kobrin, 1982; Beamish, 1987). Moreover, host 
governments also pressure foreign investors to enter joint ventures in restricted 
industries, such as the defence industry, telecommunications and parts of the 
financial services industry (Mariti and Smiley, 1983).
Child and Faulkner (1998, p.297) stated that “when one of the partners 
comes from an emerging country and the other from a highly developed 
economy, their configuration of objectives will almost certainly differ from that in 
the case of partners from two developed countries". In their study of partner 
selection criteria used in specific market contexts (emerging versus developed), 
Hitt et al. (2000) suggested that variations in partner selection criteria used by 
developed countries (Canada, France and USA) and emerging markets (Mexico, 
Poland and Romania) executives are likely to occur based on differences in 
norms, resources and infrastructures, leading to important differences in partner 
preferences. Hitt et al. (2000) also found out that emerging market firms tend to 
emphasize financial and technological assets, quality and willingness to share 
expertise, while developed market firms tend to seek unique competencies, 
market access, learning opportunities, attractive industries and cost advantages. 
Although Hitt et al.’s findings were supportive of both organizational learning and 
resource-based explanations for alliance formation, the main limitation is that 
their research has focused on strategic alliances in general and failed to 
examine how partner selection criteria might vary with different types of strategic 
alliances.
Another study seeking to show that different criteria are used by 
organizations of different cultural backgrounds was conducted by Dacin et al. 
(1997). They identified that US and Korean managers share similar motives for 
entering alliances, while having different perceptions on how these agreements 
will benefit them. An unspecified number of executives from organizations in
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each country were asked to rank 14 selection criteria. The top five Korean 
criteria were: 1) technical capabilities, 2) industry attractiveness, 3) special skills 
that you can learn from the partner, 4) willingness to share expertise, and 5) 
capabilities to provide quality products or services. While the top five US criteria 
were: 1) financial assets, 2) managerial capabilities, 3) capabilities to provide 
quality products or services, 4) complementarity of capabilities, and 5) unique 
competencies. Dacin et al. (1997) also suggested that a number of US and 
Korean firms may have desirable resource profiles for alliance partners, but 
those different criteria that each culture seeks will make locating suitable 
partners time-consuming and problematic. They further concluded that 
organizations should be aware of both their own desired criteria and those, 
which other organizations will be seeking.
Furthermore, Tatoglu (2000) explored partner and task-related criteria 
reported by Western firms seeking IJVs with Turkish partners. Key 
partner-related selection criteria were trust between the top management teams 
and the good reputation of the potential partner. Whilst key task-related selection 
criteria were potential partners’ knowledge of the local market, access to 
distribution channels and familiarity with the local culture. Tatoglu’s (2000) 
research was one of the few studies to examine the strategic motives and 
partner selection criteria for IJV formation from the perspectives of foreign 
investors from advanced industrial economies and local partners from a 
developing market economy. He suggested that a comparative analysis of IJV 
cases from the Middle East and the Far Eastern countries are needed to offer a 
better understanding of this research area.
Additionally, Li and Ferreira (2008) focused on firms’ preferences to select 
prior partners for IJVs in developing countries, finding that the technological 
commitment is a major predictor for selecting prior partners. Also the institutional 
distance between home and host country increases the likelihood for selecting
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prior partners. However, their studies only focused on the tendency of selecting 
prior partners, but neglected other aspects of the partner selection process. 
Overall, various existing academic approaches have been proposed to examine 
IJV partner selection in newly developing countries, but few studies have shed 
light on IJV partner selection criteria in China, especially from the perspectives of 
foreign investors.
2.8.2 IJV Partner Selection in China
China is one of the fast-developing emerging markets in the world, where 
risks and uncertainties are unavoidable (Brewer and Rivoli, 1990; Cosset and 
Roy, 1991; Sethi and Luther, 1986). Partner selection in China has never been 
easy, but the empirical research on partner selection in China is relatively limited. 
Glaister and Wang (1993) examined partner selection decision makings of UK 
firms in China. They found out that local Chinese partners usually provide IJVs 
with complementary capabilities, which are otherwise difficult to obtain by the UK 
firms alone. When selecting local Chinese partners for IJVs established by 
UK-based companies in China, Glaister and Wang (1993) stated that the ability 
to negotiate with the host government, relatedness of business, trust between 
top management and financial status/resources of partner were the most 
weighed criteria. Among these, the ability to negotiate with the host government 
was found to be the most dominant factor. Despite the apparent lack of suitable 
candidates to choose from when forming IJVs in China, most UK partners in 
Glaister and Wang’s (1993) studies believed that UK investors ended up with the 
right partners after attempting a fairly rigorous analysis of the IJV options. 
Moreover, based on examining aspects of partner selection criteria for IJV 
formation from the perspective of Chinese partners, Dong and Glaister (2006) 
argued that the task-related selection criteria are more determined by the 
strategic motives for ISA formation than the partner-related selection criteria are. 
However, in order to better understand the reciprocal dependencies of IJVs, the
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research findings might have been more interesting if the task-related and 
partner-related selection criteria of both partners would have been examined in 
this study. Another important study has been conducted by Wang and Kess 
(2006) by focusing on the partner selection decisions made by Chinese and 
Finnish companies. They detected that task-related criteria relating to partner 
selection were more important for Finnish manufacturers, while partner-related 
criteria were more important for Chinese firms seeking partnerships with 
Western firms. However, the study focused on strategic alliances between the 
Finnish manufacturers and Chinese distributors and agents, rather than joint 
venture experience.
The first systematic study on how to select Chinese IJV partners was 
carried out in 1997 by Luo, who stressed the importance of organizations' 
abilities to absorb partnering experience on strategic fit, with an examination of 
local firms engaged in manufacturing IJVs in China. The primary findings 
suggest that the attributes of local Chinese partners, such as market share, 
foreign experience and past collaboration with the foreign partner are critical to 
the successful performance of IJVs. With a lack of empirical evidence for support, 
Luo’s further study in 1998 illuminated three categories of various partner 
selection criteria from the perspective of foreign investors: strategic 
(operation-related), organizational (cooperation-related), and financial (cash 
flow-related) criteria. These are important to the survival and growth of foreign 
companies active in China. He suggested that every category of local partner 
attributes is important to foreign companies who seek profitability, stability and 
sustainability in a dynamic host market, but those three categories may not all 
necessarily be important to Chinese firms, given their substantially different 
rationales and needs. Luo (2002) also explored which attributes of foreign 
partners importantly affect Chinese business satisfaction with the performance 
of IJVs in China, based on the same categories of strategic, organizational, and 
financial criteria. He suggested that Chinese firms tend to select foreign partners
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based upon organizational learning considerations and the need to acquire 
knowledge from partner firms, rather than transaction cost concerns. Luo (1997) 
therefore argued that the criteria for selecting foreign partners by Chinese firms 
differed from selecting Chinese partners by foreign companies
It has been argued by Yan (2004) that foreign companies seeking to 
collaborate with Chinese companies must adapt to the Chinese “Guo Qing”, 
which means they must adapt to “national characteristics" or “a country's special 
circumstances". From the past studies of partner selection criteria in China, 
organizational form (ownership type) and “Guanxi" have been identified as two 
unique selection criteria within the Chinese “Guo Qing". Firstly, a Chinese 
partner’s organizational form, state-owned or non-state-owned (private or 
collective) company, influences not only its motivations for forming an IJV, but 
also its commitment and contribution to operations (Luo 1996), which in turn 
affects the IJV’s performance (Beamish 1987). Chinese SOEs are sometimes 
described as dying dinosaurs that continuously absorb resources from the 
economy, but produce little economic value. However, Xu (2010) argued that 
this impression is far from today’s reality. State-owned companies, led by the 
Communist Party in China account for more than 50 per cent of China's 
non-agricultural GDP and control the majority of shares of industrial output in the 
following industries: state-owned enterprises are controlling 61 per cent of the 
Chinese shipbuilding industry; 76.6 per cent of the petroleum and petrochemical 
industry; 92 per cent of the electrical power generating industry; 76 per cent of 
China's air transportation sector; 59 per cent of China's coal industry; 96 per cent 
of China's telecom services industry; 74 per cent of the country's automobile 
industry (McCormack, 2011).
State-owned organizations usually have an advantage over privately or 
collectively-owned firms in terms of not only gaining access to scarce resources, 
materials, capital, information and investment infrastructure (Perkins 1994), but
59
also with regard to industry experience, market power and production, 
innovation facilities and state-instituted distribution channels (Rawski, 1994; 
Child, 1994). However, privately or collectively-owned enterprises, typically 
operated and managed by entrepreneurs, have fewer principle-agent conflicts 
and greater strategic flexibility to opportunities in their environment (Nee, 1992). 
In addition, private and collective businesses are constrained by a "hard budget", 
forcing them to be more efficient and oriented towards profit (Rawski, 1994). It is 
reported that over 60 per cent of state-owned enterprises in China have shown a 
loss, whereas private or collective businesses have been showing continuous 
profit (Jefferson et al., 1992). Leadership in Chinese state-owned businesses is 
a fairly complicated issue, because top-level management positions are 
assigned by upper level government authorities and controlled by the communist 
party committee. Furthermore, Chinese state-owned companies can operate at 
three levels, local, provincial and central and thus can belong to different levels 
of governments. Tse et al. (1996, p. 144) argued that the higher the level of 
government involved, the more secure the ventures, because higher level 
governments have more authority in approving projects, interpreting government 
policies and exercising control.
The second “Guo Qing” is that foreign companies can gain an edge over 
their competitors in the Chinese market if they have a “Guanxi” network with the 
business community, such as suppliers, buyers, distributors and banks and 
government authorities such as political governments, industrial administration 
departments, foreign exchange administration bureaus, foreign trade and 
economics commissions, commercial administration bureaus and taxation 
departments) Park and Luo (2001). Network theory which has been studied by 
Western scholars has an Asian equivalent in the Chinese networking 
phenomena, called “Guanxi” (Wang, 2011). According to Hammond and Glenn 
(2004), Guanxi teaches a person or company to identify an outsider from a
collaborator and prescribes rules for dealing with each kind of person. According
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to So and Walker (2006), Guanxi is clearly recognized by Chinese people as a 
powerful aid to business and is widely acknowledged by non-Chinese 
businessmen and investors as something they must deal with when handling 
Chinese businesses. In reality. Western investors often lack the knowledge of 
non-market forces, such as government pressure (Bjorkman and Osland, 1998), 
but good joint-venture partners can complement this field. “Foreign firms have to 
understand and deal with a complex, often confusing web of government entities 
to ensure that their business operations are not adversely impacted by changes 
in government policies or bureaucratic whims" (Sanyal and Guvenli, 2001, p. 41). 
Osland and Cavusgil (1996) stated that US managers in China need to have a 
better recognition of the importance of understanding how the government 
functions and how they can influence government decisions. For example, 
having a local partner certainly enables foreign companies to develop close 
connections with government decision makers. However, So and Walker (2006) 
described that “Guanxi has been criticized as a form of nepotism: unfair, 
inefficient and in general detrimental to business and economic growth”.
2.8.3 Old China versus New China
Ever since the late 1970s, when the Chinese government adopted the 
Open Door Policy, which opened China up for foreign trade and direct 
investment, the Chinese market has become a general strategic objective for 
foreign investors. Entering one of the most complex and dynamic markets in the 
world, foreign investors need to carefully choose qualified joint-venture partners 
to build their capabilities and invest in a long-term strategic relationship 
(Cavusgil, 1997). Following the continuing opening up of the Chinese market 
under the accession to the WTO at the end of 2001, foreign investors might 
enjoy a simpler process of finding and selecting a suitable partner. This is 
because the steady deregulation of the industry and service sectors has
provided the opportunity for foreign investors to access and invest in business
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activities from which they were previously excluded. Furthermore, the 
proliferation of new commercial laws and regulations has removed some of the 
uncertainties, although adding to the complexity of setting up business 
operations and participating in IJVs with China (Reuvid and Yong, 2006).
However, the global financial crisis in 2008 has greatly impacted China’s 
manufacturing due to its strong dependence on export markets and 
consignment-based manufacturing. In order to maintain a sustainable economic 
growth, Chinese governments had to shift away from China’s 30-year old 
economic model of investment-intensive and export-propelled dynamism 
towards a new strategy draws increased support from internal private 
consumption from China’s 1.3 billion customers. China has entered a new era in 
recent years, especially after the just-enacted “China’s 12^  ^ Five-Year Plan” in 
2011. Yoost and Zwisler (2013) argued that the IJV entry model remains 
attractive to foreign investors under the “New China” environment, particularly as 
the costs of Greenfield investments rise and valuations remain elevated for 
acquisitions of Chinese targeted companies. Nevertheless, the existing literature 
has made limited efforts in studying IJV issues in the new era of China. The 
question of how to select the right IJV partners under such a new investment 
environment remains untouched.
To sum up, in a dynamic and complex environment, the importance of local 
partner selection regarding IJV success is magnified, because the right partner 
can spur an IJV’s adaptability, strategy-environment configuration and 
uncertainty reduction (Luo, 1997). Past research approaches, as presented 
above, have mainly focused on the comparison between partner selection 
criteria in developed countries and those in newly developing countries; 
However, with a few notable exceptions (Glaister and Wang, 2003; Dong and 
Glaister, 2006; Luo, 1997; 1998; 2002), there has been little discussion
regarding partner selection criteria in China, especially within the new era of
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China after the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008.
2.9 Conclusion and Research Gaps
In conclusion, Chapter 2, the theoretical part of this study, reviews the past 
literature regarding the phenomenon of international joint venture partner 
selection with differing approaches and unearths some research gaps which this 
thesis seeks to address. The selection of right IJV partners has become a 
popular topic during the last three decades, because partner choice may well be 
the key determinant of a subsequent success or failure of a joint venture. 
Despite that many prior studies providing theoretical propositions from different 
economic and social perspectives to explain the rationales behind the partner 
selection decision process, relatively little research effort has been devoted to 
the issue of partner selection within IJV formation (Roy, 2006; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1997; Nielsen, 2003).
Following the mainstream of IJV partner selection research in the vein of 
Geringer's (1988) typology, this chapter discussed the past literature with regard 
to how firms should evaluate and select their prospective partners based on 
task- and partner-related selection criteria. It is true that a number of significant 
studies have been done on how firms weigh the variety of partner selection 
criteria under the impact of four different types of situational or contextual factors, 
including the strategic context, foreign-partner-specific, location-specific and 
investment-specific factors. Yet, the previous literature has failed to identify and 
agree on a comprehensive list of partner selection criteria, reflecting the 
complexity and dynamism of the social and strategic context of the venture and 
the parent firm (Nielsen, 2003).
Among all the contextual factors, country environment issues, one of the 
IJV’s location-specific factors, is critical to understanding IJV strategy and the
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antecedents and outcomes of IJV partner selection, particularly in the context of 
emerging economies (Steensma et al., 2005), because foreign investors are 
more likely to face higher entry barriers and elevated uncertainty levels (Child, 
1994; Luo, 1997). Research findings from past studies, based on IJVs cases in 
developed countries, may not be adequate to explain partner selection issues in 
developing countries. Nielsen (2003) argued that research on how different 
sized firms in different cultural and economic contexts (i.e. industrialized 
countries versus emerging economies) rank the importance of partner selection 
criteria seems a fruitful avenue for future research. Although Hitt et al. (2000) 
compared partner selection in emerging countries (Mexico, Poland, Romania) 
and in developed countries (Canada, France, the United States), there is a 
paucity of literature that specifically addresses the partner selection criteria in 
China. The research conducted by Luo (1997) as an exception indicates three 
categories of partner selection criteria in China, namely, strategic, organizational, 
and financial traits. This is one of the few studies, which focus on what attributes 
of local partners are important to overall success of IJVs in China in the late 
1990s, when the Chinese economy focused on cheap, labour-intensive and 
export-led manufacturing (Old China) (Luo, 1998; Yan and Luo, 2001). However, 
China has developed into a new era of knowledge-oriented economic structure 
(New China) in recent years. Past empirical studies of how foreign investors 
should select Chinese local partners pay insufficient attention to dynamic 
changes of new Chinese conditions of the country environrnent (Research Gap 
1).
Moreover, it is very likely that IJV partner selection will vary with the 
industry of the alliance, particularly in light of the strong relationship between 
partner selection and motivation for alliance formation, as firms in different 
industries are likely to be driven by different strategic objectives (Nielsen, 2003). 
Observing this gap, Luo (1997), Hitt et al. (2004) and Glaister and Buckley (1997) 
contended that MNEs across industrial sectors differ tremendously regarding
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their partner selection criteria for IJV formation, and urge the examination of 
selection criteria within diverse industrial sectors. There has been very little 
existing literature examining IJVs in the HEM sector of China and even much 
less research systematically and specifically explaining how HEM investors 
select IJV partners in China. Given the growing importance of EDI in China’s 
HEM sector and its vital role in the technology-led economic growth of China, the 
lack of research on partner selection criteria in China’s HEM sector represents a 
critical knowledge gap in the literature (Research Gap 2).
Furthermore, since Geringer’s (1988) ground-breaking work on IJV partner 
selection, the majority of past research has been limited to a single mechanism 
of the partner selection process, the evaluation of prospective partner 
candidates. However, the partner selection process is considered by many 
scholars as a complex four-stage decision-making process, which constitutes 
partner search and identification, partner evaluation process, negotiations with 
potential partners, and selecting the IJV partners. There is an important 
oversight that empirical studies have not investigated the impact of partner 
selection criteria on the subsequent success of the IJV negotiation process 
towards signing contracts. Not all IJV negotiation processes end in a signed 
agreement, but rather break up with failed outcomes (Faure, 2012). Therefore, it 
can be argued that past research has paid little attention to how poor choice of 
IJV partners may lead to these failed negotiations or how the right selection of 
IJV partners will lead to successful outcomes of negotiation towards signing IJV 
contracts (Research Gap 3).
Another research gap also lies in that the majority of previous studies on 
partner selection criteria have adopted deductive and quantitative approaches to 
test the research hypotheses for weighting and rating selection criteria 
embedded in an IJV partner selection analysis. Survey and factor analysis have 
been normally adopted to identify appropriate partners. However, such a
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research methodology fails to provide the researcher with the rich details and 
deeper insights of IJV partner selection and fail to control the environment in 
which the respondents provide the answers to the questions in the survey 
(Research Gap 4).
In order to close the above extant research gaps in the IJV partner 
selection literature and provide answers to the research questions, this 
qualitative and inductive study aims to examine partner selection criteria used in 
the decision process by HEM firms from developed countries when choosing IJV 
partners in the new investment environment of China. It further aims to analyse 
how a right or poor choice of IJV partners influences the success of IJV 
negotiations towards the signing of contracts. The generation of research 
questions from the literature review essentially depicts the exploratory nature of 
this thesis, using a case study approach as its research procedure (Perry, 1994). 
The importance of this chapter lies in the fact that it has established a holistic 
conceptualisation of the IJV partner selection process, which offers a conceptual 
context for the following methodology chapter of this thesis.
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3 Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction
After reviewing the existing literature regarding IJV partner selection 
studies and identifying relevant research gaps in the previous chapter, this 
chapter aims to introduce and justify the choice of research methodology for this 
study, under the guidance of the “research onion" (Exhibit 3.1), as suggested by 
Saunders et al. (2008). It can be argued that the choice of research methodology 
depends on the research questions, recommendations identified within the 
literature review of IJV partner selection and according recommendations 
regarding the research methodology from the past literature (Exhibit 3.2). This 
chapter firstly discusses the reasons for the selection of the interpretivist 
paradigm, which underpins the designing of the research process (section 3.2). 
The chapter then continues with justifications of selecting a qualitative research 
design in section 3.3 and reasons for choosing an “inductive method” 
(theory-building) as the research approach in section 3.4. The question of why a 
case study research strategy is selected is analyzed in section 3.5, followed by 
reasons for conducting a longitudinal study (section 3.6). In addition, research 
procedures, including data collection methods (section 3.7) and data analysis 
strategies (section 3.8) are also presented. The chapter is then followed by 
evaluating the trustworthiness of this study (Section 3.9) and by considering the 
limitation of this research (Section 3.10). Finally, the issues of ethical 
considerations concerning the study are discussed in section 3.11. The key 
steps of selecting the research methodology for this study are outlined as a 
chapter summary in section 3.12.
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Exhibit 3.1 Research onion
(Resource: Saunders et al., 2009, P.108)
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Exhibit 3.2 Research methodology design
(Resource: present author)
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69
3.2 Reasons for Selecting the Interpretivist Paradigm
According to Johnson and Clark (2006), business and management 
researchers should be aware of the philosophical paradigm chosen before 
selecting a research strategy. That is because the paradigm has a significant 
impact not only on what is to be done, but also on how the topic investigated is 
understood. TerreBlanche and Durrheim (1999) defined the research paradigm 
as an all-encompassing system of interrelated practice and thinking, which can 
be characterised through its ontological assumptions (What is the nature of 
reality?), epistemological assumptions (What constitutes acceptable knowledge 
in a field of study?) and methodology (How to find knowledge and carry out 
research?) (Cuba, 1990). With different ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, five major paradigms exist in organizational science: positivism, 
realism (post-positivism), critical theory (transformative paradigm), interpretivism 
(constructivism), and pragmatism. Remenyi et al. (1998) argued that these 
philosophical schools of thought can help researchers to shape decisions 
regarding the choice of an appropriate methodology and related methods of data 
collection. The ontology, epistemology, methodology, and related data collection 
methods of each paradigm are presented in Exhibit 3.3. This section mainly 
discusses the interpretivist paradigm and suggests that it is more appropriate to 
underpin the designing of this research process than other paradigms.
Contrary to positivism, anti-positivist paradigms have a subjective 
ontological view on reality and advocate that the observer socially interacts with 
the situation being observed. The interpretivist researcher acts in the social and 
human world rather than observing it as a natural scientist. Interpretivism is 
inclined towards qualitative methods, such as interviews with informants, both 
participant and non-participant observations, and analysis of documentary 
evidence of all kinds (Gephart, 1999). The meanings behind the actions of the 
people under study can be revealed by these methods of data collection. Most
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scholars have defined interpretivism as a broad term, which includes 
constructivism and naturalistic inquiry. The major difference between 
constructivism and interpretivism is that constructivism sees the process of 
understanding as contributing to constructing the reality (Girod-seville and 
Véronique, 2001). Anti-positivist paradigms do not generally start with a theory 
(as post-positivism), but rather "generate or inductively develop a theory or 
pattern of meanings" (Creswell, 2003, p.9) from the data produced from the 
investigation of researcher (Cohen and Manion, 1985). Some authors (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979; Jackson and Carter, 1991) argued that a researcher must 
choose one of the paradigms and stick to it. However, others, who advocate a 
multi-paradigm approach, such as pragmatism (Gioia and Pitre 1990; Lewis and 
Grimes 1999; Weaver and Gioia, 1994; Schultz and Hatch, 1996), suggested 
that a dialogue between paradigms is possible and even desirable (Girod-seville 
and Véronique, 2001).
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Exhibit 3.3: Research paradigms and fundamental beliefs
(Resource: adapted from Saunders et al. (2009, pi 19) Cuba and Lincoln (2005))
Research Paradigms
Fundamental Positivism Postpositivism Interpretivism Pragmatism
Beliefs (Naïve realism) (Critical Realism) (Constructivism)
Ontology: the External, Objective. Exist Socially External,
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This research adopts only one paradigm, interpretivism, and the rationales 
of using it as the philosophical paradigm underpinning this study lie in the 
following several perspectives. Firstly, the ontological assumptions of 
interpretivism are that social reality is seen by multiple people and these 
interpret events differently, leaving multiple perspectives of an incident (Mack, 
2010). An interpretivist framework allows for an affirmation of the significance of 
the participants' knowledge. This research involves senior executives at different 
levels within partnering companies, and the interpretivist paradigm supports an 
understanding of the different perceptions of the IJV partner selection process. 
Secondly, the epistemological assumption of interpretivism is that knowledge is 
gathered from subjective meaning of a particular social situation (Gephart, 1999), 
and is not reducible to simplistic interpretation. The interpretivist paradigm allows 
for the complexities of the IJV partner selection process to be acknowledged and 
explored through the mental processes of subjective interpretation. Thirdly, IJV 
partner selection is a dynamic process or lived experience, rather than a static 
reality (Ghani, 2006). The interaction between the researcher and the research 
project constantly created, changed, modified and developed the subjective 
meanings. An interpretivist paradigm allows for this broader and deeper shared 
understanding through its embedded processes of reporting and discussion at 
all stages of the IJV partner selection process. Fourthly, from an interpretivist’s 
view, the research is value bound and the researcher’s own background and 
experiences are part of what is being researched and cannot be separated 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Verifying what actually exists in the social and human 
world depends on the researcher’s interpretation. The interpretivist paradigm 
helps the researcher in this study to understand, explain, and demystify the IJV 
partner selection process through personal experience from the IJV projects 
(Cohen et al., 2007). Sixthly, interpretivism also favors sustained interactions 
between the researcher and research informants (Frey, 1994). The researcher 
has spent almost three years with those senior executives involved in the IJV 
formation. The interpretivist paradigm is useful for making those senior
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executives feel comfortable with the researcher and potentially yield more 
truthful results during the interview process. Seventhly, the interpretivist 
paradigm also allows for a greater understanding of the contextual features 
influencing the research questions. It is the most fitting approach for 
understanding strategic, foreign-partner-specific, location-specific, and 
investment-specific contexts of the IJV partner selection process. Finally, using 
case studies to generate case-based knowledge in this research has also 
paralleled with the epistemology of the interpretivist paradigm within 
management studies (Easton, 1998: p.73).
In summary, interpretivism is the most relevant paradigm for this research 
based on the consideration of multiple realities, different actors' activities and the 
researcher's involvement. However, one of the limitations of interpretivism is that 
the research results may not be generalized to other situations, but it can be 
argued that the purpose of interpretivism research is the creation of theories for 
practice rather than generalizable findings (Miles and Heberman, 1994). Another 
criticism of interpretivism is that the ontological assumption is subjective rather 
than objective. However, analyzing the collected data can be done on an 
objective stance and the research data informs the researcher about what is 
going on in the environment, instead of the researcher’s own preconceptions. 
Creswell (1998) pointed out that an interpretivist study may face four challenges: 
1) The researcher may not possess a solid grounding in the philosophical 
precepts of phenomenology; 2) Participants in a study may not be carefully 
chosen to reveal their experiences of the phenomenon. 3) The personal 
experiences of the researcher are not adequately bracketed; and 4) The 
researcher may give little thought to how, and in what way, his or her personal 
experiences will be brought into the study. The researcher has been aware of 
these limitations of interpretivism and has taken them into account in this study.
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3.3 Reasons for Selecting Qualitative Research Design
After interpretivism is selected as the research paradigm of this study, this 
section focuses on reasons for selecting qualitative research design for this 
research. Connole et al. (1993) maintained that there is a difference between 
interpretivism and qualitative research, although qualitative methods are central 
to interpretive research. Erickson (1986, p. 119) tried to “avoid labeling such 
interpretivism research as “qualitative" as he claimed that quantification of sorts 
can be used in research of this nature.” The differences of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches exist in the discrete approaches taken in relation to the 
understanding and the applications of data collection and analysis methods 
(Denscombe, 2003). While quantitative research shows statistical results 
represented by numerical or statistical data, qualitative research presents data 
as descriptive narration with words, pictures or film material and attempts to 
understand phenomena in natural settings (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Bryman 
and Burgess (1999) argued that neither of these methods is intrinsically better 
than the other and the suitability of both needs to be decided by the context, 
purpose and nature of the research study in question. Some researchers argue 
that the research design of a study can be strengthened by the combination of 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single research project 
(Ceswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). This study uses the qualitative 
method as the only approach to help the researcher achieve the research 
objectives and the compelling reasons to undertake a qualitative study are 
presented in the following facets.
Firstly, selecting a qualitative study appears appropriate here because of 
the nature of the research question. Focusing on processes rather than 
outcomes, qualitative research is interested in understanding and describing 
dynamic and complex processes from a holistic perspective (Patton, 1990). This 
is in contrast to quantitative research questions that aim to analyze the causal
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relationships between variables, not processes. The main research question of 
this study is how to choose IJV partners in the HEM sector of China and the 
qualitative method can explicate a holistic understanding of the complexity of this 
selection process.
Secondly, qualitative research incorporates an “emergent design”, which 
involves data collection and analysis that can evolve over the course of a 
research project in response to what is learned in earlier parts of the study 
(Cuba and Lincoln, 1994). In this study, the researcher develops and evolves his 
understanding of the research inquiries throughout the research process, and 
the qualitative research design offers flexibility to respond to the researcher's 
evolving understanding as needed.
Thirdly, a qualitative approach is chosen because this research includes 
only a small sample size of two IJV cases but very deep and rich data. 
Compared with qualitative approach, Merriam (1988) indicated that quantitative 
research requires a large size of sample and mainly presenting numbers and 
statistical studies by using quantities, amounts, counts, and frequencies. Yin 
(2003) claimed that qualitative method can provide in-depth insights and may 
therefore be used for “analytical generalisation”, although it may sometimes be 
based on a small sample size.
Fourthly, the researcher adopts the qualitative approach because it reflects 
the importance of participant's perspectives (Creswell, 1998). Qualitative 
research is interested in how people make sense of their lives, how they 
interpret experiences, and how they structure their social world. The qualitative 
approach of this study assumes that each participant brings various perceptions, 
interpretations and values to the IJV partner selection process. The inductive 
reasoning and open-ended interview questions give participants the opportunity 
to respond in their own meaningful and rich words.
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Fifthly, qualitative research uses the researcher as the primary instrument 
for data collection and analysis and involves broad interpretation of data 
collected from multiple resources, such as case studies, fieldwork, textual 
analysis, interviews, archival studies of e-mail and historical contracts. In this 
study, the researcher collected qualitative data through examination of 
documentary evidence, semi-structured interviews with participants in the 
formation of two IJV projects and observation of IJV negotiation meetings. The 
use of these qualitative data collection methods allows the researcher to 
triangulate and better understand the research data.
Finally, this study employs a qualitative method with a case study focus, 
because this approach allows consideration of many chaotic factors, unlike 
experimental or survey methods (Galliers and Land 1987). Because the 
researcher has direct and personal contact with the people involved in a 
phenomenon and in the natural setting of the phenomenon, it is more 
appropriate to adopt a personal field study approach, such as a one-on-one 
interview as part of case study research than to use surveys or experiments to 
gather the process, meaning and understanding required for this study (Denzin 
and Lincoln 1994; Berg, 2007). As the primary instrument for data collection in 
this study, the researcher conducted fieldwork, gained access and collected data 
from IJV partnering companies within their natural setting.
Linking the assumptions of qualitative research to the six specific 
characters of this research project shows that a qualitative research approach is 
appropriate for this study. However, this qualitative research has genuine 
difficulties including the time required to undertake qualitative research and the 
costs involved. Due to lack of statistical methods, Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
contended that the qualitative researcher can bias the design of a study and 
enter this into the data collection, so that the findings of a qualitative approach 
are less trustworthy and generalizable. Problems may also emerge in the
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analysis and interpretation of data, there is often difficulty in achieving validity 
and reliability in qualitative research. Moreover, there are ethical issues arising 
from the researcher's intrusion into the “personal sphere” of those being 
researched (Burns 1995: P I3; Sarantakos 1998: P52).
To sum up, the qualitative approach adopted in this study is useful for 
understanding meanings for participants, the process by which events and 
actions take place, the context within which the participants act, and the new 
theories generated from research data (Maxwell, 1996). Although the qualitative 
approach has some limitations, Berg (2007) argued that qualitative research can 
be considered a science as long as it provides a systematic way of discovering 
and explaining how the world functions and how these realities arise and 
influence individuals and organizations. Therefore, this study aims to provide a 
systematic process to answer the research questions and come to conclusions 
through a qualitative research design.
3.4 Reasons for Selecting Inductive and Exploratory Research Approach
Saunders et al. (2009) argued that it is useful to attach the choice of 
inductive or deductive research approaches to the different research 
philosophies. Although positivist research tends to be associated with deductive 
approaches and quantitative methods, and interpretivism advocates inductive 
approaches and qualitative methods, scientific and social inquiry in practice 
typically involves an “alteration between deduction and induction” (Babbie 1998: 
P.60). Saunders et al. (2009) claimed that it is perfectly possible and often 
advantageous to combine deduction and induction within the same piece of 
research. According to Carson et al. (2001), the choice of deductive or inductive 
is determined by whether the research is aiming to test the existing theory 
(deductive) or build theory (inductive). Both deduction and induction are routes 
to the construct of social theories. Because this research aims to build theories
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of how to choose IJV partners in HEM sector of China rather than test existing 
theories of IJV partner selection and this research is guided by an interpretivist 
paradigm with a qualitative research design, an inductive research approach is 
selected as the main reasoning process of this study. Carson et al. (2001) 
contended that inductive approach might prevent the researcher from benefiting 
from the existing theories, but this interpretivist study deductively derived a 
conceptual framework from existing literature and then inductively generated 
rich and new insights from specific observations towards building theories.
Saunders et al. (2009) also argued that the purposes of research have often 
been classified into a threefold: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. The 
four research sub-questions, set in the introduction chapter, are trying to find out 
“what is happening”, to seek new insights, to ask questions and to assess 
phenomena in a new light (Robson, 2002), so that this study adopts an 
exploratory study, which is flexible to change research direction as a result of 
new data and new insights emerging and the focus of research may be 
progressively narrower as the research goes on (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 
1991).
3.5 Reasons for Selecting Case Study Strategy
According to Saunders et al. (2009), the choice of research strategy will be 
guided by the extent of existing knowledge, the research questions and 
objectives, the underlying philosophical assumptions to research design, and the 
amount of time and other resources. This study has taken all those factors into 
account and employed a case study research strategy to investigate research 
questions.
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3.5.1 Case Study Research Strategy
Stake (1995) argued that a great number of publications by qualitative 
researchers are written in the form of case studies, but the two notions “case 
study research” and “qualitative research” cannot be used interchangeably. 
There is growing evidence that the case study research is a rigorous research 
strategy in its own right (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Gillham (2003) 
defined a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates to answer specific 
research questions seeking a range of different evidences from the case settings 
and focuses on a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly defined or where the researcher has no control over the events as they 
unfold” (Yin, 2003). Ghauri and Gronhaug (2010) argued that the case study 
method is favored when the research questions are formulated as “how” or “why” 
questions and case study research can include both single and multiple case 
studies, studying an intrinsic or instrumental issue. A variety of data collection 
procedures, such as document reviews, archival records, interviews and direct 
and participant observations can be employed in the case studies (Yin, 2003). 
The utility of the case study method has been appreciated in a wide range of 
fields, especially in social science research and practice-oriented fields, such as 
management and even evaluation research, formerly the province of surveys 
and quasi experiments (Yin, 1994).
Although the case study research is often considered to have a flexibility of 
analytical method and a versatility of approach, it has been subject to a 
prevalent critique on lack of representativeness and statistical generalizability 
(Silverman, 2005). Furthermore, the rich and complex data collected in case 
study research often encounter different interpretations and potential 
researchers' bias (Cornford and Smithson, 1996). With those limitations, Yin
(2003) argued that “the research findings of a case study only allow generalising
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a particular set of results to some broader theoretical propositions and therefore 
do not offer any basis for statistical generalisations.” The reliability of findings 
can be optimized through careful sampling strategies, such as maximum 
variation, extreme and deviant cases, with-in case sampling, multiple-case 
sampling and theoretical/literal replication strategy (Creswell 1998; Miles et al, 
1994).
3.5.2 Justifications of Selecting Case Study Method
There are mainly two distinct schools of case study research: the post 
positivist approach adopted by Yin's (2003) work and the interpretivist approach 
reflected in Stake's (1995) studies. This study adopts Stake's (1995) approach of 
case study methodology to capture contextual richness and complexity of 
research questions and also offers a systematic way to collect research data, 
analyze information, and report the results of this study (Gibbert et al.,2008). The 
justifications for choosing the interpretivist case study approach can be argued 
from the following four perspectives.
Firstly, in order to ensure that the choice of research strategy is defensible, 
the researcher has considered importance of paradigm choice, the nature of the 
research problem, and the logic underpinning the design and questions 
(Creswell, 1994). This study is based on an interpretivism paradigm, aiming to 
investigate “how” and “why” questions in an inductive approach. Compared with 
other research strategies, case study research strategy is the most consistent 
with this interpretivist paradigm and the most relevant to the field under study 
(the IJV partner selection process and the IJV investors' perception of this 
process).
Secondly, case studies have been useful for theory building in studying IJVs
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Parkhe, 1993). By taking advantage of the case study
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method, this study focuses on building theories rather than on testing theories 
from a deep understanding of IJV partner selection process. Parkhe (1993) 
further added that the multiple case study research method motivated by 
advancing IJV theories is most useful for studying a phenomenon that cannot be 
detached from its contextual conditions. Yin (1989) argued that case studies are 
preferred under the condition that the researcher has little control over ongoing 
events. In this JV study, the researcher feels difficult to control over the number 
or nature of inter-organizational relationship, so that case study strategy is 
appropriate to this research.
Thirdly, Parkhe (1993) claimed that the prevailing studies, which 
emphasize sophisticated analyses of data collected from mail surveys and 
secondary sources, are not suitable for dealing with the inherent “messiness” of 
cross border cooperative alliances. In contrast with the quantitative methods, 
which are used in past partner selection research, the primary emphasis in this 
study is on the collection of qualitative data from documentary evidence, 
interviews with informants, and observation of the IJV formation process (Parkhe, 
1993). Therefore, the choice of in-depth case study method based on multiple 
sources of evidence and different data collection techniques is suitable for this 
research because it provides rich insights to the research questions and 
improves the quality of the research findings.
Finally, Cho et al. (1998) argued that there is an important need for
development of a case study approach in research projects under an emerging
market context, because obtaining a representative sample of enterprises
through conventional sampling technique can pose problems in emerging
economies. In the emerging economies, such as China, there might not be a
single directory or a readily available list of international strategic alliances or
joint ventures as the secondary data for research. Therefore, case studies are
more useful to develop theories with regard to the research of IJV partner
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selection in emerging countries.
3.5.3 Selection of the Cases and Unit of Analysis
This qualitative and collective case study strategy typically focuses in depth 
on two selected cases of IJV formation in China, unlike quantitative methods 
which depend on larger samples selected randomly (Patton 1990). The logic and 
power of purposeful sampling has been used in this research to select two 
information-rich cases from which much can be learned about issues central to 
the purpose of the research (Patton 1990). The data analysis is based on 
comparing the findings of each individual case. The method of generating data 
may tend to restrict the findings' generalisability largely to managers forming the 
sample (Sulaiman and Gupta, 1996). However, given the exploratory character 
of the case study coupled with its being on a sensitive subject, this sample frame 
was considered appropriate so as to be able to receive reasonable number of 
responses needed for a meaningful analysis and derivations (Sulaiman and 
Gupta, 1996). In-depth interviews were guided by a case study protocol that the 
researcher developed to enable consistency and data reliability across cases in 
the context of a holistic comparative case design. Although the protocol helps 
the researcher avoid the problems of a poorly designed research process, the 
researcher is endeavoring to discover and understand the respondents' own rich 
meanings and subjective perceptions as well as the realistic context of the IJV 
from an alliance manager's perspective.
The two cases in this research are selected for the following reasons: firstly, 
the aviation manufacturing is one of major HEM industries in China. Those two 
IJV cases, both related with an aircraft PAL project, are typical joint venture 
projects between foreign investors and Chinese partners in HEM sector. The 
strategic and investment-specific contextual factors of both cases are quite 
similar. Secondly, both of the selected IJV cases happened in the same period
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when China entered a new “knowledge-oriented” economy and the HEM sector 
has been regarded as one of the seven pillar industries in the current Chinese 
economic structure. The location-specific contextual factors of both cases are 
almost the same. Thirdly, both of the foreign investors are subsidiaries of the 
same aircraft manufacturing Group Company. The foreign-partner-specific 
context factors of both cases can be assumed to be very similar to each other. 
However, one of the IJV cases is successful in operation, while the other one 
failed in the negotiation process. It is interesting to examine the partner selection 
process of both a successful case and a failed case and offer more valuable 
insight of choosing suitable Chinese IJV partners by a comparative case study 
method. Finally, the researcher was involved in the failed case as an interpreter 
and translator between the foreign investor and the Chinese partner, so that the 
researcher can be regarded as a participant-observer within the context of the 
failed case study. It can also be argued that this case study approach is also 
influenced by ethnographic methods, because the researcher not only studies 
the groups under question but also worked and participated with them on one of 
the cases (Gillham, 2003; Yin, 2003). Moreover, specification of the “case” 
involves the identification of the unit of analysis, which can be an individual(s), 
some events, an entity, decisions, programs, implementation process, or 
organizational change (Yin, 2003). In this case study research, the “units of 
analysis” under question are decision-making processes of IJV partner selection 
by alliance managers and directors involved in both of the cases.
To sum up, an interpretivist case study research strategy is the most useful 
method for the study of the IJV partner selection process in HEM sector of China, 
because such a method meets the epistemological and ontological assumptions 
of interpretivism and has the methodological characteristics, which are 
appropriate for capturing the dynamism of alliances and the relationship 
between actors in the IJVs where the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
the context are not clearly evident (Yin 1994). As Patton (1990: P. 185) claimed,
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“the validity, meaningfulness and insights derived from case studies have more 
to do with the information richness of the selected cases and the observational / 
analytical capabilities of the researcher than with the sample size.” In order to 
offer in-depth analysis of the research questions, this case study selected two 
information-rich cases, one successful case and one failed case, as purposeful 
samples. The units of analysis of both cases are decision-making processes of 
choosing IJV partners by alliance managers and directors involved in these two 
cases. Base on a careful choice of cases and units of analysis, this case study 
attempts to achieve the various requirements of a credible research: 
professional, ethical, thoughtful, authentic, rigorous, systematic, and properly 
articulated (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Yin, 2003).
3.6 Reasons for a Longitudinal Study
A longitudinal study was decided by the researcher in this research rather
than a cross-sectional study after the case study strategy was chosen.
According to Bouma and Atkinson (1995), the basic question of a longitudinal
study is: “Has there been any change over a period of time?” Cherry (2012)
argued that most longitudinal studies are observational, so that they may have
less power to detect causal relationships than experiments do. However,
longitudinal studies might have more power than cross-sectional observational
studies by observing the temporal order of events and by being able to exclude
time-invariant and unobserved individual differences, because longitudinal
studies conduct repeated observations at the individual level. Although
longitudinal studies take a lot of time and effort, it is very useful for the research
of this study, which tries to investigate the partner selection criteria and the
influence of these criteria on the following IJV negotiation process (as part of the
partner selection process), which have been lasted for several years in both
selected two cases. Any amendments and changes of the joint venture contracts
over this period will be part of the research focus, so that the researcher
85
introduces a longitudinal element to this study in order to examine change and 
development of the partner selection process.
3.7 Selected Data Collection Methods
Yin (2003) pointed out that the data collection processes for case studies 
are more complex than other alternative research strategies and should follow 
formal procedures in order to ensure research quality. The data collection 
process of this study adopted Yin's (2013) suggested three principles: sourcing 
evidence from multiple sources, creating a case study database, and 
maintaining a chain of evidence. Stake (2000) contended that triangulation is 
crucial to performing a reliable case study, because the reliability is increased 
where converging lines of inquiry are developed from the multiple sources of 
evidence and the construct validity is also addressed as multiple measures of 
the same phenomenon are provided through multiple means (Merriam, 1988; 
Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) suggested various sources of evidence 
can be used in case study research, such as physical artifacts, archival 
documents, interviews, documentation, direct observation, and 
participant-observation. This study follows the suggestion of Carson et al. (2001) 
by logically utilizing three sources of evidence: archival documents, participant 
observations and in-depth interviews to increase the construct validity of the 
research. Merriam (1988) argued that archival documents are readily available 
and are generally non-reactive and unobtrusive, whereas observations are 
useful data collection methods in studies where the phenomenon is little known, 
where the phenomenon is hidden from public view and where the perceptions 
between insiders and outsiders differ (Jorgensen, 1989). As for interviews, 
Minichello et al. (1991) claimed that it is an ideal way of collecting data which is 
not easily observable and the in-depth interview methods are particularly 
appropriate for the greater understanding of feelings, intentions, thoughts and 
past experiences of participants (Patton, 1990). Multiple sources of data were
deliberately used in this study, because the work experience of being employed 
by Company L as an interpreter and translator for case one project not only 
allowed the researcher to access many useful research data through 
observations and archival documents, but also helped to easily access the 
interview opportunities with the key informants of both cases. In addition, a case 
study database (See Appendix A) was set up in this study in order to organize 
the research data in a manner that other researchers can also access it easily. 
Both a folder system and an Excel database have been used to store useful 
information, categorize raw data and record events. The core of the data was 
composed of about 982 pages of archival records, 52 pages of observation 
notes from attending 15 negotiation meetings and 245 pages of 20 interview 
transcriptions. The data collection process lasted for over two years and ended 
when the researcher had exhausted the sources and no new important 
information related to this study occurred (Gall et al., 2003). On top of the 
electronic filing, the researcher printed, labelled and filed each page of data. 
Moreover, during the whole research process, the researcher has been 
consistently checking the cross-reference between the case study report, the 
database, citations to specific sources in the database, the protocol and the case 
study questions. A chain of evidence was maintained throughout this study and 
also included in the research report with an aim of increasing the reliability of 
study. Besides emphasizing the main principles of collecting reliable research 
data, the researcher also devoted great efforts on improving the quality of three 
sources of evidence, which are subsequently discussed in the following 
paragraphs.
3.7.1 Archival Documents
Firstly, the researcher found out archival documents were helpful in this 
study, because they were useful for providing thick description of the events or 
issues being examined in the cases, tracing the history of the organizations and
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statements made by important people in the organizations, as well as 
counteracting the biases of the interviews. During the period of working on this 
research, the researcher had opportunities of accessing a high pile of historical 
administrative documents of both cases. These archival records of both cases 
contain emails and letter correspondence (47 pages), minutes of previous 
negotiation meetings (88 pages), copies of framework agreements (24 pages), 
past financial information of IJV parties (38 pages), as well as different versions 
of draft contracts at different stages of the negotiations (891 pages). Although 
document reviews can be used to clarify or substantiate participants' statements 
in interviews, Glaser and Strauss (1967) pointed out that the documentary data 
may not be accurate or unbiased, because those data are originally collected for 
a different purpose (Hakim, 2000).
3.7.2 Participant Observation
Secondly, observation notes taken in the negotiation meetings also serve 
as an important source of empirical material in this study. Demunck and Sobo 
(1998) claimed that, compared with other methods of data collection, participant 
observation has the advantages of affording access to the "backstage culture", 
which allows for richly detailed description, and provides opportunities for 
viewing or participating in unscheduled events. However, participant observation 
can be considered as being conducted by a biased human who serves as an 
instrument for data collection and the researcher must understand how his/her 
gender, sexuality, ethnicity, class, and theoretical approach may affect 
observation, analysis, and interpretation (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002). In this study, 
the researcher was employed by the Chinese partner of Case one. Company L, 
as an interpreter and translator from 26th August 2009 to the end of September 
2010. During this period, the researcher provided consecutive interpreting 
service in 15 rounds of negotiation meetings between two parties and also was 
responsible for translating the contents and amendments of draft contracts from
English to Chinese, as well as the mutual correspondence of negotiation from 
English to Chinese or from Chinese to English. After each round of negotiation, 
there were changes and newly added terms and conditions to the agreement. 
The Microsoft Word program showed the traces of those changes and provided 
useful data for the researcher to analyze any disputes and compromises 
between both parties. When the researcher attended these 15 meetings lasting 
for a total duration of more than 25 days, he worked as an active participant and 
wrote down 52 pages of observation notes. During the negotiation meetings, the 
role of the researcher was a “complete participant”, which conceals the identity 
of the researcher to other negotiators (Gill and Johnson, 2002). The main 
advantage of being a complete participant is that social phenomena are being 
studied in their natural contexts and this observational approach can also avoid 
unduly influencing the observed setting (Babbie, 1986). All these observations 
provided the researcher an opportunity to validate the data from the interviews 
and some extracts from the observation data is presented in Appendix E in order 
to support the validity of this study. However, the observation data in this study 
were unfortunately only limited to the Case one and the reason for lack of 
observation on Case two was due to the fact that the IJV in Case two was 
successfully established two years before this study started, however, the 
instrumental nature of Case two (success) significantly contributes to the 
understanding of failure in Case one.
3.7.3 Semi-structured In-depth Interviews
The third pillar of the empirical material consists of the transcribed 
interviews with 11 key participants involved with the failed IJV case and 9 key 
informants from the successful case. Genise (2002) noted that the advantages 
of interview method of collecting data lie in three aspects. Firstly, this method 
allows direct contact with the users and often leads to specific and constructive 
suggestions. Second, interview methods are useful for obtaining detailed
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information. The third aspect is that few participants are required to gather rich 
and detailed data. As the most common method of data collection in qualitative 
research, interviews help the researcher find out the opinions of interviewees 
with regard to the IJV partner selection phenomenon in China as well as 
understanding how and why the interviewees have those particular perspectives 
(King, 2004). Stake (1995) supported this view by arguing that the principle use 
of interviews is to obtain the descriptions and interpretations of others, because 
no situation will ever be viewed in the same way by all. In-depth semi-structured 
interviews as defined by Hitchcock and Hughes (1995) are particularly 
appropriate for theory-building methodology in this study, because the 
interviewer can have a clear list of issues to be addressed, but at the same time 
can give the respondents the flexibility to develop ideas and speak more widely 
on the issues raised during the interviews (Denscombe, 2003). The 
semi-structured interviews can also help the researcher locate each 
respondent’s answer to the same questions more quickly, and organize 
questions and answers that are similar more easily (Patton, 1987). However, 
Gillham (2003: P. 13) pointed out that “when discussing interviews as a research 
technique, what interviewees say may not be what they actually do.”
The researcher has successively conducted in total twenty in-depth 
semi-structured interviews (Exhibit 3.4) over 12 months in order to gather 
insightful views on partner selection decision-making process and selection 
criteria of each IJV case. The selection of participants for this study was based 
on a purposeful sampling strategy (Patton, 2002), because this study is 
qualitative and seeks to discover what occurs, how and why and what the 
implications are. It was purposeful to select the key informants playing different 
roles in case projects for this study, including alliance managers, senior directors, 
lawyers involved in both cases, and consultants appointed by either foreign 
parties or Chinese partners, in that they would be the group of people who were 
particularly knowledgeable about the two case projects and whose insights can
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be helpful in understanding events that have happened and the reasons why 
those events happen in both cases. The 20 interviews were arranged on the 
basis of either personal connections or referrals, so that there is high level of 
initial trust in the interviewer-interviewee relationship, which served to improve 
the internal validity of the findings. The participants of Case one were 
interviewed face to face between 20 September 2012 and 16 January 2013. 
Nine of the interviews were held in participants’ offices, and the other two 
interviews were conducted in coffee shops close to the interviewees’ offices. 
Five months later, the researcher conducted another 9 face-to-face interviews 
with informants of the second case project from 11 June 2013 to 26 June 2013 in 
their offices. The duration of each interview was controlled between 30 to 60 
minutes, depending on the available time of informants.
The researcher firstly sent permission emails followed up with telephone 
calls to obtain permission with agreed location and timing of the interviews from 
the interviewees. On many occasions when initially agreed appointments were 
cancelled due to unforeseen events affecting the interviewees, the researcher 
had to re-schedule the meetings when they were available. About two weeks 
before the interview started, the researcher sent an interview guide based on a 
semi-structured interview approach (Merriam, 2002) (See Appendix B) to the 
participants, so that they would have the opportunity to prepare and provide 
more accurate answers. The documentary evidence, collected prior to the 
interview-themes, the evidence from observation conducted about two years 
ago before the interviews and the research questions, generated from literature 
review, were all incorporated into the guiding questions in the interview guide.
As the first step in the interview process of this study, the researcher 
assured to the interviewees that none of their names and the companies’ names 
would be disclosed in order to ensure accurate information, and a “informed 
consent” agreement was obtained from each informant before the interview
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(Carson et al., 2001) (see Appendix G). When interviewees or correspondents 
are quoted in this study, the acronyms are used to recognize the different 
informants. With participants’ approval, all the interviews were recorded by a 
digital recorder to ensure accurate transcription. In addition to recording the 
content of interviews, the researcher took interview notes, which allowed 
tracking key points to return to later in the interview or highlighting ideas of 
particular interest or importance (Merriam, 1998). Moreover, emails were also 
used to get clarifications and answers to some follow-up questions.
During the interviews, each respondent was asked to answer the same set 
of questions, such as what were the motives of IJV partners; how IJV partners 
were selected; what criteria were used to evaluate potential partners; what 
conflicts were during negotiation process and why the IJV formation was 
unsuccessful or successful. Some of the interview questions were open-ended 
and the participants were encouraged to describe any issues of interest about 
their experience in IJV partner selection process and about their cooperation 
with partnering companies. Probing and/or follow-up questions were used, when 
necessary, to encourage participants to elaborate on or clarify a response 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).
As suggested by Denscombe (2003), all interview protocols and 
transcriptions were kept in the same format and consecutively numbered and 
stored. Also one pilot interview was conducted in order to test potential interview 
questions and to gain preliminary insights. In order to prepare for each new 
interview, the notes from prior interviews were reviewed. Within a week of each 
interview, the recorded data were transcribed to a computerized narrative as part 
of the case study database. All interview transcriptions were sent to the 
interviewees encouraging the respondents to make comments or amendments. 
The researcher explained to the informants that their responses would be part of 
the research findings and that some of their statements might be used as quotes.
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However, the quotes will not be attributed to one specific person. The interviews 
with Chinese managers or directors were conducted in Chinese and the ones 
with French managers or directors are in English. All of the interview data were 
translated and transcribed into the English language to provide reference.
Although the interview method serves as an important source of data, a 
risk of proximity often occurs between interviewer and interviewee, especially as 
in these two cases, as the researcher knew many of the interviewees before the 
interviews. Therefore, the researcher had to remain as objective as possible and 
follow the interview guidelines firmly in order to avoid bias (Johnson et al., 2007). 
Moreover, in order to reduce retrospective sense-making by image-conscious 
informants, the researcher also had to limit strongly confounding bias by using 
highly knowledgeable informants, who viewed the phenomenon from diverse 
perspectives, from different hierarchical levels and from different parts of the 
organization (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Overall, the total number of 20 
interviewees is a fairly small sample size, but the number seems to be sufficient 
enough to provide the evidence required by this research.
In conclusion, the triangulation of various kinds of data gathered from three 
different sources reduces bias of this research and certainly adds depth to the 
final results of this study. However, the triangulation method of data collection is 
also subject to constraints in time, financial resources, and access, like in this 
study, where no observation data could be obtained because the research did 
not even start when the IJV in Case two was successfully established.
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Exhibit 3.4: A list of interviews
(Resource: present author)
Name Job Position Role in this Project Date o f  Data 
Collection
Case One A  failed aircraft FAL IJV project between Company A  (Foreign 
investor) and Company L (Chinese partner)
Interviewees from Company A
Mr. FB Senior 
director o f  
Company A
The person who ended 
the JV negotiation with 
Company L
20 Sept. 2012
Mr. SM Senior 
director o f  
Company A
The main decision 
maker o f all negotiations 
with Company L for three 
years
21 Sept. 2012
Mr. JM Senior 
director o f  
Company A
The key negotiator o f  
Company A  between 
2008-2010
24 Oct. 2012
Mr. PD Senior manager o f  
Company A
The key negotiator 
before 2008
24 Oct. 2012
Mr. GT Senior director o f  
Company A
Leader o f  Company 
A ’s partner selection team
8 Nov. 2012
Interviewees from Company L
Mr. WM Senior director o f  
Company L
The main decision-maker o f  
Company L for the JV 
negotiation
8 Jan. 2013
Mr. ZB Senior 
director o f  
Company L
The key negotiator o f  
Company L
8 Jan. 2013
Mr. MP Senior director o f  
a private-owned 
Chinese Airline
A  member o f brain trust 
team o f  Company L
14 Jan. 2013
M r.LR Chinese Solicitor 
o f Company L
The key mentor for the 
Company L’s negotiation 
Team
15 Jan. 2013
Mr. JH Senior director o f  
Local Chinese 
Airport Company
Supporting negotiator o f  
Company L
15 Jan. 2013
M r.ZX Middle manager o f  
Company L
Organizing meetings and 
archiving company files
16 Jan.2013
Case Two A successful aircraft FAL IJV project between Company B 
(Foreign investor) and a Chinese consortium comprising Company T, Company 
V I and Company V2
Interviewees from Company B
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Mr. DL Senior director o f  
Company B
The key negotiator o f  
Company B
11 Jun. 2013
Mr. MB Senior director o f  
Company B
The main decision maker o f  
all negotiations with 
Chinese consortium
11 Jun. 2013
Mr. LB Senior direetor o f  
Company B in 
China
Supporting negotiator o f  
Company B
19 Jun. 2013
Mr. MR Senior manager o f  
Company B in 
China
Supporting negotiator o f  
Company B
20 Jun. 2013
Interviewees from Company T
Mr.GL Senior director 
o f  Company T
The main decision-maker o f  
Company L for the JV 
negotiation
23 Jun. 2013
Mr. BP Senior director o f  
Company T
The key negotiator o f  
Chinese consortium
23 Jun. 2013
Mr. JK Chinese Solicitor The key mentor for the 
Chinese negotiation team
24 Jun. 2013
Interviewees from Company V I
Mr. SF Senior director o f  
Company VI
Supporting negotiator 25 Jun. 2013
Interviewees from Company V2
Mr. NC Senior director o f  
Company V2
Supporting negotiator 26 Jun. 2013
3.8 Selected Methods of Data Analysis
Bogdan and Biklen (2003) defined qualitative data analysis as “working with 
the data, organizing them, breaking them into manageable units, coding them, 
synthesizing them, and searching for patterns”. In this study, the researcher 
followed a systematic and in-depth data analysis strategy suggested by Creswell 
(2003) to reduce and analyze the research data at four stages, which involved 
organizing and preparing the data, coding the data case by case according to 
phases and themes, comparing the two cases, and applying the theory.
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The first step of the analysis was to get a general sense of the data by 
inputting the rich text files into NVivo 10, a qualitative data analysis software 
package, designed by QSR International. The total data uploaded into this 
software consists of about 245 pages of transcribed interview material, 52 pages 
of observation notes from the negotiation meetings and 1,108 pages of archival 
documents. The NVivo helped to develop the codes (nodes in NVivo) and apply 
those codes to sections of texts imported in the program. These codes were then 
placed into a tree showing the ties between them. Text that seemed relevant to 
the research questions but did not fit into the initial coding scheme was marked 
with new codes (free nodes in NVivo). Miles and Huberman (1994) pointed that 
the use of NVivo can help researchers to reduce analysis time, make procedures 
more systematic and explicit, cut out much drudgery, ensure completeness and 
refinement, and permit flexibility and revision in analysis procedures. However, 
some scholars argued that researchers using the qualitative data analysis 
software are farther away from their data when they are not surrounded by the 
physical presence of their piles of text data (Weitzman, 2003).
The second step was to code all the research data into phases and themes 
within each case to reflect the contextual factors and features of integration. The 
data of this research was analyzed by using Glaser and Strauss's (1967) method 
called “grounded theory” which follows three basic steps in data analysis: open 
coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Open coding helps to disaggregate 
the data into units and axial coding aims to recognize relationships between 
categories. For the interview data, the researcher grouped the paragraphs of 
transcripts on the same phases (open coding) and themes (axial coding) 
together with the assistance of NVivo and noted down the reasons for using 
phases and themes to structure them. Although the initial set of codes was 
based on themes identified in the IJV literature on partner identification and 
selection, the researcher also documented different themes that emerged from 
the texts of the interviews but were not present in the literature and also took
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notes about issues or ideas that might add to or change the initial coding 
scheme developed from the research questions. A codebook, which identified 79 
phases (Open coding) and 14 themes (Axial coding) from the data analysis, was 
listed in Appendix F. The coding process was a nonlinear one. The set of themes 
from different interviews within each case helps to triangulate and refine the 
understanding of the themes within each case. To verify the validity and 
meaningfulness of these theme sets, the researcher re-coded the case 
interviews by using the theme sets. The interview data were also compared with 
archival documents or notes taken from participant observation to check their 
reliability. The data analysis of this study used the constant comparative method 
(Merriam, 1988) which allowed for themes and patterns to emerge from the 
multiple sources of evidence. Although data collected from archival documents 
and observation notes were primarily useful in establishing the facts, they still 
provided the researcher with some perceptions and reactions that were 
validated in the interviews.
Following the case-by-case analysis, the researcher also conducted the 
cross-case comparison between the failed case and the successful case. Miles 
and Huberman (1994) claimed that cross-case analysis could be of value, 
because it enhances generalisability as well as deepening the understanding 
and explanation of a phenomenon. In this study, characteristics and themes 
were compared and contrasted across cases for similarities and differences by 
an organized and compressed way (Yin, 2003). Interpretations of these 
contrasts were then made. The cross-case analysis allowed the researcher to a 
stronger understanding of the uniqueness of each individual case, the 
commonalities between them, and the many factors that influence the success 
of IJV formation. The researcher also used handwritten visuals and matrices to 
compare and contrast the cases and to identify themes and questions emerging 
from the data.
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The last step was to compare these emergent findings with existent 
literature. This method of generalization is known as analytical generalization, 
which enhances the internal validity, generalizability, and theoretical level of 
theory-building from case research (Yin, 1989). Eisenhardt (1989) argued that 
examining literature which conflicts with the emergent findings is important for 
two reasons. The first reason is that the chance of neglecting conflicting findings 
might be reduced. Secondly, “conflicting results forces researchers into a more 
creative, frame-breaking mode of thinking than they might otherwise be able to 
achieve” (p. 544). Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989) contended that literature 
discussing similar findings is also critical, because it ties together underlying 
similarities in phenomena not normally associated with each other. In this study, 
the research firstly compared and contrasted the findings with the exiting 
literature reviewed in Chapter two in order to explore how these perspectives 
could contribute to the understanding of the findings, and then tried to develop 
some fresh thoughts that could not be explained by reviewed literature.
Overall, this study adopted a systematic data analysis approach to study 
the transcribed interviews, researcher’s observation, and other in-depth 
documentary evidence. The researcher has spent a two-year period on data 
collection. 20 semi-structured interviews have been conducted and 15 
negotiation meetings were observed. The individual cases were analyzed to 
establish an initial coding scheme, and then cross-case analysis was conducted 
to discover patterns and themes that are related to the research questions. As 
the researcher acts as the primary instrument of analysis by using the grounded 
theory method, the researcher recognizes his biases and the subjectivity of the 
data, which may result in difficulties of providing reliability and validity of this 
study. In order to verify the accuracy, entirety and completeness of the findings, 
a process of member-checking (Creswell, 2003) is integrated in this study. All the 
major conclusions were presented back to the two interviewees, who are invited 
to comment on or assess the research findings, interpretations, and conclusions.
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However, the researcher understands that different members may have different 
views of the same data. In addition, the researcher also kept a reflective journal 
to monitor his subjectivity and to assist in the data analysis process. According to 
Morrow and Smith (2000), the use of a reflective journal adds rigor to qualitative 
inquiry as the investigator is able to record his/her reactions, assumptions, 
expectations, and biases about the research process.
3.9 Trustworthiness of the Research
According to Yin (2003), the rigor of case study research can be evaluated 
by four main criteria, namely internal validity, construct validity, external validity 
and reliability. However, some researchers argued that these evaluation criteria 
cannot be strictly applied to the qualitative paradigm, in particular when 
researchers are more interested in questioning and understanding the meaning 
and interpretation of phenomena. Patton (1990) claimed that the possibility of 
any method being totally ‘objective’ is doubtful, because truth is relative. 
According to Gephart (1999), the validity of a piece of interpretive research is 
dependant on whether similar findings can be achieved if another researcher 
enters the same field by using the same kinds of strategies as the first 
researcher. Lincoln and Guba (1985) stated that interpretivist studies must meet 
the criteria set for trustworthiness including credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability. This research, being both interpretive and 
qualitative, can be evaluated from the above four perspectives.
3.9.1 Credibility
In qualitative research, credibility is analogous to internal validity and 
concerns whether the data are believable and trustworthy. In order to ensure that 
the data are credible, the researcher has adopted a number of research 
strategies in this study. The first is that the researcher spent more than a year on
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data collection and such a prolonged engagement provided opportunities for 
persistent observation and continual data analysis. A triangulation method of 
data collection including documents, observations and interviews was also used 
in this study to enhance credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), and the findings 
that were drawn from the interview data were always compared against 
observations and documentary evidence to strengthen or weaken a finding. 
“Member checks”, a systematic rigorous approach, also likely increased 
credibility of this study. The researcher took data tentative interpretations back to 
the interviewees from whom the data were derived and they were asked whether 
the results are plausible. This method helped to ensure the researcher had 
collected what the participants had said and enabled gathering as much of 
others' perspectives as was possible to increase authenticity (Mertens, 1998). 
Furthermore, this research includes both a successful case and a failed 
experience, which also increased credibility of this research. Faculty supervision 
also supported credibility, because the two research supervisors offered the 
researcher an opportunity of discussing research design and analysis with them. 
Another way of enhancing credibility in this research is that the overall research 
design links the research questions deliberately with the data collection and 
analysis phases, as well as with the discussion of the results and conclusions.
3.9.2 Transferability
Transferability, as the second criterion, refers to the generalizability of the 
study and can be analogous to external validity. In case study research the goal 
is not to generalize to a larger universe (statistical generalization), instead the 
researcher is endeavoring to generalize a particular set of results to some 
broader theory (analytical generalization) (Yin 1994: P36).To strengthen the 
external validity of the present case study, three main methods have been 
applied. Firstly, this study used a purposeful sampling approach, increasing the
replication logic within the study and provided an explicit discussion of the
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rationale for selecting two information-rich cases (Silverman, 2005). The two 
cases were selected in a manner that the majority of key characteristics (e.g. 
form of investment, industry, characteristics of the target country) were similar. 
Secondly, a discussion of the study’s context was included. The researcher 
provided detailed descriptions of the organizations and kept detailed notes and 
analysis of data gathered from interviews, observations and documents. This 
method helped to specify the conditions under which specific behavior could be 
expected to occur and permitted the readers to judge whether transferability was 
applicable and to reflect on what might be parallel in their own experience 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Lastly, the use of extent theory in conducting this case 
study research is the main vehicle for analytical generalisation (Yin, 2003).
3.9.3 Dependability
The third criterion concerns dependability, which is analogous to reliability. 
Merriam (1998) argued that dependability refers to the extent to which research 
results can be replicated with similar subjects under a similar context. Guba and 
Lincoln (1981) advocated the use of an “audit trial” as a means of ensuring 
dependability by taking the readers through the research process, so that he/she 
can judge whether the process and conclusions of the research are trustworthy. 
In this study, the researcher offers explicit explanations about how the data 
collection and analysis have been conducted and thus enables the readers to 
understand the approach taken by the researcher and to determine whether 
those research behaviors are dependable. Also in order to make the findings 
more transparent and more comprehensible for other researchers, the study 
provides a detailed account of the research design and procedures that were 
used and offers a comprehensive case study protocol including the interview 
guide, observation summaries and verbatim transcriptions for each interview. A 
standardized format for data collection, reporting and analysis was provided by
the case study database. Moreover, the documented interview guide assured
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the replication of the research findings with different interviewees. The reliability 
for this work can also be reflected from the comparable answers from different 
interviewees at different times and locations.
3.9.4 Confirmability
Finally, confirmability refers to the degree to which the data and 
interpretations of the research are based firmly on gathered evidence rather than 
the personal construction of the researcher (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To satisfy 
this criterion, the researcher emphasized the role of triangulation, which can 
reduce effects of the investigator's bias and provide a detailed methodological 
description enabling readers to determine how far the data and constructs may 
be accepted. Moreover, the researcher invited an external audit, which offered 
an opportunity for an outsider to challenge the research process and the study 
results. In order to create a detailed audit trail, the researcher maintained a log of 
all research activities and documented all procedures of data collection and 
analysis throughout the study (Creswell and Miller, 2000). The independent 
auditor of this study was Dr. Baoyu, Xue, who is an associate professor of Hefei 
University of Industry with a PhD in Organisational Behaviour. Being a 
competent peer, he independently determined whether inferences from the 
research were logical, whether the findings were grounded in the data, and 
whether the research process of this study was suitable as a basis for further 
study and also confirmed the dependability and confirmability of this study.
3.10 Research Limitation
Although the researcher adopted many methods to enhance the 
trustworthiness of the research, there are still a number of potential problems 
within this case study, such as lacking of rigor, biased views either from the
observations of researchers or the statements of case participants, and
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difficulties for scientific generalization. In particular, two biases have posed 
threats to the validity of conclusions. The first bias is a “risk of proximity” during 
the stage of collecting and analyzing the data (Johnson et al., 2007). Proximity 
prevents the researcher from exploring issues that would enrich the research, 
because the researcher might carry conscious assumptions and preconceptions 
during the research process. Because some interviewees were colleagues of the 
researcher, they might assume that the researcher, as the interviewer, should 
already know some of their thoughts on the interview questions. The other bias 
is considered as participant observer bias. As a participant observer of the first 
failed case, the researcher sometimes shared his thoughts and findings with 
other participants in the case and might tend to have more positive judgments 
than other researchers with a more distant stance.
Although it is impossible to completely eliminate these biases, the 
researcher has adopted a number of methods to minimize these biases. The 
researcher wrote down the preconceptions and personal perspectives in the 
memos in order to track what reflexivity being used and how to control bias 
(Gillham, 2003). A case study database was created by the researcher in order 
to allow the research data to be easily retrieved and shared with other 
researchers who are interested in the data. The researcher also used structured 
methodology and formally compared research data with existing partner 
selection theories to reduce researcher bias. The proximity bias can be 
minimized by expressing no views about the propositions except to pose 
questions and the participant observer bias can be reduced with multiple 
interviewees and different approaches of asking the same questions. 
Furthermore, the researcher intended to generalize the research data to a 
potential partner selection theory rather than to a universal population. Therefore, 
scientific generalization is not important in this case study.
There are also practical limitations on the number of interviewees, the time
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available for interviews and the amount of documentary data collected (Parkhe 
1993). However, the restriction on people, time and materials can help to reduce 
the length of time and volume of documents generated by this case study. In 
addition, the time for data collection and the volume of data were also minimized 
by concentrating on the particular partner selection characteristics identified in 
past literature. Although this research has its limitations, it provides valuable 
insights for IJV partner selection studies in HEM sector of China. Many of these 
limitations originate from the qualitative nature of this study and may be offset by 
the advantages of qualitative research, such as relevance and the unfolding of 
multiple complex realities (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
3.11 Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations before, during, and after the research that was 
conducted, such as ensuring ethically adequate access to the organization, 
ensuring privacy and confidentiality of participant companies, ensuring 
confidentiality of informed consent from interviewees, and ensuring proper 
storage of research data guided the whole process of this research. Protecting 
the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants is one of the main ethical 
considerations in case study research. This study protected the anonymity of the 
participating companies and the interviewees by removing the identifying 
information during the recording and coding process. Silverman (2000) 
reminded researchers that they are actually entering the private spaces of their 
participants while they are doing their research. Creswell (2003) also stated that 
researchers should have an obligation to respect the needs, rights, values and 
desires of the interviewees. In this research project, the researcher obtained 
informed consent of all the interviewees in writing in the format given in Appendix 
0. The informants agreed that all information they provided could be used for the 
purposes of the doctoral research and associated academic publications. 
Confidentiality of the data collected from each respondent was kept throughout
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the research process and the research data were stored securely with access 
only by the researcher from the beginning of this research.
3.12 Conclusion
In conclusion, with little possibility to control these contemporary events 
(IJV partner selection process) in a complicated real-life context but a deep 
access to the organizations and actors in the research, this study was designed 
as an inductive, exploratory, longitudinal and comparative case study by using 
qualitative research methods of data collection and analysis. In order to reach 
the requirements of a credible research: ethical, professional, thoughtful, 
rigorous, systematic, authentic, and properly articulated (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985; Yin, 2003), this chapter firstly considered the importance of paradigms to 
the research and justified the selection of the interpretivist paradigm. It then 
moved on to justify choosing qualitative research design and inductive and 
exploratory research approach. Furthermore, this chapter adopted Yin's (1994) 
case study research strategy due to its comprehensiveness and clarity on 
procedures. The rationales of using a longitudinal study were also discussed in 
this methodology chapter. Following this, research procedures were outlined. 
This chapter presented how the data was collected and analyzed and what 
measures were included for strengthening the trustworthiness of the research. It 
also discussed the limitations of the study design and highlighted the importance 
of ethics throughout this intellectual journey. In Chapter five, the detailed data 
analysis was based on the research paradigm and methodology laid out in this 
chapter.
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Chapter 4 Case Context
4.1 Introduction
As the study focuses on the issues of IJV partner selection in Chinese 
commercial aviation manufacturing sector, one of the major and representative 
HEM industries in China, this chapter aims to address the research context of 
the study by providing a brief overview of the Chinese aviation manufacturing 
industry and introducing the selected IJV cases and the case companies 
involved. Both of the case projects (a failed case and a successful case) were 
selected from the researcher's past work experience in dealing with IJV 
formation. From April, 2009 to September, 2010, the researcher was involved in 
the failed case (Case One) as an interpreter and translator and was responsible 
for interpreting for the delegation team of Company L during all the major rounds 
of negotiation meetings and translating different versions of draft IJV contracts 
between both parties. Being the similar aircraft FAL project in Chinese HEM 
sector. Case two was successfully established in 2007. In order to learn the 
successful experience of forming an IJV project, the researcher was introduced 
by the Chairman of Company L to visit the management team of Case two three 
times during the period, when the researcher was working for Company L. 
Therefore, the researcher was privileged to access many first-hand inside 
information of both cases. Due to reasons of confidentiality, the identities of all 
the case companies remain undisclosed in this study and all the case companies 
and IJVs will be indentified throughout this research by letters. The chapter is 
structured into four sections that are subsequently presented: introducing 
Chinese aviation industry (4.2), introducing case A (4.3), introducing case B (4.4), 
and conclusion (4.5).
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4.2 Introducing China’s Commercial Aviation Manufacturing Industry
4.2.1 Outlook of Chinese Aviation Market
With a domestic market of 1.3 billion consumers, almost every segment of 
Chinese aviation market has great growth potential in the long-term. According 
to a recent market forecast by Stewart (2010), Chinese aviation market will have 
an annual increase of 7.9 per cent in the next 20 years and will be the second 
fastest growing market in the world after India. The Asia Pacific market, including 
China and India, is expected to account for 31 per cent of all global demand by 
2027. The Chinese Aviation Authority is predicting that in the next 20 years, 
China will require 3,815 airliners, comprising 2,822 aircrafts of 100 seats or more 
and 993 regional jets. Moreover, passenger numbers in China have been 
growing at over 10 per cent a year (2009 measured against 2008) during the 
period when most other areas of the world have experienced a decline, 
according to the statistics provided by the Center for Asia Pacific Aviation in 
2010. This huge market is encouraging foreign manufacturers to invest in local 
market in order to generate sales to Chinese airlines. At the same time, Chinese 
manufacturers have already started developing their own aircrafts with an aim of 
competing with foreign players.
4.2.2 Structure of China’s Commercial Aviation Manufacturing Industry
Although China's government had a long-standing interest in 
manufacturing commercial aircrafts, the production of China's aircraft 
manufacturing industry was almost limited to serving the Chinese military. 
Besides the production of smaller (often propeller-driven) planes based on 
modified Soviet designs, Chinese aviation manufacturers play the role of 
providing aircraft parts for foreign aircraft manufacturers in the global supply 
chain of commercial aviation manufacturing. Until recently, Chinese airlines,
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most of which are state-owned, have been importing almost all of China's 
commercial aircrafts from the West. In order to compete with foreign 
manufacturers for the growing Chinese aviation market, the Chinese 
government has consolidated its efforts to develop two domestic commercial 
aircrafts since 2008: a regional jet, the ARJ-21, and a narrow-bodied aircraft, the 
C919, by re-merging the Aviation Industry Corporation of China I (AVIC1) and 
the Aviation Industry Corporation of China II (AVIC II) into a giant aviation group, 
AVIC, and also setting up a new state-owned commercial aircraft manufacturing 
company, the Commercial Aircraft Company of China (COMAC), which aims to 
closely mirror the business operations of Boeing and Airbus Group. In the past 
several decades, the China's commercial aviation manufacturing market has 
always been monopolized by the state-owned enterprises. After the restructuring 
of aviation manufacturing sector to align more closely with the global market in
2008, the Chinese aviation manufacturing industry mainly consists of two giant 
group companies, the AVIC and the COMAC. With more than 400,000 
employees and over 200 subsidiaries including 23 listed companies in China, the 
AVIC is manufacturing larger aircrafts and engines, including fighter aircrafts, 
turbofan engines, air-to-air missiles, military and commercial helicopters, a 
50-seater turboprop MA600 airliner (the ARJ-21), along with the 50-seater jumbo 
aircraft (ERJ 145). While the COMAC is expected to focus on the design, 
assembly, testing, and marketing of China's forthcoming indigenous commercial 
airliner, the C919, a 190-seater passenger airliner, which was launched in March
2009, with an aim of being a strong competitor to the Airbus A320 and Boeing 
737s after in-service from 2020. Despite the fact that China has made great 
achievements in various aspects of aviation industry in the past decade, the 
output of China's aviation manufacturing industry still remains a tiny share of 
both China's total industrial output (0.7% in 2010) and the world export market 
for commercial aviation products (1.3% in 2011). Butterworth (2010) pointed that 
the Chinese are a generation behind in aircraft technology and there are still
many holes in China's aerospace business portfolio, especially in areas such as
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competitive engine, avionics, and aircraft system design capabilities, but the 
Chinese manufacturers are catching up the Western companies at a fast speed.
4.2.3 Chinese Policies for Commercial Aviation Manufacturing
Technological successes of launching of manned spacecraft or stealth jet 
fighters are regarded by Chinese government as important indicators of a 
nation's technological prowess and manifestations of the country's rise as a 
great power, because the advance in aviation manufacturing is seen as driving 
economic growth and innovation as well as strengthening national defense. 
However, all of China's commercial aircrafts have been so far either imported 
from foreign firms or produced domestically under licenses from foreign 
manufacturers. In order to achieve the goal of creating its own commercial 
aviation manufacturing industry competing with foreign manufacturers, the 
Chinese government has adopted a 3-step strategy of first using foreign designs 
directly in domestic production and assembly, then developing its own designs 
under the help from foreign manufacturers, and finally creating completely 
independent technology of producing commercial aircrafts without any foreign 
assistance. In China's last few Five-Year Plans, the development of an 
indigenous commercial aviation manufacturing industry has been consecutively 
listed as an important goal for the State Council. In 2012, this goal was 
reconfirmed by the Chinese government, which expected the commercial 
aviation manufacturing sector, as one of seven “new strategic industries”, will 
serve as an engine of the country's future economic growth over the next several 
decades. Since then, various policy instruments have been employed by the 
Chinese government to stimulate commercial aviation manufacturing industry, 
such as providing substantial launch aid to COM AC's C919 project, pressuring 
state-owned airlines to make purchase decisions in accordance with government 
policy, compelling foreign commercial aviation manufacturers to purchase 
Chinese components or set up joint ventures with Chinese partner, acquiring
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foreign companies and technologies, as well as encouraging foreign poorer 
countries to purchase Chinese aircrafts through diplomatic corps and loan offers.
4.2.4 Implications for Foreign Companies
Yan (2009) argued that “there are rising numbers of Western aerospace 
companies, who are keen to engage with China, not just through sales, but 
through offsets, foreign direct investment and joint-ventures." In recent years, 
due to the conducive business environment and China's massive demand for 
commercial aircrafts, many Western companies have been involved in the 
rapidly expanding Chinese aviation industry and a great number of new 
manufacturing ventures have been invested in China by many international 
prime contractors, such as Airbus, Boeing, Brazil's Embraer and Canada's 
Bombardier. Moreover, the world's leading aircraft sub-contractors, including 
Rolls-Royce, General Electric and Safran were also involved in the increase of 
activities in China. Under the incentives of lucrative sales to a continually 
expanding Chinese aviation market, these foreign investors are willing to sell 
their technological expertise to China. In the meantime, the Chinese government 
asks for technology as an entry price and plays foreign competitors off against 
one another for commercial rewards. However, the advanced aircraft 
manufacturers are reluctant to release the latest knowledge, because they could 
help China to increase competitiveness in the civil aviation sector as well as run 
the risk of dual-use technology, which may assist Chinese military aircraft 
developments at the same time. The most common approach of safeguarding 
their intellectual property and technologies is to manufacture key components 
outside of China and assembly the imported components in China. In addition, 
the international certification issued by the aviation regulatory agencies, such as 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), may also help to prevent potential 
loss of intellectual property in China, because Chinese manufacturers must
obtain it even if components are to be used in Chinese aircrafts. Under the
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growing competitive threats from Chinese manufactures, many foreign aviation 
manufacturers underlined the importance of innovation in preventing the 
emergence of Chinese competitors and even have started to design products 
specifically for China in order to compete with their Chinese competitors at the 
lower end of the market (Crane et al., 2014).
4.3 Case A
4.3.1 Introduction of Case A
Case A is a typical IJV project among those investment activities in China 
aviation industry. In Oct 2006, Company A approached Company L during the 
China Air Show period in Zhuhai, China and made a proposal of establishing an 
IJV of FAL with Company L to assemble and deliver regional aircrafts in China. 
The total investment of this project was estimated at around 300 million EUR, 
which is split between two parties. Company A (51%) and Company L (49%). By 
then. Company L has been running a charter airline route by working with 
another private Chinese Airline company for almost a year and has also started 
the process of applying for a permanent regional airline company license from 
the Chinese central government. Having the same objectives to create a venture 
that will be efficient, cost effective and successful, both parties have agreed the 
key principles of cooperation in the letter of intent signed in 2007. As what is 
required by Company A, Company L should have the capacity to purchase 50 
aircrafts and also provide broader access to the Chinese market by securing the 
Chinese government approval of the FAL project. As an experienced aircraft 
manufacturer with a successful commercial and industrial programme and 
organization. Company A should manage the whole production and ensure the 
quality of the products will meet the required approvals of the airworthiness 
authorities. The total negotiation period lasted for 4 years with more than 40
rounds of negotiation, which took place either in China or in France, however,
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both of the IJV parties lost interest in further negotiation in Nov 2010 and this IJV 
failed during the process of negotiation.
4.3.2 Foreign investor of Case A (Company A)
Located in France, Company A has been a European joint venture between 
a French aircraft manufacturer (50%) and an Italian aircraft producer (50%) 
since 1981. As a pioneer in manufacturing regional aircrafts, it primarily 
produces high-wing, twin turboprop, short-haul aircrafts with sales exceeding 
1,200 aircrafts, with over 380 operators in more than 90 countries. It has a strong 
customer base across the globe and a proven track record of innovation 
providing the best economies of scale for operators. Since 2012, the Company A 
has started to design a new 90-seat model, which will be launched in 2017. The 
advantage of Company A as the foreign investor into the FAL project (Case One) 
lie in four aspect: firstly, it is a world-class regional aircraft manufacturer with a 
30-year reputation of high efficiency, operating flexibility and passenger comfort; 
secondly, due to the soaring price of crude oil, the growth in regional air traffic, 
and the pressure on airlines to reduce cost, the turboprop aircrafts are getting 
more popular on the world's regional aircraft market; thirdly. Company A belongs 
to two giant parent companies, which are world-leading organizations in the 
aerospace sector with strong technical and financial background; lastly. 
Company A delivered five regional aircrafts as its first sales into China to a 
Chinese state-owned airline in 1997. However, it has not sold any more new 
aircrafts to China since then. Although Company A set up a representative's 
office in Beijing in 2006, they have made little progress in growing market 
opportunities in China largely due to the high import duty of regional aircrafts. 
Manufacturing or assembling in China might be the only way-out strategy for 
achieving market growth in China.
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4.3.3 Chinese Partner of Case A (Company L)
Company L, a private owned enterprise, was established in 1982 with a 
registered capital of 12 million euro and 60 million euro assets covering trading, 
mining, and property development. Among five private shareholders, Mr WM is 
the chairman and also the biggest shareholder with 35% stake. The core 
business of Company L is in the mining sector but the company started to get 
involved in aviation sector, when Company L, holding 51% shares, set up a joint 
charter airline, in 2006 with another Chinese private airline Company O, holding 
49% shares. The charter airline leased one Boeing 737-500 aircraft to operate 
an air route between Tianjin-Hefei-Kunming. However, beginning on December 
15, 2008, all the Company O' flights were suspended for one month due to a 
dispute among its shareholders and its joint charter business with Company L 
has been stopped as well ever since. Therefore, Company L has only less than 2 
years’ experience in running a charter airline business in Chinese aviation sector, 
but Mr WM personally has strong collection with Civil Aviation Administration of 
China in Beijing as what Mr WM claims to the researcher.
4.4 Case B
4.4.1 introduction of Case B
Being another aircraft final assembly line project. Case two is a joint 
venture between Company B(51 percent) and the Chinese industry Consortium, 
Company Z (49%), which comprised the Company T, a local governmental 
company, which holds a 60 percent. Company V I , which holds 20 percent and 
Company V2, which holds 20 percent of the consortium’s 49 percent overall 
share. This FAL project of was successfully established in north Chinese port city 
of Tianjin not far from Beijing in May 2007 and is the third FAL in the world after 
the ones in Toulouse, France and Hamburg, Germany. All the aircrafts are
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assembled and delivered in China, and held to the same standards as those 
assembled and delivered in Europe. With a registered capital of 60 million EUR, 
a total investment of 800 million EUR and a land coverage of about 0.6 million 
square meters, this FAL is built for the final assembly, painting, testing and flight 
experiments of a medium-range, single-aisle twin-engine airplane with a 
capacity of 180 seats, which remains the most popular aircraft of Company B 
after 17 years on the market. The company has about 1000 people working on 
site including more than 150 employees from Company B in Europe.
The National Development and Reform Commission of China (NDRC) and 
Company B signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on December 4, 
2005 when the Chinese Premier visited Company B's Headquarters in France. 
This MOU has confirmed a Chinese order of 150 commercial aircrafts with a list 
of price of nearly US$10 billion and also finalized an agreement to set up a FAL 
plant making those aircrafts in China as part of the deal. As the 
multi-billion-dollar deal for the European aerospace giant, the deal also included 
an additional 20 of the European aircraft maker's new wide-body planes. Since 
the end of 2005, Company B had been searching for appropriate IJV Chinese 
partners with the help of NDRC in four regions of China, including Zhuhai, 
Shanghai, Xian, and Tianjin. Finally, Tianjin has been selected as the location for 
this FAL project after 15 months negotiation and the Chinese Consortium, 
Company Z signed the joint venture agreement with Company B for establishing 
the FAL project on June 28th 2007 in the presence of Chinese Premier. The 
Tianjin FAL started operation in August 2008 and the first aircraft assembled in 
Tianjin was delivered to its first airline customer in June, 2009. Since then, a total 
of more than 130 aircrafts have already been delivered to 11 Chinese airlines 
from the Tianjin plant. Because the FAL was located in China, Chinese airlines 
have placed orders for more than 550 Company B's aircrafts in the last few years 
and the in-service fleet of this Company B's aircraft in China have increased 
from some 200 to more than 770 by the end of August 2013.
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4.4.2 Foreign investor of Case B (Company B)
Company B is a leading aircraft manufacturer with the most modern and 
comprehensive family of aircrafts, ranging from 100 seats to more than 500 
seats. It is jointly owned by a French group company (75%) and a British 
company (25%). Since the early seventies, the Company have sold more than 
11,700 aircrafts to more than 470 customers and operators in the world and have 
already delivered more than 7,300 of these airliners. Due to the China's 
economic booming and the rapid development of the Chinese aviation industry. 
Company B has published estimates that potential sales among all airlines in 
China over the next 20 years will be more than 1,600 airplanes and it is seeking 
to occupy a 50 percent market share in Chinese civil aviation sector by 
undercutting its American competitor. Besides selling aircrafts to Chinese market. 
Company B has also purchased more than 200 million U.S. dollar worth of high 
quality components and materials per year from Chinese companies in recent 
years.
4.4.3 Chinese Partner of Case B (Company Z)
Company Z was formed with a registered capital of around 40 million USD 
at the beginning of 2007 especially for this FAL project by three Chinese 
companies. Company T, Company VI and Company V2. Company T was 
founded by Administrative Committee of Tianjin Port Free Trade Zone in 1999 
and was authorized by local government to manage 120 state-owned companies 
in this region. The core business of Company T covers energy and public utilities, 
trade and logistics, real estate development and property management, and 
financial leading business. With a total asset of 47.6 billion in 2012, Company T 
has been growing with the development of the Tianjin Free Trade Zone and is 
committed to change Tianjin Port Free Trade Zone, Airport Logistics Industrial 
Park and Airport International Logistics Zone into a fastest-growing region in
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China.
In October, 2008, the other two Chinese partners of Case B, Company V1 
and Company V2, were merged into one giant state-owned group company. 
Company V, in order to more efficiently manage resources and avoid redundant 
projects. Both Company V1 and Company V2 have been China's two leading 
state-owned aviation manufacturers and their business units cover defence, 
transport aircraft, engine, helicopter, avionics and systems, general aviation, 
aviation research flight test, trade and logistics, assets management, finance 
services, engineering planning and construction, automobile and etc. After being 
merged. Company V, as one of World Top 500 enterprises, owns almost 200 
member companies and approximately 400,000 employees. The major business 
focus of Company V is to efficiently develop indigenous military technologies and 
to eventually compete with Boeing and Airbus in the civilian airline industry.
4.5 Conclusion
Because a review of the research context is essential for the analysis of 
findings, this chapter briefly presented the context of the case study by 
examining the status quo of Chinese aviation sector, introducing two case 
projects and providing background information of both foreign investors and 
Chinese local partners in each case. Figure 4.1 offers basic information of both 
cases and contrasts the similarities and differences between these two IJVs. In 
addition, a historical account of the most important events for each case is 
illustrated in Appendix J and K respectively.
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Exhibit 4.1 Basic information of both cases of this study
(Resource: present author)
IJV Projects Case One(Failed) Case Two(Successful)
IJV country China China
IJV business Aircraft Final Assembly 
Line
Aircraft Final Assembly Line
IJV location Hefei, Anhui Province Tianjin, China
Product of IJV 72 seats Regional Aircraft 180 seats trunk Aircraft
Origin of Foreign Investor France France
Origin of Chinese Partner Anhui, China Tianjin, China
Shareholding Of Foreign 
investor
51% 51%
Shareholding Of Chinese 
Partner
49% 49%
Year of initial contact 2006 2006
Length of Negotiation Four Years with a failed 
outcome
15 months with a successful 
outcome
Year of establishment Failed in 2010 2007 Delivered the first 
aircraft in 2009
Size of the investment 300 million EUR 800 million EUR
Registered Capital 40 million EUR 60 million EUR
Ownership Type of 
Foreign Investor
50% owned by the world 
largest aerospace and 
defence corporation
75% owned by the world 
largest aerospace and 
defence corporation
Ownership Type of 
Chinese Partner
Private-owned enterprise Jointly owned by three 
state-owned enterprises
Partner search Both parties met in the 
China Air Show
NDRC helped the foreign 
investor to identify four IJV 
candidates
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Chapter 5 Data Analysis
5.1 Introduction
After having discussed the methods of collecting and analyzing the 
empirical data in Chapter 3 and the context of the study in Chapter 4, this thesis 
now presents the analysis of the collected research data in Chapter 5. As 
presented in Chapter 3, this study draws on three main data sources: interview 
data, documentary data and observational evidence. In Case one, the 
researcher, as the leading interpreter for Company L, was privileged to have 
access to minutes of meetings, different versions of draft IJV contracts, 
correspondence between directors of each party, and interviews with alliance 
managers, senior directors, lawyers involved in both cases, as well as 
consultants appointed by both parties. Compared with Case one. Case two lacks 
of observational evidence, because the researcher was not involved in this IJV 
formation project as a participant. All the research data collected in Case two 
originated either from interview data or analysis of documentary evidence. 
Twenty in-depth semi-structured interviews in total (Exhibit 3.4) with 11 key 
participants involved with the failed IJV case and 9 key informants from the 
successful case have been conducted to gather insightful views on motives for 
partnership entry and partner selection process from both the perspectives of 
foreign HEM investors and Chinese partners. To guide the data analysis, this 
study linked each data analysis section with research questions identified in 
Chapter 2. Because of the ethical issues, both of the case projects and involving 
parties will be identified by the letters throughout Chapter 5 and the acronyms 
are used to recognize the different interviewees or correspondents. Section 5.2 
presents the evidence from analyzing the case one, a failed IJV formation, 
whereas section 5.3 introduces the findings related to the case two, a successful 
IJV formation. In both of these two sections, the data analysis will focus on the
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motives of foreign investors in forming IJVs (section 5.2.1 and section 5.3.1), 
motives of Chinese partners in allying with foreign investors (section 5.2.2 and 
section 5.3.2), contextual factors influencing partner selection criteria (section
5.2.3 and section 5.3.3), the search and identification process of Chinese 
partners (section 5.2.4 and section 5.3.4), the criteria of partner selection(section
5.2.5 and section 5.3.5), the conflicts during the negotiation process(section
5.2.6 and section 5.3.6), as well as the summarized causes for failure or 
success(section 5.2.7 and section 5.3.7) in sequence. Following the individual 
case analysis, the research findings of both cases are compared to each other in 
section 5.4, indicating explanations for the observed differences. Finally, Section 
5.7 provides concluding remarks for this chapter.
5.2 Case One: a Failed IJV Formation
To start with, the case one describes a failed IJV formation process 
between a French aircraft manufacturer. Company A and a Chinese 
private-owned enterprise. Company L. Company A had spent almost four years 
on negotiating an IJV contract with company B, but this IJV formation ended with 
a failed outcome after more than 40 rounds of negotiation, which took place 
either in Hefei, China or Toulouse, France. In July 2007, both parties agreed in 
the Letter of Intent that Company A will have control over the management of the 
joint venture, particularly in the field of production and quality, by taking 51 per 
cent majority stake in the joint venture. The rest of shares, 49 per cent will 
belong to Company L, which should be responsible for having the capacity to 
purchase 50 aircrafts produced by IJV, providing broader access to the Chinese 
market, and securing the Chinese government approval for this project. Under 
the lead of Mr. ZB, the senior director of Company L, the Chinese negotiation 
team was composed with four groups of people, including five Chinese lawyers, 
one interpreter, five specialists of the Chinese aviation industry and two CEOs 
from Chinese airlines with international business negotiation experience as
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project consultants, whereas the Company A's negotiation team was made up of 
its senior director, Mr. JM, senior manager, Mr. PD, a European lawyer and an 
interpreter from their Beijing office. Hired by Company L as an interpreter and 
translator for this project, the researcher conducted “Participant Observation” by 
witnessing the important period of IJV negotiation process from 26th August 
2009 to the end of September 2010. The official interview data were collected 
from the interviews with all the key players of this IJV partnership from 
September 2012 to January 2013. This section aims to find out how the 
Company A selected its Chinese IJV partner and why the wrong choice of IJV 
partner caused the failure of IJV formation by analyzing the research data 
collected from interviews, archived records, and participant observation.
5.2.1 Motives of Company A (HEM investor) in forming IJV
In 2001, Company A exported its first batch of four airplanes to Chinese 
market; however, it had not sold any more aircrafts in China since then. For 
Company A, the main investment stimuli were to increase sales and market 
share in China. First of all, analysis of the interview data showed that the 
management team had a big confidence in the fast growth of Chinese aviation 
market. Mr. JM, the senior director of Company A, told the research in the 
interview that “China is stiil a deveioping country and Chinese people mainly 
reply on traditional railways and highways as transportation methods. As the 
Chinese economy develops, more and more Chinese people will be able to 
afford flight tickets and will travel more frequently by air.” The report of feasibility 
study presented that the aim of this IJV project is to produce more than 380 
regional aircrafts during the joint venture period of 30 years. Each of the aircraft 
aims to sell at 19.5 million USD for both domestic and overseas market, meeting 
roughly 1/3 of the demand of future need of Chinese regional aircraft market by 
2020.
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Secondly, the data also evidenced that Company A believes that its 
aircrafts will meet the requirements of Chinese aviation industry and will have a 
good market potential in China, especially for the western part of China with 
complicated and mountainous areas. Mr. PD, Company A's senior manager, 
explained that “compared with building railways and highways in those regions, 
it is much easier to set up regional airports. By the end of 2010, China has built 
over 151 passenger airports, among which the top 20 bigger airports are taking 
80% of the capacity, in the next 5 years, China will build another 42 new airports. 
There are many truck aircrafts (over 100 seats) commuting among those 
regional airports in China, but most of the airlines are making loss and resources 
have been wasted heavily. For example, the truck aircrafts (normally turbofan 
aircrafts) have to maintain a flight altitude of 5000 meters because of heavy 
noise, whereas thé regional aircrafts (normally turboprop aircrafts) can maintain 
a height of 3000 meters due to the feature of lower noise.” Therefore, Mr. PD 
argued that for the same distance, the regional aircrafts, like Company A's 
products, will make a smaller parabola in the air and the oil consumption will be 
lower.
Thirdly, the empirical results of this study suggested that Company A 
aimed to invest a new Final Assembly Line in Asia for the increased demand of 
Asian market, because its existing two European production lines were over the 
capacity. When asked about reasons for setting up a third FAL factory, the 
senior director, Mr. JM, claimed that “the Company A is very busy with its 
promising sales orders and wants to increase its production capacity 60% over 
current 1 aircrafts per month by 2014 in order to supply queued-up outstanding 
three-year orders worth 5 billion USD. From now on to 2015, Company A cannot 
deliver any aircraft to new clients without extending production facility, especially 
to the Asian market. Setting up a new FAL is the only way to meet the market 
demand.”
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The fourth motive found in the research data is that establishing a joint 
venture with a local Chinese partner, compared with setting up a wholly-owned 
enterprise will assist Company A to get the business license of operating 
manufacturing facility and obtain the local knowledge of selling aircrafts in China. 
According to the interview with Company A's senior director, Mr. JM, Company A 
has started to look for the Chinese joint venture partners, since the Chinese 
Zhuhai Air Show in Oct. 2006. When asked the reasons of choosing the joint 
venture as the way to break into Chinese market, Mr. JM answered that 
“Chinese market is huge, but the operation wili be difficult and the Company A 
will not be able to involve into the Chinese market thoroughly without local 
partners’ assistance. Due to different culture backgrounds, the way of Chinese 
thinking is different to that in the Western countries. The knowledge of local 
customs, culture and language as well as the existing sales networks is key 
motivational factors to seeking IJV cooperation with local Chinese partners. ”
From Company A's point of view, the fifth reason why Company A 
invested such a joint venture is that it hoped to provide the customers more 
comprehensive range of services. The FAL project can certainly employ a great 
number of Chinese employees, increase contact and the cooperation with more 
Chinese enterprises as well as different levels of Chinese governments, and 
provide more efficient after-sales services to Chinese airlines. By doing so, the 
Company A will be able to promote the commercial knowledge of regional 
aircrafts to more Chinese consumers as well as increase its brand impact in 
China. Mr. GT, the leader of the partner selection team in China explained that 
“the FAL factory wiii bring the Company A ’s aircrafts much closer to Chinese 
clients. For example, in the past, Chinese airlines had to send a team to France 
for 2 months to receive a new aircraft, if  Company A moves the assembly line to 
China, the Chinese airlines will save costs of buying airplanes.”
Taking advantage of the “National Dignity” of Chinese buyers as sales
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incentives may be the sixth motive of investing an IJV FAL in China, because 
“Made in China” products have advantages over “Imported” products during the 
decision-making of Chinese governmental purchase partially due to the 
patriotism factor in the heart of Chinese people, especially those directors of 
Chinese airlines. The FAL factory under European management but located in 
China is certainly attractive to its Chinese customers. Mr. FB, the senior director 
of Company A, also explained that “due to the tight competition with its Western 
competitors for Chinese market, Company A has adopted the strategy that they 
have moved some components’ manufacturing to China in order to get a good 
impression from Chinese airlines, which approved to be very successful. 
Company A ’s aircrafts from FAL line in China will certainly encourage more and 
more Chinese airlines to purchase these ‘Made-in-China’ products.” Research 
data from the interviewee has also demonstrated that the advanced aircrafts of 
Company A must occupy the Chinese market share quicker and make it harder 
for Chinese competitors to compete before the technology of regional airplanes 
created by Chinese manufacturers finally catch up with that of Company A. If the 
Company A's airplanes and “Chinese-made” aircrafts are at similar quality level, 
most of the Chinese airlines will prefer to purchase aircrafts with Chinese-owned 
intellectual property rights to protect the national industry of China.
Finally, further analysis of the research data suggested that the FAL 
project can help Company A to increase the profitability margin of its products 
and make its aircrafts more appealing to Chinese airlines by importing aircraft 
parts instead of assembled aircrafts because most of aircraft components may 
be exempted from the import duty and import value-added tax (VAT) according 
to the regulations of Chinese Customs. Mr. JM explained this motivation by 
showing a presentation in a negotiation meeting and the meeting minutes 
revealed that the major causing problem of slow development of regional 
aircraft market in China is that the government is imposing a higher import tax 
and duty on regional aircrafts (less than 100 seats) compared with trunk line
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aircrafts (more than 100 seats). The current Chinese import duty for regional 
airplanes is 22.85% and the VAT is 17%. However, the duty for imported parts 
of regional aircrafts can be exempted in order to support the development of 
Chinese own regional aircraft manufacturing industry, because Chinese 
regional aircraft manufacturers must rely on the imported aircraft components 
to keep the quality standard of their products.
5.2.2 Motives of Company L (Chinese Partner) in Joining IJV
After the motives of Company A in forming the FAL IJV in China are 
examined, this section aims to identify the motives of Company L in allying with 
its foreign partner in this IJV project. Based on the interviews with negotiators 
and directors of Company L, the findings of this study firstly suggested one of the 
most important reasons for joining this IJV is to realize the company chairman's 
childhood dream of having his own private aircraft. During the interview, Mr. ZB, 
the senior director of Company L, said to the researcher that " the chairman of 
Company L iives close to the local airport and has been watching aircrafts’ 
landing and taking off almost every day in the past 50 years. He always has a 
dream of owning a personal aircraft from childhood. Although he is a successful 
entrepreneur nowadays, Mr. WM had many suffering experience with long 
journey trains during his business start-up period. Being the owner of a private 
airplane will be a great reward for his past hard efforts. If the FAL project is 
successful, Mr. WM wili be able to purchase his own dreamed aircraft at a 
special price from the joint venture and travel around China by his own airplane.”
Furthermore, the interview with Mr. ZB also revealed that the reason why 
Company L has interest in this IJV project is that joining this IJV project is part of 
a company strategic plan for rescuing the existing charter airline business and 
promoting other business activities. Company L's main business activities have 
been in mining and smelting sector since 1980s and only started to operate a
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charter airline business in 2006 through its subsidiary company, called Company 
L Aviation Management Company. The charted route was between 
Tianjin-Hefei-Kunming by operating the airplane leased from a private Chinese 
airline company. According to the strategic plan of Company L's Aviation 
Management Company, the management board of Company L aimed to 
upgrade its charter airline business into the first regional airline company in the 
Anhui region of China. However, despite Company L's charter airline business 
was in serious loss during the negotiation period with Company A, switching the 
business to aircraft manufacturing might be a good way-out for its existing 
business in aviation sector as well as keeping existing employees. Mr. ZB said 
that “by making our own aircrafts, Company L wiii be abie to save costs of 
aircraft purchase and also grow more knowledge of regional airplanes for its 
proposed regional airline company.” Moreover, the analysis of the interview data 
with Mr. ZX, middle manager of Company L, indicated that “Company L can also 
increase its own reputation and company image in China and attract both local 
and central government’s attention by working with a world-class multinational 
company. It wili be a lot easier for Company L to get the license of operating a 
regional airline from the central Chinese government if Company L jointly owns 
an aircraft FAL factory with Company A. It can be also imagined that the 
cooperation with Company A wiii benefit other business activities among the 
group, such as property development, because the central and local government 
may grant more favorable tax policies and financial support to all of Company L’s 
companies as a whole group company after a closer relationship with Chinese 
government is established through the FAL IJV project. ”
Another important motive suggested from the evidence is that Company L 
has the same confidence as Company A's that Company A's products will meet 
the demand of Chinese regional aircraft market. Mr. WM ( the senior director of 
Company L) said in the interview that “ / have never worried about the market for 
Company A ’s products and the demand of regional airplanes for Chinese market
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will be more than 2000 units, among which half of the market will be turboprop 
type of airplanes according to the report published by Chinese aviation 
authorities. By the end of 2020, the Chinese aviation industry wiii need 800 
additional regional aircrafts. Our target wili be occupying one third of this market 
by producing around 380 Company A ’s aircrafts in China.” This view was further 
confirmed by the interview data with the senior director of a local airport, Mr. JH 
and he said that “due to lack of regional aircrafts, many Chinese airlines are 
using more than 120-seat aircrafts to fly the air routes with small traffic. However, 
the attendance rates become very low and then the airlines have to cut down the 
routes and try to group passengers. This solution might make the situation even 
worse. Many passengers have to choose high speed trains instead, because 
fewer air routes are available to travel with.” Moreover, because the oil 
consumption of Company A’s turboprop aircrafts is 50% lower than that of the jet 
regional airplanes with the same number of seats, the Company A's products 
might win their popularity in the current global market. Mr. ZB provided the 
researcher an example that “if an airline company has 20 Company A ’s 
airplanes, it may save over 30 miiiion USD on fuel costs annually in comparison 
with using the other competitors’Jet regional aircrafts.” According to the Letter of 
Intent between both IJV parties. Company L was committed to purchase the first 
50 Company A's aircrafts assembled in Chinese FAL factory for the proposed 
Anhui Airline, because the management team of Company L believed that Anhui 
province alone is already a good market for the Company A's regional aircrafts. 
Mr. ZB introduced to the researcher that “Hefei, the capital of Anhui, is an inland 
capital city. The regional aircrafts wiii become an important transportation 
method, which can link Anhui more closely with the neighboring provinces. 
There are already seven regional airports being built in Anhui, however, there 
are currently no flights commuting between those cities in Anhui, and the 
regional aircrafts, requiring only 600-meter runways, will be able to provide the 
market gap and save at least 20% operational cost compared with the trunk line 
aircrafts. ”
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In addition, it was deduced from the interview data that Company L 
believes that the assembly line in Hefei will exercise the huge and positive 
influence on the aviation industry in Anhui and also stimulate the other suppliers 
in this industry to enlarge their businesses in Anhui. Mr. JH revealed to the 
researcher that “the supply chain of aircraft manufacturing is very long, covering 
machinery, electronics, materials, metallurgy, instrumentation, chemical 
industries. According to the development of aviation industry in American and 
Europe, every 10,000 USD investment towards aviation industry wiii generate 
revenue of 500,000 USD to 800,000 USD, because more and more 
manufacturers of aircraft components wiii set up factories next to the FAL factory 
in order to save logistics and transportation cost.” Mr. ZB took the joint venture of 
Germany car manufacturer, Volkswagen, as an example and explained that “at 
the beginning of Volkswagen’s IJV operation, all the car parts had to be shipped 
from Germany 30 years ago. However, with the development of localization, 
most of the parts are now made in China except the car engine.” It is, therefore, 
suggested from the evidence that one of the important motives for allying with 
Company A from the perspective of Company L is to make contribution to the 
local economic prosperity.
5.2.3 What are the contextual factors influencing partner selection 
process?
Section 5.2.1 and section 5.2.2 have identified the motives of forming IJV 
from the viewpoints of both Company A and Company L. Nielsen (2003) argues 
that companies may be expected to value the capabilities of a potential partner 
differently depending on the strategic motives for the investment. Besides the 
strategic motives factors influencing the partner selection process of in this FAL 
project, interview data indicated that the nature of the industry of the joint 
venture and the respective industries of the venture partners can also affect the 
relative importance of partner-selection criteria. Since 2006, when Company A
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started to negotiate an IJV with Company L, Chinese airline industry had been 
experiencing a difficult time. Mr. MP, the senior director of a Chinese private 
airline, told the researcher that “due to the financial crisis and the increased cost 
of security for Olympics in 2008, the three largest state-owned Chinese airline 
companies have made the yearly loss in total of 3 bilion euro. In particular, China 
Eastern airline made 1.4 billion euro loss for that year, top of the loss league. In 
order to prevent bankruptcy, Chinese central government has given almost 
unlimited support to those state-owned airline companies, however, the 
private-owned companies did not have such luck and ail the private-owned 
airlines suffered serious loss due to lack of governments’ support and 
autonomous choice of flight routes. The most profitable flight routes like Beijing 
to Shanghai were only granted to the state-owned airlines. The East Star airline, 
the largest private-owned airline went bankrupt in 2009, while the OK airline, the 
second largest private-owned airline, temporarily stopped ail the operations over 
a month at the year end of 2008.” Mr. ZB also recalled that “Company L worked 
together with OK airline to set up a charter flight route from 
Tianjin-Hefei-Kunming by leasing a Boeing 737-500 on 25th September 2006. 
From 2006 to 2009, especiaiiy after the global financial crisis, this charter 
business Company L’s charter airline business had always been in serious loss. 
Every sold ticket caused 30 euro net loss under the level of the operational cost 
during that period, so the charter airline business could not last any longer and 
the Company L had to close its charter airline business at the end of 2009 as 
well." Interview data demonstrated that both Company A and Company L were 
concerned with the gloomy market condition during the negotiation period of this 
FAL project.
The second industrial factor affecting both parties' investment decision on 
forming IJV is that regional aircrafts are less popular in Chinese aviation market 
compared with trunk aircrafts. The status quo of Chinese aviation sector is that
big airports are reaching saturation, while the smaller airports do not have
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enough aircrafts going there. Although the market for regional aircrafts is huge, 
however, Mr. JH, the senior director of Anhui Airport, told the researcher that 
there are many reasons that Chinese airlines are in favor of trunk line aircrafts to 
fly between regional airports. Firstly, the cost per passenger seat is an important 
influential factor. The cost per passenger seat for regional .airplanes is about 
300,000 USD, while the cost of trunk aircrafts per seat is only 200,000 USD. 
Secondly, the airline business has peak and off-peak season. Regional aircrafts 
will not be able to meet the high demand in the peak travel season of China. 
Thirdly, China aviation industry has been already in short of pilots. The 
introduction of new types of aircrafts will involve more demand of pilots and 
relevant extra training. Fourthly, the regional aircrafts normally commute 
between the second-tier or third-tier cities with less developed economy. The 
income of passengers in those smaller cities is relatively low, so that the airfares 
cannot only be sold at a cheap price. Last but not the least, the Chinese air 
space are mainly under the control of Chinese military. Regional aircrafts 
normally have to give ways to trunk airplanes under the air control. Because the 
landing and taking off slots are very limited in big airports, those airports as 
transportation hubs usually do not allow regional aircrafts to enter. Mr. JH 
described that “Chinese regional aircraft market wiii have a bright future but with 
twisted roads leading to i t ”
Another important industrial factor influencing Company A's partner 
selection process is that Company A has a strong Chinese state-owned 
competitor. Company X, making similar turboprop airplanes. Mr. JM, the senior 
director of Company A, described that “the only advantage of Company X ’s 
regional aircrafts is “Made in China”, but such an advantage hinders the 
development of the Chinese regional aircraft m arket” The Company X's 
turboprop aircrafts cannot meet the requirements of certificate of airworthiness 
issued by Western countries due to its unrealizable quality. Before November 
2008, Company X's aircrafts were only sold overseas to third-world countries
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under Chinese governmental loan to support those developing countries in 
Africa, South-East Asia and South America, because Company X's aircrafts 
were banned by Chinese Aviation Authority from August 2002 to October 2008 
due to the quality problem. However, Company X's overseas sales suffered from 
World Financial Crisis starting from 2008. In order to survive. Company X had no 
choice but set up a regional airline. Happy Airways, a joint venture with Chinese 
Eastern Airline in November 2008 and requested this joint venture to purchase 
ten Company X's aircrafts from the parent company. As demonstrated by the 
interview data with Mr. LR, Chinese Solicitor of Company L, “Company X ’s 
turboprop aircrafts have always been regarded as the “National Pride” by the 
Chinese government since 1990s and the high import duty rate and VAT on
imported regional aircrafts is a kind of governmental protection given to
Company X ’s aircrafts. Company X  can also enjoy free duty and VAT on 
importing global advanced aircraft components, which can make its aircrafts 
become more competitive in both aspects of quality and price.” The 
establishment of Happy Airways and the operation of Company X's turboprop 
aircrafts in Chinese regional airline market in 2008 is a critical turning point for
Company A's FAL project. It is the three brand new Company X's aircrafts
delivered in November 2008 and a confirmed order of 10 new models of 
Company X's aircrafts in the next 5 years that constitute major threats to 
Company A's entry into Chinese market.
With an aim of creating further barrier for Company A's entry into Chinese 
market. Company X approached Company L in 2009 with a proposal of setting 
up a new joint venture airline with Company L as what they have done with 
China Eastern Airline in 2008. The proposed joint venture with a registered 
capital of 30 million euro was requested to order fifty regional aircrafts in the 
coming 10 years from Company X. Therefore, Company L was confronted with 
two joint venture options during the important negotiation period with Company 
A. One is to have a joint venture airline with a Chinese regional aircraft company,
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Company X, by purchasing 50 Chinese aircrafts, which may not have reliable 
quality. The other one is to set up a joint venture aircraft manufacturing line with 
Company A to supply 50 advanced foreign-branded aircrafts for the Company 
L’s own regional airline company. In the interview, Mr. ZB pointed out that “the 
Civil Aviation Administration of China has stopped the approval o f any new 
airline companies since 2009 in principle because of the financial crisis and 
gloomy sector performance. If Company L worked with Company X, there might 
be a higher possibility that Company L ’s dreamed Anhui Airline can get the 
exceptional license because of the purchase of Chinese aircrafts with 
autonomous inteliectuai property rights.” Therefore, this alternative option of 
working with Company X certainly affected Company L’s cooperation and 
negotiation process with Company A regarding the FAL project.
Additionally, the research results also suggested that institutional 
environment of China also affects the Company A’s decision-making of partner 
selection. According to the interviewee, Mr. LR, “there are currently 121 million 
passengers taking international or regional airplanes every year in China, 
however, only 4% are flying with regional aircrafts. The total number of aircrafts 
in China in 2013 is around 1,000, among which the regional airplanes are less 
than 10%, which is very low, compared with the American market’s 37% and 
European market’s 34%.” Mr. JM explained this situation in the negotiation 
meeting by arguing that “the major causing problem of slow development of 
regional aircraft market in China is that the central Chinese government has not 
given fair policies to support regional aircraft sector. The current Chinese import 
duty for trunk line airplanes is 7.06%, whereas the duty for the regional airplanes 
is 22.85%. Furthermore, although the landing and taking off cost of the smaller 
planes is only 0.6 euro per ton cheaper than that of the large aircrafts, the airport 
navigation charges are only 1 euro-cent difference, without taking the weight of 
aircrafts into consideration.” It was also found from the interview data that the 
examination and approval procedure of setting up aircraft manufacturing project
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strongly influences Company A's partner selection process. According to the 
Chinese commercial law, all the HEM projects must get the approval from the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) before obtaining the 
business license. The joint venture agreement between foreign investors and 
Chinese partners can only be officially valid after being authorized by the NDRC. 
During the IJV formation process of this FAL project. Company A has adopted 
the strategy of relying on Company L to deal with issues of governmental 
approval. However, Company L, as a private-owned company, cannot 
guarantee that the final draft IJV contract between two parties would certainly 
pass the approval of NDRC, although the chairman of Company L has good 
personal connections with some officers working in the NDRC. Therefore, it is 
suggested from the evidence summarized above that no matter how much both 
IJV parties like each other, the final choice on which Chinese partners 
Company A should select is decided by the Chinese partner's relationship with 
central Chinese government, simply because China is still a socialist nation with 
a strong centralized state power on controlling foreign-related investment.
5.2.4 How was Company L Identified?
The research results also provided empirical evidence for the search and 
identification process of Chinese partners in this IJV project. Geringer (1991) 
argues that multinational companies often adopt a linear path to select IJV 
partners: identifying, screening, evaluating, and finally selecting partners, 
however, this linear path is sometimes challenged by the uncertain and 
unpredictable nature of internationalization (Araujo and Rezende, 2003). Many 
foreign investors are inclined to search for partners within their existing networks 
with prior business connections or transactions by a formal search procedure 
(Gulati, 1995), but the results from the interviews demonstrated that Company A 
has never conducted business with Company L before and Company L was 
identified as the potential IJV partner opportunistically at the Zhuhai Air Trade
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Show in 2006. Before Company A’s delegation started to investigate all the 
potential IJV partner candidates in China, five candidates located in different 
areas of China were nominated by Company A' Chinese office in Beijing. Mr. PD, 
the senior manager of Company A in charge of Beijing office, told the researcher 
that “the initial contact with Company L started from the business meeting at 
Zhuhai Air Trade Show and the other four partner candidates were mainly 
selected from friends’ recommendation.” Consistent with Cyert and March’s 
(1992) finding, analysis of the interview data with Mr. JM also showed that 
“Company A looking for a fast entry into China selected the first identified 
strategically adequate partner, Company L, rather than invest time and 
resources on a comprehensive process of identification and evaluation of all 
potential partner candidates, which might fuifiii the maximum number of desired 
criteria.”
5.2.5 Why was Company L selected?
When questioned about the advantages of Company L over other the four 
IJV candidates, Mr. ZB, the senior director of Company L, said that “if  the license 
of operating a regional airline, Anhui Airline, is successfully granted by the 
Chinese central government. Company L will face the situation that where to 
purchase regional aircrafts to build its fleet.” The findings of research data have 
demonstrated that the major advantage of Company L was the potential 
purchase order from its proposed new airline. Mr. JM, the senior director of 
Company A, recalled that “one of the important reasons why Company A 
selected Company L as the IJV partner is that Company L was in the process of 
applying for a regional airline company, which would be able to bring sales order 
to the FAL project, if  Company A builds aircrafts together with the potential 
customer, it wili increase the possibility of new sales in China and even end up 
with guaranteed sales.” The confirmed order of 50 aircrafts from Company L as 
agreed by two parties in the Letter of Intent and Framework Agreement is a
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fundamental condition for IJV cooperation from the perspective of Company A. 
This Clause was also specified clearly in the first version of IJV contract drafted 
by Company A's lawyer. “Company L shall commit to the purchase of 50 
Company A ’s aircrafts from the Joint venture at an agreed price of 19.28 million 
USD per aircraft and the first 50 aircrafts produced by the JV Company shall be 
sold in China.” These findings proved that an important task-related criterion, a 
capacity of bringing confirmed sales order to the FAL project is one of the major 
reasons why Company A selected Company L as its IJV partner.
The interview data also found out that the choice of Company L as 
partner candidate was determined by another task-related criterion, an ability of 
acquiring government approval for this FAL project. The negotiators from 
Company L have emphasized many times on the different negotiation meetings 
that there should be no problem for Company L to get the license of operation for 
this FAL project, because their chairman has a close personal relationship with a 
senior government officer working in the aircraft manufacturing department of 
NDRC, which is responsible for approving all joint venture projects in Chinese 
Aviation industry. During the interview with the senior director of Company L, Mr. 
WM showed the researcher a business card, which has been lying on Mr. WM's 
office desk since the beginning of the negotiation with Company A. Mr. WM said 
that “as long as this gentleman is on our side, we will be able to get the license 
for this FAL project and Company A wiii also not be abie to work with other 
potential Chinese partners on this project unless we decides to give up this 
project in the first place.” Mr. JM, the senior director of Company A, explained to 
the researcher that “Company A has always been looking for a local Chinese 
party, which can successfully lobby the central government to stop protecting the 
Chinese state-owned regional aircraft factory by issuing a FAL license for foreign 
aircraft manufacturer. Our confidence in Company L ’s ability of acquiring all the 
necessary governmental approval for the FAL project made us believe that 
Company L might be the right IJV business partner for us in China.”
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Apart from the abilities of bringing potential sales order and acquiring 
government approval for this FAL project, the capability of acquiring suitable 
land from the local authorities for building assembly facilities might be the 
Company L's third advantage over other partner candidates, according to the 
interview with Mr. ZB, the senior director of Company L. He explained that “the 
FAL has to be built next to the airport because all the test flights o f assembled 
aircrafts must rely on runways nearby.” The interview with Mr. JM also revealed 
that Company A was attracted by Company L's ability of helping the joint venture 
to buy or lease the land next to the new 4E class international airport, which the 
local government aims to complete by the end of 2010. The interview with Mr. JH, 
the senior director of local airport company confirmed that “the local Chinese 
government was willing to give substantial support to the FAL project and 
reserve a suitable site near the new airport for the joint venture.” Mr. JH also 
revealed that “it will be a lot easier to find a suitable site for deveioping the FAL 
facilities near the new airport than the old airport, because many existing 
buildings around the old airport have to be demolished in order to construct new 
FAL facilities.”
5.2.6 What obstacles in the partnership were the most difficult to overcome 
during the negotiation process?
Although Company L was successfully selected by Company A as the 
most suitable IJV partner for this FAL project among five potential candidates in 
China, the whole negotiation process between both parties have lasted more 
than four years from June 2006 to November 2010. Because the researcher was 
involved in this failed case as a “Participant Observer”, a detailed description of 
the whole negotiation process (Appendix E) is provided as a reference for the 
following data analysis. Research results indicated that there were four main 
obstacles, which were the most difficult to overcome during the negotiation 
process.
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The first obstacle is on the responsibilities between the parties for the sales, 
marketing and support activities. At the initial stage of the negotiation. Company 
A required three conditions for the cooperation: 1) The JV company shall 
subcontract the marketing, sales and after-sales services exclusively to 
Company A. 2) The JV company's export sales shall not exceed 30% and 3) The 
first 50 aircrafts produced by the JV company shall be bought by Company L at 
the agreed 19.28 million USD.
In response to these requirements. Company L argued that the JV shall 
have its own freedom to sell the aircrafts globally and the JV Company can ask 
for help from Company A to guide the sales, marketing and after sales service if 
the JV Company thinks it is necessary. Company L also required that the overall 
objective for export sales of aircrafts produced by the JV Company shall be at 
least 30% during the Joint Venture term and Company A should guarantee that 
at least 30% of the turnover should be from aboard, because both the central 
Chinese government and Company L expect the JV to be an international 
company. Regarding the confirmed order of 50 aircrafts. Company L will be 
committed to buy 50 aircrafts only if Company A shall provide a complete list of 
existing component suppliers, authorize the JV to purchase directly with global 
suppliers and provide advice on what kind of components can be sourced locally 
in China.
After several rounds of negotiation. Company A agreed to give up the 
exclusive right in sales, marketing and after-sales service, but the JV Company 
should sub-contract all these services to Company A for the first 10 years of the 
JV period, because both JV company and Company L lack of experience in 
those matters. Furthermore, Company A also agreed that the actual amount of 
export sales achieved may be higher or lower than 30% and shall depend on the 
market demand, provided that the 50 aircrafts subject to the order shall however 
be delivered exclusively to customers in the PRC and not allocated for export out
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of the PRC.
However, Company L was still not happy with these compromises from 
Company A. Mr. ZB, the senior director of Company L, argued in one of the 
negotiation meetings that “if  Company A insists on obtaining 10-year exclusive 
rights o f marketing, sales and after-sales services from IV company. Company A  
should be responsible for selling at least 50 aircrafts as well, because the JV’s 
sales target for the first 10-year operation will be minimum 100 airplanes.” This 
argument seriously discouraged the Company A’s interest in negotiating further 
with Company L on this issue, as what Mr. JH told the researcher. He said “if 
Company A had the ability o f selling 50 aircrafts in China, it would not 
necessarily need a business partner in China.” The last letter, which Mr. WM, the 
senior director of Company L, wrote to Company A on the 26th Sept 2010, put 
the discussion of this issue into a worse situation. Mr. WM wrote that Company 
L’s shareholders hope to review the original number of the committed order 
quantity and the number should be about 30 instead of 50 under the recent 
market change of Chinese regional aircraft industry. Research data revealed that 
it was the last correspondence between two parties and Company A did not have 
further interest in negotiating with Company L after receiving this letter, because 
the decrease of committed order quantity broke up one of the fundamental 
conditions signed by two parties in the Framework Agreement at the beginning 
of negotiation.
Moreover, it was deduced from the data that the second obstacle lies in the 
role of each partner and of the JV in the sourcing and purchasing of the Supply 
Kits and the manufacturing Jigs and Tools, which are designed for building 
aircrafts. Company A initially planned to control all the purchase for the joint 
venture and requested that the joint venture shall buy the Supply Kits and the 
manufacturing Jigs and Tools, only from Company A and its affiliates at a fixed 
price, required by Company A.
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In regard to this issue, the response of Company L is that the JV shall 
control the purchase and source the supply kit globally by tendering process, so 
that Chinese local companies will have opportunities to get involved in the 
supply chain of building Company A's aircrafts and the local economy might 
therefore be enhanced by such a development. Mr. ZB, the senior director of 
Company L, said to the researcher that “localization is the key factor of success 
of joint venture in China.” He also took the carmaker, Volkswagen as a learning 
example. “When Volkswagen first came to China 20 years ago, almost every car 
component was imported from Germany and nowadays, more than 90% of the 
components are made in China. Such a joint venture can then be regarded by 
Chinese government a successful cooperation. Company L and local 
governments expect this FAL project to attract more investments to the local 
aviation industrial industry so as to benefit the local economy as a whole.” 
Company L further requested that the JV shall not only buy the Supply Kits from 
Company A or its affiliates under a global procurement process, but also shall 
increasingly raise the percentage of Chinese suppliers. Before giving orders of 
Jigs and Tools to Company A’s required existing suppliers, the JV Company 
should try to source locally in China in order to reduce the operational cost and 
maximize the investment returns. Mr. WM, the senior director of Company L, 
also argued that “without knowing the detailed list of component suppliers and 
the cost breakdown of Company A ’s aircrafts. Company L will not be able to 
verify the quality of the assembled aircrafts in China will be the same as that 
made in European factories.”
However, Company A did not agree with Company A’s arguments by 
arguing that neither Company L nor the JV Company have enough experience of 
sourcing and providing all the required components of building complicated 
aircrafts and Company A is also concerned about whether other suppliers will be 
able to meet the quality requirements of the Company A’s Aircraft Supply Kits. 
The interview data with Mr. ZB also revealed that another reason why Company
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A requested the JV to purchase all the components from Company A and its 
associated companies is that the cost of JV company and the profitability of 
Company A and its affiliates can easily be maintained. The question that who 
should be responsible for purchase was heatedly debated between both parties, 
but Company A made compromise at last by agreeing that “JV Company can 
identify and propose to Company A alternate suppliers or sub suppliers and 
source suppliers from China. In the meantime. Company A shall make best 
efforts to deliver a competitive product and maximize the economic and financial 
return of the project, with the aim to increase the use of Chinese suppliers, 
reduce costs and increase efficiency." Company A also agrees to set a purchase 
manager position in the JV Company upon Company L's request, but the 
purchase manager, nominated by the Company L can only be related with 
purchasing the Aircraft Supply Kits and the purchase manager must report to the 
General Manager and be under the General Manager’s supervision.
Unfortunately, all of those compromises still could not meet Company L’s 
requests. Mr. WM suggested that “Company A should review Chinese aviation 
manufacturers more carefully and write a proposal stating when Company will 
start to use new Chinese suppliers, how much the share of localization will be 
and what parts of aircrafts can be purchased in China potentially." The contents 
of the last letter written by Company L revealed the reason why Company L 
insisted on increasing percentage of Chinese suppliers. Mr. WM wrote that 
“Company A told him that the cost of the final assembly line is only 2% of the 
total aircraft production and the annual return rate is around 8% under the 
condition that Aircraft Supply Kits will be purchased at a fixed purchase price 
from Company A and its affiliates. The 8% return rate is not very appealing to 
other shareholders of Company L, because Company L could make a minimum 
35% annual return by investing in other projects, such as developing property in 
China. Unless Company A agrees to allow the JV Company to purchase 
components globally on a tendering basis with an aim for increasing the
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profitability of aircraft manufacturing, Company L will have no further interest in 
this project anymore.”
Thirdly, both parties have conflicts on the issues of management control. 
Company A initially did not plan to invest any cash capital into this joint venture 
and only planned to use its technology of assembling aircrafts in exchange of 
30% shares of the proposed joint venture. However, Company L refused this 
proposal and insisted that both parties should make equal capital contributions 
to the JV. Only until the 51/49 share split in the ownership of the joint venture 
was agreed between two parties, the formal negotiation process had started. 
According to the original contract drafted by Company A, the General Manager 
of JV Company should be appointed by Company A and be responsible for all 
the daily operations of the company, whereas the Chairman of JV Company, 
appointed by Company L should only act as a spiritual leader, who shall not get 
involved in the daily business operation. Company A also requested that 
Company A shall have 3 votes in the board meetings and Company L shall have 
2 votes. All the purchase decision, approval annual budgets, amendments to the 
business plan, production rate adjustments, and salary polices can be made 
upon the affirmative vote of a simple majority (2/3) of all the Directors. In addition. 
Company A requested that the General Manager, appointed by Company A shall 
have the authority of approving any agreement with any Party or any of its 
Affiliates for the sale and purchase of any Aircraft assembled by the JV 
Company up to RMB 2,500,000. If this kind of transaction between the JV 
Company with any Person other than a Party or any of its Affiliates, the figure 
should be up to RMB 5,000,000. These Clauses drafted by Company A have 
demonstrated that Company A does not want Company L to get involved in the 
daily operation of JV Company.
With regard to the above requests from Company A, the management 
team of Company L believes that such an arrangement of management control
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is unfair to Company L. Mr. ZB, the senior director of Company L, said that 
“although Company A has the advantages of providing technology to the joint 
venture, Company L also provides the governmental supports and market 
access to the JV company. We believe that the importance of Company A ’s 
technology is equal to Company L ’s essential knowledge of Chinese market and 
deep relationship with Chinese governments. 49% shareholding is as important 
as 51%) ownership. Therefore, the daily business operation should be jointly 
managed by both parties with equal authorities.” Company L requests that all the 
decisions regarding approval annual budgets, amendments to the business plan, 
production rate adjustments, and salary polices will affect business profitability 
and should be all made upon the affirmative vote of at least 4/5 of the 
shareholders. Company L also suggested that the authorization power of the 
General Manager should never exceed RMB 500,000.
From October 2009 and March 2010, Company A and Company L have 
entered into a cold war period. Both parties have not contacted each other for 5 
months and only on the 25th March 2010, Mr. JM, Company As senior director 
sent an email to Company L and told Company L that they had made 
compromises on the remaining issues of previous negotiations by moving sales 
of license of IP and amendments to the business plan to unanimous vote, but Mr. 
JW insisted that “for these ongoing issues that do not affect the company 
strategy or business plan, we prefer to have a management structure that can 
function more efficiently. Company A is the 51% shareholder with the experience 
in managing an aircraft production facility, so it is expected that Company A can 
handle these less strategic matters on its own. The Chairman and the board 
should not enter into the day-to day management of the company, because this 
is the responsibility of the General Manager and the management team. The 
limited authorization power of RMB 500,000 given to the General Manager will 
also slow down the operation of the company.”
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However, Company A was not satisfied with those new amendments 
suggested by Company A, because the management team of Company L is not 
familiar with corporate governance structure of Western countries and is not 
confident that the General Manager appointed by Company A will be able to 
utilize the capital wisely. Company L insisted that they should be involved in all 
the decision-making related to selling aircrafts as well purchasing aircraft kits 
and the JV Company's General Manager must work under the Chairman’s 
supervision. In the last negotiation with Company A, Mr. ZB, the senior director 
of Company L suggested a hierarchy system of power allocation in the JV 
Company. The General Manager, appointed by Company A should only have the 
power of authorizing business transaction up to RMB 1,250,000 and the 
Chairman, appointed by Company L should have the power of authorizing the 
transaction documents, which worth between RMB 1,250,000 to RMB 5,000,000. 
For any business transaction above 5 million RMB, the JV Company should 
report to the Board Meeting for the permission. He also suggested other 
methods to balance the power of controlling between both parties, such as 
introducing a third shareholder to dilute the Company A’s shareholding under 
50%, appointing an independent director who can have one voting right in the 
board meeting, and head-hunting a CEO, who should not be appointed from 
either Company L or Company A’s related companies. After hearing those new 
suggestions made by Company L on the last round of negotiation meeting. 
Company A refused to give any further feedback on these issues.
The last important obstacle is that both parties cannot make an agreement 
on conditions for the termination of the IJV Agreement. Company A proposed in 
the draft contract that the JV Company will be immediately terminated under the 
following three conditions. Firstly, Company L cannot get the business license 
for the JV Company within 60 days after signing the joint venture contract. 
Secondly, any tax concession or a related issue for Export control is terminated, 
cancelled or revoked by the government. Thirdly, Company L cannot obtain a
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concession for a period acceptable to the Company A from the local government 
for usage rights of land near the local airport.
Regarding these three conditions, Mr. ZB, the senior director of Company L, 
argued that “Company L is not an agent of Chinese government and cannot 
make any promise for the Chinese government The only thing what Company L 
can do is to lobby the government If there are any changes in tax concession, 
which causes a Material Adverse Effect on the JV Company or any party. 
Company L needs some time to settle the problem and the joint venture should 
not be in the position of immediate closing down under such uncontrollable 
changes. Although Company L has close relationship with Chinese government, 
tax and duty rate are not decided by Company L. ” Company L requested that this 
termination be subject to a 12-month delay, because Company L needs extra 
time to lobby the governments. Furthermore, Mr. ZB said that “the Chinese 
governmental approval on big projects like building aircrafts is a complicated 
procedure and it will definitely take longer than 60 days to get the business 
license in China.” \N\ih regard to the usage rights of the local airport. Company L 
also cannot guarantee that the length of period granted by the local government 
meet Company A's requirements.
After Company L’s continuous efforts in the negotiation meetings. 
Company L finally agreed to give 180 days instead of 60 days to Company L to 
get the business license for the FAL project, otherwise. Company A is entitled to 
declare the JV Contract null and void without any liability towards the other party. 
With regard to the tax issues. Company A insisted that Company L should 
guarantee the tax concession for the whole period of IJV project, because the 
decision to make this investment is based upon a commitment from the Chinese 
government to provide a tax concession. Mr. JM, the senior director of Company 
A, said that “it is Company L’s responsibility that the Chinese government should 
be obligated to honor its commitment on this issue and if  the government
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changes its position after granting a concession, then either party should have 
the right to cancel the JV.” In the last email from Company A, Mr. FB, the senior 
director of Company A questioned Company L that “whether Company L is still 
confident to be able to secure the approvals of the Chinese governments and 
obtain the necessary tax exemptions.”
Mr. WM, answered this question by saying that “whether the Company A ’s 
aircrafts will able to enter China’s aviation market mainly depends on the attitude 
of the Chinese government. Company L cannot sign the IJV contract with those 
Clauses related with governmental guarantee on behalf of Chinese 
government.” This negative answer discouraged Company A's intension to 
negotiate further with Company L and both parties have not contacted each 
other since the date of this replying letter.
5.2.7 Why did this IJV formation fail?
Although both parties have spent more than four-year hard efforts on 
negotiating a mutually agreed IJV contract between them, this formation of FAL 
project ended with a failed outcome. Why did this project fail? The researcher 
finds it interesting to identify the causes of failure from the research data. Faure 
(2012) argued that the participants of international negotiation are biased, 
because they are convinced that their own arguments are the right ones and the 
explanation for the collapse of a negotiation normally lies on the other side of the 
table. Therefore, in order to collect interview data with higher validity, the 
researcher not only interviewed the negotiators from each party how and why 
this negotiation went down the drain, but also gained deeper insights with regard 
to reasons of failure from the in-depth interviews with three third-party mentors of 
Company L, who have witnessed the whole negotiation process of this FAL 
project.
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The research findings from the interview with Mr. JH, the senior director of 
local Airport Company, revealed that one of the important reasons why this IJV 
formation failed is that Company A has been overoptimistic with the 
under-developed Chinese regional aircraft market. He said that “Chinese 
airports are charging the same taking off and landing costs to both regional and 
trunk aircrafts and Chinese governments only authorize the most popular and 
profitable air-routes to the trunk airlines, mainly owed by the Chinese 
governments. Moreover, because most of Chinese people are taking their 
annual holidays at the same time around the National holidays of China, many 
Chinese airlines prefer to buy trunk aircrafts with more than 100 seats in case of 
the high demand in the peak season.” He further explained that “Chinese 
private-owned airlines were under serious survival pressure in China after the 
global financial crisis starting from the year of 2008, due to the shortage of pilots, 
no access of popular routes, limited financial support from banks and 
government, and lack of economy scale with only a small number of aircrafts. 
Chinese government has ceased to issue any new license to private-owned 
airlines because most Chinese airlines were in serious loss after the global 
financial crisis and some of the private-owned regional airlines even went 
bankrupt during the negotiation period of the FAL project.” Under such a difficult 
market situation, whether Company L can successfully get the license of a new 
regional airline from the central government and then operate the 50 Company 
A's aircrafts assembled by the FAL project is a serious problem in front of both 
IJV parties. Even Company L would have such a license, how long the Company 
L's regional airline company would be able to survive is another concern. The 
interview data also revealed that Hefei, an inland city in China, may not be a 
suitable location for this FAL project, because there might not be enough air 
traffic in this region for supporting the Company L's new regional airline business. 
Therefore, it can be summarized that the gloomy Chinese regional aircraft 
market during the negotiation period of the FAL project might be one of the 
critical reasons for this IJV failure.
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Additionally, the results also suggested that the failure of this IJV project 
may be caused by the threat from the Company A's Chinese competitor, 
state-owned Company X. Before November 2008, none of Company X's 
aircrafts could be sold domestically in China due to previous quality issues. Its 
aircrafts were only sold overseas to the third-world countries under Chinese 
governmental loan to support those developing countries. In that period. 
Company X could not cause any competition to Company A in the regional 
aircraft market of China. However, with the aim to rescue Company X from the 
edge of bankruptcy at the end of 2008, Chinese government decided to set up a 
new airline to operate Company X's ten aircrafts in China and Company X's 
aircrafts have started to be in direct competition with Company A's models in the 
Chinese regional aircraft market since then. Moreover, Company X's proposal 
on setting up a joint venture airline with Company L at the beginning of 2009 
dramatically affected the Company A's negotiation with Company L, because 
Company L can easily obtain a license of regional airline with the help of 
Company X as a joint venture partner. The interview data with Mr. LR, the 
Chinese lawyer of Company L demonstrated that the management team of 
Company L was hesitated with the choice between these two joint venture 
opportunities and the final decision of working with Company A on FAL project 
was then delayed. He also argued that “Company A missed the golden time of 
setting up its Chinese factory before the Chinese competitive aircrafts started to 
be accepted by the Chinese airlines.”
Besides the two major contextual factors leading to the project failure, 
analysis of research data also showed that Company A might adopt a wrong 
approach for searching and identifying its Chinese IJV partner. The institutional 
environment of setting up IJV project in China is different with that of Western 
countries. The license of forming an IJV project has to be granted by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in Beijing. Mr. LR 
suggested that “Company A should approach the NDRC in the first place before
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searching potential partners, because the NDRC may have special requirements 
for the potential IJV partner candidates. Normally the NDRC will provide 
feedback on whether this proposed IJV project will be welcomed by Chinese 
government and will also recommend some potential Chinese business partners 
for the joint venture projects upon the initial request of foreign investors.” 
Although the negotiators of Company L emphasized that Company L has good 
connections with the NDRC, but it cannot guarantee this proposed project will 
definitely be approved by the central Chinese government. Without contacting 
the NDRC directly. Company A cannot have the full knowledge of the attitude of 
Chinese government towards this FAL project. On 25th April 2009, Mr. WM, the 
senior director of Company L wrote a letter to Company A to summarize the 
progress of the negotiation. He wrote that the “local government has approved 
this joint venture proposal in principle, but the final approval has to be granted by 
the central government for such a substantial foreign investment.” In order to put 
pressure on Company A, Mr. WM also informed Company A that his connection 
in the NDRC proposed three conditions to Company A before authorizing this 
project. 1) All the Aircraft Supply Kits should to be globally sourced by the joint 
venture, and should not be purchased from Company A at a fixed price. 2) The 
joint venture should continue to enlarge the portfolio of Chinese suppliers. 3) 
30% of the aircrafts assembled by the joint venture should be sold to overseas 
market. However, all of these three conditions, which were passed on to 
Company A through Company L, might not reflect the true attitude of the NDRC 
on this project. In the interview with Mr. LR, he also made a suggestion that “if 
Company A fully understood the requirements of the NDRC with regard to this 
proposed FAL project before searching the potential partners, it would have 
been a lot easier to identify and negotiate with IJV partner candidates in China.”
In addition to a wrong approach of identifying potential IJV partners, it can 
also be found from the research results that the IJV formation failed because of 
choosing an unsuitable IJV partner. Evidence from the research findings
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confirmed that the potential partnership between Company A and Company L 
lacks of strategic fit, organizational fit as well as financial fit (Yan and Luo, 2001 ). 
The researcher found that the most important reason leading to the IJV failure is 
that both parties have incompatible value of the FAL project. From the beginning 
of negotiation. Company A has informed Company L that the cost of the FAL 
process only accounts for 2% value of the total aircraft production and the profit 
margin for its existing FALs in Europe is usually fewer than 8%. Due to higher 
freight and logistics cost of shipping giant bodies of aircraft to China, the 
proposed joint venture might not have advantages in cost-saving compared with 
Company A’s European production lines. However, the directors of Company L 
expected a much higher profitability from this FAL project and also compared the 
investment return rate of this project with what Company L have achieved in 
mining and property development sector. In the letter to Company A, Mr. WM 
wrote that “although the world economic recovery is still slow and China’s 
economic and social development is experiencing difficulties, China is still full of 
vitality. If correctly choosing the investment projects, our private capital can 
maintain a 35 percent of return ratio in general.” In order to reduce the cost of 
manufacturing and increase the investment return of FAL project. Company L 
requested that the JV should source all aircraft components globally on a 
tendering basis and at least 20% of the aircraft components required by the FAL 
project should be sourced in China. With regard to this request. Company A 
found it difficult to accept because the detailed cost breakdown of aircraft 
components is an important part of intellectual property rights of Company A’s 
aircrafts and sourcing alternative suppliers at the early stage of IJV may not 
maintain the same quality in Europe. Additionally, the leaders of Company L 
have the ambition to develop the joint venture as an international company, 
which requires the JV to export at least 30% aircrafts outside China, however, 
this ambition may interfere Company A’s existing global strategy as well as 
existing business success in other countries.
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The research findings reveal that Company A aimed to select a suitable 
Chinese IJV partner for its FAL project based on three important task-related 
criteria. The first important criterion is that the Chinese IJV partner shall be able 
to bring a confirmed sales order with a minimum 50 aircrafts to the joint venture. 
Secondly, the Chinese partner shall obtain Chinese central government’s 
approval on business license and favorable tax policies for the FAL project. The 
last criterion is that the Chinese partner shall provide guarantee on 
government’s concession of using suitable land next to the local airport. 
According to the interview data with Mr. JM, the senior director of Company A, 
Company A selected Company L as the IJV partner to form a FAL project based 
on three main reasons as follows: “the Chairman of Company L has agreed with 
Company A in the Letter of Intent between two parties that a confirmed order of 
50 aircrafts will be placed by Company L or its new proposed airline company to 
the Joint venture. Company L also confirmed that it can also help the IV to get the 
license of FAL production line from the central government and obtain 
satisfactory concession to Company A on tax policies and facilities from the local 
government.” However, it seems that none of these criteria can be met from the 
research evidence. After more than 40 rounds of negotiation, Mr. WM, the senior 
director of Company L informed to Company A that “the other shareholders of 
his company were only willing to be committed to 30 aircrafts instead of 50 under 
the continuously deteriorate market situation. Company L’s management team 
does not know when and whether their application of establishing a regional 
airline will be approved by the Chinese central government.” Moreover, Mr. WM 
also emphasized that Company L is not a Chinese government’s agent, who can 
give guarantee to Company A in terms of business license and tax concession. If 
any changes in governmental policies are against the interest of JV, Company L 
needs to spend extra time on lobbying both the central Chinese government and 
the local Chinese government. In addition, Mr. ZB explained in the interview that 
“the location of the Joint venture might become a problem. Due to its central local 
In the new city, the old airport will be converted into a green park. There is no
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definite date on when the new airport will be open and when the runway can be 
used by JV Company, although the new aircraft has been in construction.”
Additionally, there is clear evidence that the cooperation of both parties 
lacks of organizational fit in two aspects: poor communication between partners 
and absence of mutual trust. Firstly, Mr. MP, the senior director of a 
private-owned Chinese Airline, gave the criticism to the bad organization of 
Company L's negotiation team by saying that “negotiating such a big project is a 
sophisticated process, which requires careful planning and preparation. 
Company L should build a dedicated in-house team for this project from the very 
beginning; otherwise conflicts may occur because of the misunderstandings.” 
Because Company L's main business activities are located in Anhui, an inland 
area of China, it has little past experience of dealing with international business 
partners. None of the full-time employees of Company L can speak fluent 
English or French and Company L has to rely on part-time third-party 
interpreters to assist the negotiation with Company A. Furthermore, none of the 
lawyers, appointed by Company L, can speak good English or read contract and 
correspondence in English. All the communication had to be through interpreters 
or translators. Before the researcher joined the negotiation process, every 
chapter of the first English version IJV contract drafted by Company A was sent 
by Company L separately to each different university student for translation into 
Chinese in order to save cost and increase efficiency. However, there were so 
many obvious translation errors in the Chinese version of IJV contract that many 
original ideas from the English version had been lost in such an unprofessional 
translation process. The researcher also found out that both parties have 
completely misunderstood each other on some critical issues over 2 years due 
to the poorly translated IJV contract. Moreover, as the leading negotiator of this 
project, Mr. ZB does not have any experience or training of dealing with 
international negotiation and lacks of knowledge in aircraft manufacturing 
business. All the other members of Chinese negotiation team are on the
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part-time basis, so that little preparation has been made for each round of 
negotiation meeting. When there was a meeting of negotiation in Hefei, China, 
Mr. ZB then invited Chinese lawyers and other third party interpreters to be 
present in the meeting on that day in order to save cost of their services. For 
those meetings in France, Mr. ZB just took one interpreter with him to reduce the 
travelling costs. It is, therefore, clear that improper communication and deficient 
preparation might increase the difficulty of mutual cooperation.
The second aspect of organizational unfit between two parties is due to 
the absence of trust between partner and the negotiation teams. The senior 
director of Company L, Mr. WM, was offended by the private commission, 
offered by Company A to him privately at the beginning of the negotiation. He 
was always concerned about whether Company A truly aims to exchange its 
advanced technology with the Chinese market or just make short-time profits 
from selling those initial 50 aircrafts to Company L. Mr. WM was also 
disappointed by the Company A's short notice of absence of the proposed 
signing ceremony in Hefei on the 30th June 2010. The previous CEO of 
Company A agreed with Company L to sign a basic contract for the purpose of 
governmental approval by taking out whatever disagreed issues in other 
agreements to be discussed after the business license is issued, however, he 
did not turn up in the signing ceremony. According to the interview data with Mr. 
ZB, Company A made the chairman of Company L lose face in front of many 
Chinese local government officers, who attended the ceremony on that day. As 
what Mr. ZB explained to the researcher. Company L started to lose interest in 
further negotiation with Company A after this unhappy experience. Moreover, 
research findings revealed that the trust built between the negotiation team of 
both parties over four years was dramatically affected after Company A changed 
the management team by appointing a new CEO at the critical period of 
negotiation in 2010. The new CEO adopted a different strategy towards this 
proposed project and requested Company L to agree all the terms and
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conditions requested by Company A before applying for the business license 
from Chinese government. However, Mr. ZB argued that “Company L lost further 
interest in making efforts to start the negotiation from the beginning again with 
the new management team of Company A .” On the other hand. Company L was 
disappointed with Company A's changing some fundamental cooperation terms, 
which have already been agreed with Company A in the Framework Agreement 
and the Letter of Intent, such as the initial order of 50 aircrafts and equally 
sharing the cost of establishing JV Company. Company L kept bringing up new 
requests and new conditions during the process of negotiation and used the 
disagreements from Company L's other shareholders as excuses to repudiate 
what he has already agreed with Company A in the previous negotiation. When 
asked by the researcher why this negotiation fails, Mr. ZB, the main negotiator, 
analyzed that “some shareholders of Company L has gradually lost interest in 
this joint venture after understanding the potential return rate is less than what 
they have expected.” Also Company A was annoyed that Company L was 
discussing another joint venture project with Company A's Chinese competitor, 
Company X, at the same time of negotiating with Company A. In his last letter to 
Company L, Mr. FB, the senior director of Company A questioned Company L by 
asking that “whether Company L has already set up another airline company 
with Company X  and whether Company L is still committed with Company A on 
this FAL project.”
The last but not the least reason why the IJV formation failed is that there is 
a lack of financial fit between Company A and Company L. According to the 
business plan, the registered capital of the joint venture is roughly 40 million 
euro but the operating capital requires 300 million euro. Building the FAL facility 
alone may cost 40 million euro according to the estimates from Company A. 
When asked whether a private company has the financial ability to support such 
a big project, Mr. ZB, the senior director of Company L, said to the researcher 
that “Company L can afford half of the required register capital, 20 million euro,
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further capital required can be sourced from other three resources. Firstly, 
aircrafts are normally made for orders, so that aircraft manufacturers usually can 
receive 30% deposit from the clients. Secondly, Company A, as a high-tech 
company, will be supported by European governments and some financial 
supports can be applied. Lastly, most airlines buy their aircrafts on the leasing 
basis and the leasing companies and banks will provide financial support to the 
JV Company. Therefore, Company L believes that there should be enough 
capital supporting this massive joint venture project.” However, Mr. MP, the 
senior director of a private-owned Chinese Airline, said to the researcher in the 
interview that he does not believe Company L, as a small private-owned 
company with a registered capital of 12 million euro and total assets less than 60 
million euro, has the financial ability to co-support a FAL project requiring 300 
million euro operating capital with Company A. He also commented that one of 
the important reasons why Company L could not commit the purchase of 50 
aircrafts as it originally agreed is that “Company L was not in a strong financial 
position to support the FAL anymore after the impact o f the World Financial 
Crisis. ”
To sum up, the causes of failure in Case one can be traced back to both 
a number of internal factors at the company level as well as some external 
factors at industry level. The first reason at the company level is that the private 
ownership structure of the Chinese partner in Case one did not allow providing 
two key task-related criteria as what was expected by Company A from its IJV 
partner, such as guaranteeing the IJV license from the government and 
providing favorable tax policies. The second company level reason causing 
failure was due to the fact that the total number of aircrafts committed by 
Company L changed from 50 to 30 aircrafts, which dramatically reduced 
Company A's interest in the investment and also affected the trust between two 
IJV parties. Thirdly, there are major conflicts between the strategic motives of 
both parties. The foreign investor. Company A, aimed at increasing sales and
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market shares in China, while its potential Chinese partner in Case one was 
mainly interested in purchasing aircrafts at a good bargain so as to benefit its 
own airline business. In addition. Company A concentrated on its existing 
business expansion in Chinese market, while Company L expected the success 
of establishing such an IJV with a globally reputable foreign investor will 
enhance its reputation in China and also improve its Guanxi with local 
government, which will then contribute to other business activities, such as real 
estate development. Other than those causes of failure at company level, it may 
be also concluded that the changes in the Chinese regional aircraft market 
during the negotiation period might be the fourth major reason leading to failure. 
Company L could not sustain its own charter airline business with one aircraft 
during the gloomy aviation market, let alone maintaining its committed order of 
50 new aircrafts. Fifthly, the competition from Company A's Chinese competitor 
also exerted negative impacts on the business negotiation between Company A 
and Company L, simply because Company L had tv/o options of setting up a 
regional airline company at the same time. Lastly, the failure of Case one at 
industry level was also due to a wrong approach for searching and identifying its 
Chinese IJV partner. Within a protected and highly regulated aviation 
manufacturing market, it might be an unwise decision for the foreign investor to 
find a partner according to its free will. The likelihood of success could be 
significantly raised, if the foreign investor would look for suitable partners from 
the candidates recommended by the Chinese government. Another interesting 
finding from the Case one is that guanxi or good connections with Chinese 
government might not guarantee the successful formation of IJV in China. In this 
case study, although Company L was proud of its good guanxi or connections 
with a government officer with power and authority in Chinese aviation industry, 
favorable polices from government cannot be simply obtained based on an 
individual guanxi. It is unwise to sacrifice the whole guanxi web for a single 
guanxi partner, even though it is important, for the simple reason that individual 
guanxi partners contribute fewer resources than the guanxi group as a whole.
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5.2.8 Summary of Case One
To conclude, section 5.2 presents a detailed analysis of research data 
collected from the failed case project. Faure (2012) argued that there is much to 
learn from negotiations that did not reach any agreement, because failure is a 
most effective school for thinking. Both of the motives of foreign investors for 
forming this IJV project and the motives of Chinese partner in the case are 
provided with evidence. The Company A’s main purpose of forming such a FAL 
project is to increase its sales in China, while the main motive of Company L is to 
have a regional airline company operating the aircrafts, which can be bought 
from the JV company at a cheap price. It has also been found out that it is the 
motives of both parties, the status of Chinese aviation industry as well as the 
institutional environment of China that strongly influence the partner 
identification and selection process in this project. Importantly, the research 
results shov\/ed that the Chinese partner. Company L, in this case study was 
identified opportunistically without a systematical investigation and the partner 
selection was based on three criteria: confirmed sales order, ability of obtaining 
governmental approval, and ability of securing land permits from the government. 
In addition, the research findings revealed that during the negotiation process, 
the two IJV parties have obstacles of researching agreements in the aspects of 
responsibilities of sales and marketing, responsibilities of sourcing and 
purchasing Supply Kits as well as Tools and Jigs, the structure of management 
control and the conditions for the termination of the IJV Agreement. Based on 
the secondary data, participant observation and in-depth interviews, it is, 
therefore, suggested from the evidence summarized above, that the multiple 
external causes, such as the motives of IJV parties, the nature of industry, and 
Chinese institutional environment, combined together with the lack of strategic fit, 
organizational fit as well as financial fit between two joint venture parties at the 
same time, produce a multiplication effect leading to an ultimate failure of this 
IJV formation process. Exhibit 5.1 summarized the reasons explaining the failure
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of IJV formation in Case one.
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Exhibit 5.1 The reasons explaining the failure of IJV formation in Case one
(Source: present author)
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5.3 Case Two: a successful IJV formation
After presenting the data analysis of a failed IJV formation case, this 
study will examine the research data collected from a successful IJV project. 
Located in Tianjin, a northern Chinese port city close to Beijing, the Case two is 
also an aircraft Final Assembly Line (FAL) joint venture project, which is 51 per 
cent owned by a French aircraft manufacturer. Company B, and 49 per cent held 
by a Chinese consortium (Company Z). An investment company (Company T) 
has 60 per cent shares of Company Z on behalf of the Tianjin local government, 
while each of the two largest Chinese state-owned aircraft manufacturers 
(Company VI and Company V2) has 20 per cent. In 2008, Company VI and 
Company V2 were merged into one Group company, which is one of Fortune 
Global 500 companies with the same size as Google (21 billion USD in 
revenues). The initial discussion of this FAL project between leaders from 
France and China started in September 2005, when Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. 
Wen, visited France. The Chinese consortium in Tianjin was identified at the 
beginning of 2006. After almost one year and half negotiation, both IJV parties 
have signed the joint venture agreement in July 2007. As the first and only 
Company B’s aircraft assembly line outside of Europe, the FAL project in Tianjin 
delivered its first single aisle aircraft in June 2009 and has produced over 150 
aircrafts by the end of 2013. Appendix J illustrates a sequence of Events in Case 
Two. The researcher made his first visit to the FAL project in Tianjin under the 
recommendation of the Chairman of Company L in 2009 in order to gain lessons 
of forming this successful IJV project from the meetings with the JV's directors. 
Three different copies of IJV contract drafted at the different stages of 
negotiations and some important correspondences between JV parties were 
obtained on this trip. Moreover, with the aim of investigating the research 
questions of this study, the researcher conducted nine semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with senior directors and managers from both the foreign investor of 
this case and its three Chinese partners. The same set of interview questions
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used in the Case one have been adopted in the second case in order to offer 
opportunities for comparison between the research results. Based on the 
documental evidence and interview data, Section 5.3 aims to analyze the whole 
partner selection process of this FAL project, as well as the reasons why the IJV 
formation of this project was successful.
5.3.1 Motives of Company B (HEM investor) in forming IJV
What is the Company B’s purpose of establishing this IJV in China? 
Based on interviews with senior directors and managers from both the foreign 
side and the Chinese parties, the researcher found out five motives of Company 
B in forming this Chinese IJV project. First of all, the investment decision of 
making aircrafts in China can be considered as part of a long-term strategy of 
Company B to win a larger share of the fast growing China’s aviation market 
from the competition with its American competitor. Company I, which has been 
dominating Chinese market in the past decades. Mr. MR, the senior manager of 
Company B in China, told the researcher that “China is the second largest 
aviation market of the world, and it should surpass the US before 2032. 
According to the Company B’ latest Global Market Forecast, Chinese 
government plans to increase the total number of airports to 244 after building 
97 new airports by 2020. Chinese airlines will need more than 2000 single-a isle 
aircrafts in the next 20 years.” Because this market represents billions of dollars, 
many aircraft companies are constantly having a war to win this market. The 
interview with Mr. LB, the senior director of Company B in China, revealed that 
“the establishment of a FAL in Tianjin has significantly promoted the Company 
B’s image and brand in China and also brought the Company B closer to the 
clients in this fast developing aircraft market.” Th\s view is also confirmed by Mr. 
JK, the Chinese solicitor of Company T, who said that “the FAL factory has 
helped the Company B to strengthen its relationship with Chinese government 
and its reputation among Chinese customers by employing Chinese staffs,
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communicating with different levels of Chinese governments, as well as 
providing efficient technical services to Chinese airlines.” Mr. MB, the senior 
director of Company B, suggested that “setting up this FAL project is part of 
Company B ’s new round of competition with Company I.” According to the 
research results, the Company B’s aircrafts occupied less than one third of 
Chinese single-aisle aircraft market, before the Tianjin FAL project was 
established. However, China has ordered for more than 550 aircrafts from 
Company B since the IJV agreement of Tianjin FAL project was signed and the 
joint venture has helped Company B successfully increase its market share to 
50% by expanding the in-service fleet of Company B’s aircrafts in China from 
200 to more than 700 by the end of 2013.
Secondly, the logic of opening the FAL plant is to sustain Company B’s 
sales in China. Mr. LB, the CEO of Company B in China, said in the interview 
that “the FAL factory can be considered as a strategic project for Company B, 
not only to increase sales in China, but also to ramp up the production capacity 
of its best-selling aircrafts to meet the strong demand of Chinese market. ” The 
FAL project was built due to the expectation of large orders from Chinese 
airlines for the popular single-aisle aircrafts. Chinese domestic air routes are 
expected to grow strongly in the coming years because the economy of China 
continuously expands. The empirical results of this study suggested that 
Chinese airlines were purchasing around 70 Company B’s single-aisle aircrafts 
every year from 2001 to 2005, but both of the two Company B’s existing FAL 
factories in Europe could not keep up the demand from the fast developing 
Chinese aviation sector. At the end of 2005, Prime Minister, Mr. Wen placed a 
new order of 150 Company B’s aircrafts with Company B on behalf of Chinese 
government. In order to deliver those aircrafts more efficiently and sustain its 
incremental sales in the robust Chinese civil aviation market, the management 
team of Company B decided to set up a new FAL factory in China. Mr. JK, the 
Chinese solicitor, argued that “Company B had to build the third FAL somewhere
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on the planet upon the fast-growing demand from the Chinese market. It could 
be built next to the existing FAL factories to save costs of construction, however, 
the third line was given to China mainly for the political purpose. ”
The third motive found in the research data is that the FAL factory might 
help Company B to lower manufacturing costs to better compete with its 
American competitor. According to the interview with Mr. LB, the senior director 
of Company B, the Tianjin FAL project is part of Company B’s PowerS 
restructuring program, which aimed to achieve a targeted reduction of 3 billion 
USD in overhead and costs by bringing more outsourcing suppliers and new 
risk-sharing partners. The director of Company B admitted that “at the 
beginning of the FAL project, it costs Company B more to assemble the same 
aircraft in China because of the longer lead time and higher transportation cost 
to bring the aircrafts from Europe in sections ready for assembly, although the 
freight costs for shipment from Europe to China is normally cheaper due to many 
empty containers available.” However, from a long-term view, the FAL project in 
China will reduce cost of employment and cost of purchase by gradually 
reducing foreign engineers in the factory and increasing the percentage of 
Chinese suppliers, because the wages of Chinese workers and the prices of 
Chinese components are relatively cheaper than those in Europe. In particular, 
the wings of Company B’s aircrafts can be now outfitted in China and then 
delivered to Tianjin FAL. In the past, part of the Company B’s wing boxes, 
purchased in China had to be shipped to UK for subassemblies and then 
delivered to the two European FAL factories. Mr. SF, the senior director of 
Company V1 supported the argument by saying that “China is graduating more 
than 500,000 engineers each year and the Chinese currency is 50% 
undervalued against euro. The advantage of cheap Chinese labor cost will be 
hard to beat in the coming years, unless there will be something dramatic 
movements in currency and trade structure of globalization.” Furthermore, the 
research findings demonstrated that the FAL factory in China can save initial
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production costs because the local Chinese government is willing to invest 
factory facilities for this project on the basis of low interest leasing. It can be also 
found that because the central Chinese government provides tax exemption for 
imported aircraft parts, Company B can increase profitability of selling aircrafts to 
China if it can maintain the similar cost level of assembling aircrafts in China 
compared with its costs in Europe. Mr. DL, the senior director of Company B for 
the FAL project, recalled that “the cost o f  assem bling aircrafts in China was 
s ligh tly  h igher than that o f  the European factories despite m uch low er la bo r costs, 
bu t a fte r the cost o f  production goes down ove r time, th is Tianjin p lan t actually  
will m ake h igher p ro fit than Com pany B ’s two o the r assem bly lines. ”
The fourth motive of Company B in investing this FAL factory is to use its old 
technology of assembling an old-model aircraft in exchange for the Chinese 
market, before this old technology finally becomes valueless to Chinese 
manufacturers. Mr. MB, the senior director of Company B, said to the researcher 
that “the current technology o f  Com pany B ’s FAL in China is based  on a program  
developed in the 1980s. Com pany B  has a lready deve loped a m ore  
technologica lly advanced single-aisle aircraft, which its two European FAL  
factories are responsib le fo r delivering to the worldw ide custom ers.” In his 
opinion, as long as Company B continues its strategy of being the leader in 
technology, it will be extremely hard for Chinese manufacturers to catch up 
quickly. Even if Chinese manufacturers apply knowledge gained from this FAL 
project on its own competing aircrafts, the Company B’s new-model aircrafts 
would have already been popular in the market. Therefore, Company B intended 
to grasp the opportunity that Chinese airlines are still willing to purchase the old 
model of Company B’s aircrafts and transfer a relatively low-tech part of the 
aircraft manufacturing process to the Chinese manufacturers in exchange for 
large aircraft orders before the Chinese manufacturers lose interest in the 
Company B’s old technology eventually. The interview data further found that
once Chinese airlines select the old-model of Company B’s aircrafts over the
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American competitive aircrafts, there is a higher possibility that these customers 
will purchase the new models of Company B’s aircrafts as well in the future. 
Company B might increase the total turnover of all ranges of products by sharing 
the old assembly technology, a small fraction of its intellectual property, to 
Chinese manufacturers.
Lastly, the empirical results of this study suggested that setting up an 
assembly plant in China is part of Company B’s goal to be a long-term strategic 
partner rather than an opponent of the ambitious and rapidly expanding Chinese 
aviation sector. Mr. LB, the senior director of Company B in China, said that 
“Com pany B  is com m itted to a long-term  deve lopm ent in China and the Tianjin 
FAL project, as a s ign ificant m ilestone fo r the cooperation between Com pany B  
and  China, is pa rt o f  Com pany B ’s s tra tegy o f  in terna tiona liza tion.’’ The 
research results revealed that Company B has been progressively placing more 
orders with Chinese state-owned manufacturers for its aircraft parts and trying to 
integrate Chinese aerospace firms into the portfolio of its suppliers. Company 
B’s aircraft components, such as wing parts, emergency-exit doors and 
assembly and transportation tools and jigs for Company B’s aircrafts, have 
already been supplied by six Chinese manufacturers. Mr. LB suggested that 
“Com pany B  p lanned to increase its purchase in China from  34.5 m illion USD in  
2005 to 450 m illion USD in 2015 and  1 b illion USD in 2020 and  hoped that such  
an increase o f  purchase from  Chinese suppliers w ill be pa id  o ff b y  the increased  
orders o f  a ircrafts from  C/?/na.” According to the interview with Mr. MR, the 
senior manager of Company B in China, “Com pany B  m ight take a gam ble b y  
transferring its technology o f  assem bling a ircrafts to Chinese am bitious  
sta te-ow ned enterprises, but Com pany B  m ust take such a risk  to win m ore  
orders in an estim ated 300 billion USD worth Chinese m arke t.” He also added 
that “one o f the m a jo r advantages o f  Com pany B  is its  cooperative re la tionship  
with Chinese aviation industry, from  no t on ly m ateria ls procurem ent, bu t also  
jo in t ventures, such as the FAL project. F o r the fu rther grow th in China,
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Com pany B  w ill continue to pursue this proven s tra tegy.” Besides the first 
batch of 150 aircrafts, which Chinese government was committed to before the 
establishment of this FAL project, Chinese government has placed two further 
large orders of Company B’s aircrafts after the FAL factory delivered the first 
assembled aircraft, making the total order quantity of Company B’s single-aisle 
aircrafts reach a total of 400. Mr. LB said that “a ll the three large orders p laced  
b y  China in the recent years w ould have been possible, bu t no t like ly  w ithout the  
Tianjin FAL  prq/ecf.” Additionally, the results also suggested that Company B’s 
initial decision to invest in China was about market share, but Company B is now 
attracted by Chinese highly skilled engineers and the capability of Chinese 
manufacturers in producing high quality aircraft parts for Company B at a cheap 
cost. Mr. MB said that “Com pany B hopes to be a Chinese com pany a nd  de live r 
China-built a ircrafts to W estern custom ers one day, i f  p roduction s lo ts becom e  
available a t short notice. There is no reason w hy a irlines outside China shou ld  
not buy a Com pany B a ircra ft m ade in Tianjin one day.”
5.3.2 Motives of Company Z (Chinese Partners) in Joining IJV
After examining the motives of Company B in forming this IJV project in 
China, this study will focus on the motives of Company Z (Chinese Partners) in 
allying this FAL project. The research evidence showed that the rationales why 
the Chinese partners joined this FAL project are mainly in three aspects: growing 
the skills needed to support Chinese own aircraft manufacturing, bringing more 
business to Chinese suppliers through localization of aircraft parts and 
contributing to the development of local region. The first two motives are related 
with Company V1 and Company V2, because they are both Chinese leading 
aircraft manufacturers, while the third motive is associated with Company T, 
which is an investment company belonging to the local government. The 
research results have demonstrated that both Company V1 and Company V2 
hope to maximize the knowledge gain from Company B for their own fledging
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aircraft production lines. In the Chinese central government’s 11th five-year 
development plan, Chinese government considered a large-aircraft 
manufacturing project as an important part of the Chinese long-term 
development plan for science and technology. Company VI and Company V2 
have successfully launched their own designed regional airplane, a 90-seat 
ARJ-21, which represents a hodgepodge of about 20 foreign suppliers and 
subcontractors. Under the Chinese central government’s 13th five-year plan, the 
Chinese aircraft manufacturers plan to challenge the Western aircraft 
manufacturers with a 180-seat aircraft C919, which was originally expected to be 
in the market at the end of 2015 and has already had an outstanding order of 
380 aircrafts. The Chinese state-owned manufacturers plan to source all of the 
aircraft components in China and sell over 2,000 C919 in the next 20 years. 
However, the delivery of the first C919 has been delayed due to many quality 
issues and the Chinese aircraft manufacturers cannot give a clear date of its first 
delivery. Mr. SF, the senior director of Company VI said that “i f  we m anage the 
FAL pro jec t together with Com pany B fo r severa l years, we can accum ulate  
experience in designing, assem bling and  selling large aircrafts. M oreover, i f  
those Chinese technicians and p ro jec t m anagers, tra ined by  the FAL project, are  
la te r on em ployed b y  Chinese a ircraft production lines, they w ill b ring advanced  
know ledge in production and m anagem ent to Chinese a ircra ft m anufacturers  
and  raise the qua lity  s tandard o f  Chinese aircrafts. ” Mr. NC, the senior director of 
Company V2, added that “although the F A L  p ro jec t on ly  accounts fo r 5% w ork  
load  o f the whole process o f  a ircraft m anufacturing, the com puterized testing  
technology o f  Com pany B ’s FAL p ro jec t is  m ore superio r to ours and even m ore  
advanced than its Am erican competitor. The se t o f  tools and m ethods o f  testing  
aircraft sa fe ty  is what we want to learn m ost from  this FAL p ro je c t.” Another 
benefit of the FAL project for the Chinese C919 is that this Tianjin project will 
attract a group of world-class aircraft parts suppliers to set up factories in China. 
Those factories might not only provide supporting facilities to the Tianjin FAL 
project, but also give support to the research and development of C919 project.
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Additionally, analysis of the data suggested that the FAL project may 
bring more business to Chinese aircraft parts suppliers. Mr. LB, the senior 
director of Company B in China told the researcher that “the FAL p ro ject 
attached great im portance to the cultivation o f  loca l supp liers in o rde r to reduce  
costs from  the in itia l stage o f  the project. The percentage o f Chinese loca l 
suppliers in the FAL pro ject has always been the m ain fac to r in fluencing the 
purchase o f Chinese governm ent and  Chinese airlines. F o r a long time, the 
percentage o f  Chinese loca l supp liers in Com pany B ’s a ircrafts has been  
m ainta ined a t less than 6%, bu t Com pany B  m ade a prom ise with Chinese  
governm ent that this percentage w ill be gradually  increased to above 15% in this 
FAL prq/ecf.” With regard to this issue, Mr. SF, the senior director of Company 
V1 suggested that “the FAL project, assem bling the wings, engines, fuselage, 
noses, tails, and doors im ported from  Europe together, is less than 5%> o f  the 
value added process o f  a ircra ft m anufacturing and  the rea l value added p rocess  
is in the a irc ra fts ’ com ponents.” The research evidence has demonstrated that 
as the FAL project accelerates the process of localization according to Company 
B’s agreement with Chinese government, it will have to use more and more 
Chinese suppliers, especially in the aspects of fixtures, equipment maintenance, 
and production consumables. The strict European standard may also help the 
Chinese suppliers to enhance product and service quality and improve the 
international competitiveness. Some local suppliers may enter European and 
global markets because the FAL project operating at a European standard firstly 
opens the door to them. The localization of manufacturing the wing section of the 
Company B’s aircraft in China is a typical example. Before the existence of the 
FAL project, a subsidiary of Company V1 could only build wing boxes for 
Company B’s aircrafts. Those wing boxes had to be shipped along with other 
parts to Company B’s factory in UK, where the wine is outfitted before being 
returned to the FAL factory in Europe. After the FAL project was established in 
China, more than 50 aircraft parts suppliers have built facilities close to the
Tianjin FAL factory within eight months. The wing sections of Company’s
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aircrafts assembled by the Tianjin FAL project are now outfitted in China. Such a 
progress in localization not only helped the FAL project save huge amount of 
costs of production, but also provided the local Chinese manufacturers new 
business opportunities.
Another motive of Chinese partners is that the FAL project will contribute 
to the development of Tianjin Binhai New District and its region. Mr. BP, the 
senior director of Company T, explained that “the Tianjin FAL project, as a g ian t 
pro ject with the to ta l investm ent ove r 1.5 b illion USD, has the responsib ility  o f  
leading the fast econom ic deve lopm ent o f  the loca l area. The FAL p ro jec t can be  
regarded as a flagship shop in a large shopping mall. The success o f  the FAL  
pro ject w ill be able to generate a com plete industria l supp ly  chain, which m ay be  
worth over 10 billion USD, because com panies from  the upstream  and  
downstream  o f the a ircra ft m anufacturing industry, includ ing navigation, 
com munication, m eta l m anufacturing, in te rio r m aterials, a ircra ft design, pa rt 
m anufacturing, sales and a fte rs a le s  service, w ill come to invest facilities around  
the FAL project. In particular, this Chinese FAL p lan t w ill also a ttract investm ent 
from  Com pany B ’s supp liers.” According to the research findings, the FAL 
project has dramatically promoted the Tianjin Binhai New District and more than 
70 aviation enterprises have come to visit this area since the establishment of 
FAL project. Among them, 11 enterprises with the total investment over 200 
million USD have registered and settled down in this New District, where the 
FAL project is located. More than 30 projects related with aviation industry have 
shown their intension to invest in this region and 10 of them aimed to provide 
services for the FAL project. Therefore, the main purpose of joining this FAL 
project from the perspective of Company T is to take advantage of this FAL 
project as a pillar project for attracting investment. Mr. GL, the senior director of 
Company T, said that “a round the regions o f  Toulouse in France, Ham burg in 
G erm any and Seattle in the States, there are thousands o f a ircra ft com ponents
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m anufacturers, which have fo rm ed three g ian t “A v ia tion Supply N etw orks”. A s  
the Tianjin FAL pro ject developed, the fourth large aviation ne tw ork w ill be 
fo rm ed in China around the Tianjin reg ion .”
5.3.3 What are the contextual factors influencing partner selection 
process?
Section 5.3.1 and Section 5.3.2 offer motives of IJV formation from the 
perspectives of company B and its Chinese partners respectively. In addition to 
the strategic motives factors influencing the partner selection process of in this 
FAL project, the research results revealed that the partner selection process 
may be also affected by two other contextual factors, the nature of the aviation 
industry and the China's institutional environment. Analysis of the research data 
showed that the status quo of Chinese aviation industry from 2005 to 2007 
influenced the partner selection process of this FAL project. Since 2005, the 
Chinese aviation industry has deteriorated as the Global Financial Crisis has 
reduced travel demand and also died up financing options for airlines. Mr. MR, 
the senior manager of Company B in China, recalled that “there were m any  
m ergers am ong C h ina ’s unprofitable s ta te-ow ned a irlines to cope with the 
gloom y market. The la rgest priva te-ow ned airline even w ent bankrupt. However, 
Com pany B  was s till optim istic about China, because C h ina ’s aviation industry, 
la rge ly  driven b y  its dom estic demand, w ill g row  incredibly, once the g loba l 
econom y recovers. Moreover, Com pany B ’s custom ers in China are m a in ly  
state-ow ned enterprises, which are a lways supported b y  the centra l Chinese  
governm ent. With the protection o f the Chinese governm ent. C om pany B ’s 
Chinese clients cou ld  easily survive from  the d ifficu lt econom ic recession and  
the aircraft orders p laced  by  those Chinese sta te -ow ned airlines w ill no t be  
affected .” The interview data demonstrated that Company B could only work with 
the Chinese government to safeguard its investment return of this FAL project,
because none of their Chinese customers had the sufficient finance to purchase
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new aircrafts without substantial support from the central Chinese government 
under the downturn of the commercial aircraft market.
Another important factor affecting the partner selection process is that 
Company B’s single-aisle aircrafts had no direct Chinese competitors during the 
formation period of FAL project. Although Chinese government has the plan for 
building a large aircraft for a long time, the design of Chinese 180-seat 
single-aisle aircraft project officially started in July 2008. The only competitor of 
Company B’s aircraft was made by the American company. Company I, at the 
stage of IJV partner selection from 2005 to 2007. According to the interview with 
Mr. SF, the senior director of Company V I, Chinese airlines only had two 
options of purchasing aircrafts, which can meet the requirements of Chinese 
aviation markets. He said that “i f  the Chinese governm ent cannot m ake a 
satisfactory agreem ent with Com pany I, it has to ask its  s ta te -ow ned airlines to 
purchase from  Com pany B instead. Chinese governm ent has always been  
looking fo r h igher leve l o f  cooperation with both Com pany B  and C om pany I by  
adopting the stra tegy o f  using the Chinese m arket in exchange fo r advanced  
technology o f  a ircraft m anufacturing.” Before working with Company B on this 
FAL project, the NDRC contacted Company I, the American aircraft maker with a 
proposal of assembling aircrafts in China. However, Company I was only willing 
to cooperate with Chinese government on a very old model, which has already 
been out of date in the Chinese market. Since the proposal of working with 
Company I failed, the Chinese government has started talks with Company B on 
the possibilities of producing Company B’s aircrafts in China. Mr. NC, the senior 
director of Company V2 explained that “because China does no t m ake its  own  
la rge aircrafts, the Chinese airlines, ow ned by  the Chinese governm ent, have to 
spend 10 billion USD in the next 10 to 20 years on e ither o f  the two overseas  
suppliers. It was a wise strategy to take advantage o f  the com petition between  
those two suppliers and request an a ircraft assem bly line in China, from  which  
Chinese m anufacturers can accum ulate advanced technology o f  a ircra ft
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m anufacturing, instead o f  watching those two foreign a ircra ft m arkers m aking  
huge p ro fits  from  China bu t leaving noth ing fo r Chinese aviation industry .”
Besides the nature of Chinese aviation sector, which affects the partner 
selection process of this FAL project, the institutional environment of China is 
also influential in the IJV formation process. Mr. GL, the senior director of 
Company T said that “every session o f  Chinese governm ent has its investm ent 
focus, which is norm ally  associa ted with the background o f  e ithe r Chairm an o f  
Chinese com m unist pa rty  o r  Prim e M in is te r o f  Chinese governm ent a t that time. 
Since Prim e M in iste r Mr. Wen was in P ow er from  2003, the fast-grow ing harbo r  
c ity , T ian jin , has drawn the attention o f  centra l government, because Mr. Wen 
was grown up in th is a rea .” In 2006, the State Council positioned Tianjin as the 
next center of economic development after the Shanghai-Pudong area and 
Shenzhen at the beginning of China’s Five-Year Plan” (2006-2010) and 
granted the Tianjin Binhai Nev,/ District (the coastal area of Tianjin port) as a 
boned zone, which enjoys many preferential tax policies from the central 
government. However, besides its geographic advantage of being an 
international sea port, Tianjin, as an old industrial city, has only some declining 
light industries, such as bicycles, textiles, and home appliances. Until the 
establishment of the FAL project, the only large investment project in this 11 
square kilometers Bonded New District had been a local beer factory. In order to 
change this situation and speed up the development of the Tianjin local 
economy, both of the central and local government hoped to take full advantage 
of Tianjin’s geographic location and change Tianjin to be an important global 
aerospace industry city, which can serve as a key recipient base for advanced 
foreign technology in the aviation and aerospace industry. In order to attract 
Company B’s investment, the local Tianjin government dedicated an area inside 
the Binhai New District as a Free Trade Zone, which can offer more policy 
support and guarantee to undertake the FAL project and also reserved a large 
number of land next to Tianjin new airport for the FAL factory and its supporting
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facilities. Mr. BP, the senior director of Company T, explained that “there is huge  
difference between bonded area and  Free Trade Zone. The la tte r area can a llow  
Com pany B  to land, handle, produce and re-export its m ateria ls o r products  
without the in tervention o f  the Chinese custom s authorities, bu t the bonded area  
can on ly  a llow  Com pany B store its  im ported m ateria ls o r products w ithout 
paying  du ty .” The research findings suggested that all of these favorable 
governmental policies, which can provide the FAL project with an excellent 
institutional environment, dramatically influenced the Company B’s partner 
selection decision making process.
5.3.4 How was the Chinese consortium (Company Z) identified?
Under the influence of contextual factors discussed above. Company B 
started to look for its Chinese IJV partners immediately after signing a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the NDRC of Chinese government 
on 1st December 2005. The research findings revealed that Company B has 
adopted a “Top Down” strategy of identifying its Chinese IJV partners by 
negotiating the basic terms of cooperation with the Chinese central government 
in the first place. The MOU between two parties not only specified the decision to 
study feasibilities of establishing a final assembly line for the single-aisle aircraft, 
but also confirmed that Chinese state-owned airlines would have to purchase at 
least 150 Company B’s aircrafts from this FAL project. The interview with Mr. MB, 
the senior director of Company B, indicated that Company B replied on the 
NDRC to recommend the short-listed Chinese partners and jointly conducted 
field survey with the NDRC in four cities: Shanghai, Xi’an, Zhuhai and Tianjin for 
the FAL site selection. Company VI and Company V2, as the two largest 
Chinese aircraft manufacturers, were regarded as the most ideal IJV partner 
candidates by Chinese government. After the initial discussion with Company B, 
Company VI requested to hold 51% of this FAL project. However, Company B 
refused Company VTs suggestion and emphasized that the fundamental
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condition of the IJV cooperation is that Company B must be the main 
shareholder. According to the interview with Mr. LB, the senior director of 
Company B in China, it was the NDRC, who persuaded the Company V1 to give 
up the intension of being the majority shareholder after both parties have 
entered a stalemate for five months. After Tianjin was finally selected as the 
most ideal FAL site, the NDRC encouraged the Tianjin local government to form 
a special Chinese consortium with both Company V1 and Company V2 for this 
FAL project. Mr. LB said that “the leaders o f  C om pany T, ow ned b y  the Tianjin 
loca l governm ent, approached the directors o f  Com pany V1 and C om pany V2 
on ly  two m onths before the cooperative fram ew ork agreem ent was s igned On 
26^^ March 2006 and the negotiation started to develop sm ooth ly  a fte r th is th ird  
Chinese pa rtne r was invo lved .” Therefore, the empirical results of this study 
suggested that Company B might not be able to identify the suitable Chinese 
partners without the intervention and support from the NDRC of Chinese central 
government and Company B has adopted a logical procedure of identifying its 
IJV Chinese partners: getting the approval from the NDRC, searching the 
suitable FAL site short-listed by the NDRC, and negotiating with its potential 
Chinese partners recommended by the NDRC.
5.3.5 Why was the Chinese consortium (Company Z) selected?
Since the IJV partner candidates were recommended by the NDRC, the 
Company B did not have any other options besides the NDRC's shortlists. 
According to the interview with Mr. LB, the CEO of Company B in China, 
“Com pany V1 and  Com pany V2 were the two com pulsory IJV  partners, which  
Com pany B m ust choose fo r the FAL project, othen^/ise it  w ill be very d ifficu lt fo r  
the NDRC to grant business license to the jo in t venture. Furthermore, C om pany  
B was happy to be in partnersh ip  with both these Chinese sta te-ow ned a ircra ft 
m anufacturers, because they have experience in a ircra ft m anufacturing and  
both o f  them have a lready been Important com ponents suppliers fo r C om pany B
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in the pas t 20 yea rs .” Therefore, it can be found that both Company V1 and 
Company V2 were qualified for the Company B’s three criteria in selecting IJV 
partners: ability to get the governmental approval (task-related criterion), 
industrial experience (task-related criterion) and favorable past business 
association (partner-related criterion).
Although Company B did not have many choices in choosing its Chinese 
IJV partners, it was allowed by the central Chinese government to choose the 
suitable FAL site from four shortlisted contenders, Zhuhai, a port city close to 
Hong Kong in South of China, where the China Air Show are held once; 
Shanghai, home to Company V1 which were experienced in assembling 
American McDonnell Douglas(MD) aircrafts and are currently in the process of 
building Chinese own large aircrafts; Xi’an in western China, home to Company 
V2, which is manufacturing Chinese regional aircrafts and the wing boxes for 
Company B’s aircrafts, and Tianjin, a northern Chinese port city, which finally 
joined the competition after the other three cities have prepared Company B’s 
survey for almost half a year. Mr. LB, the CEO of Company B in China, told the 
researcher that “a fte r Com pany B ’s investigation, Shanghai cannot be  
considered because the FAL site w ould have been loca ted a t a busy  
in ternational a irport and it would be ha rd  to ge t suffic ien t airspace fo r a ircra ft test 
flights. X i ’an was ru led  ou t because X i ’an, as the in land city, is  too fa r aw ay to 
the po rt and m ost o f  the a ircraft pa rts  have to re ly  on sea fre igh t in o rde r to 
reduce the transportation cost. A lthough Zhuhai, as a sea port, offers advantage  
o f saving transportation cost, its  loca l area is often a ffected b y  the typhoon  
weather. Com pany B fina lly  se lected Tianjin ove r three o the r Chinese cities  
m ain ly due to its unique geographica l advantage o f having an in te rna tiona l sea  
po rt and  a new  in ternational a irport with enough airspace fo r a ircra ft test 
fligh ts.”
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After the location of the FAL project was decided, the research results 
demonstrated that Company B started to request Company V1 and Company V2 
to meet the other two critical partner selection criteria; the ability to provide 
favorable tax policies for the FAL project (task-related criterion) and the ability to 
offer suitable land and facilities for the joint venture (task-related criterion). When 
the two Chinese aircraft manufacturers were told that their proposal of having 
51% shares of the FAL project was rejected, they started to lose interest in this 
joint venture and refused to negotiate further with Company B for more than five 
months. In addition, because both of the headquarters of Company VI and 
Company V2 are far away to Tianjin, they would have difficulties to provide 
favorable tax policies and suitable land and facilities for the FAL project without 
the support from the local Tianjin government. In order to push the process of 
this project ahead, the NDRC requested the local Tianjin government work 
together with Company VI and Company V2 and provide the Company B with 
required tax policies and facilities. The research findings revealed that since the 
Company T, owned by the local Tianjin government, joined the negotiation of 
this FAL project, it promised to locate the project in a special Free Trade Zone, 
with the most preferential tax policy and the most complete functions of Boned 
Logistics Zone and Fast Export Processing Zone. Moreover, the assembly plant 
next to the new Tianjin airport will be built not by the joint venture, but by the 
local Tianjin government to Company B’s requirements. The local government 
retains ownership of the land and the buildings, which request an investment of 
over 500 million euro and leases them to the joint venture on a special interest 
term, free interest for the first five year and 1% over the commercial bank 
interest rate after the five years. In order to guarantee the slots for the test flights, 
the local government is also willing to invest a new runway, which can be 
exclusively for the FAL project. According to the comments of Mr. GL, the senior 
director of Company T, “it was these specia l p re ferentia l po lic ies g iven b y  the  
Chinese governm ent in the aspects o f finance, tax and  land  tha t a ttracts  
Com pany B to settle down in Tianjin. ”
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Therefore, it is suggested from the evidence summarized above that 
the reason why Company B selected three Chinese state-owned enterprises as 
its IJV partners for this FAL project is that Company V1 and Company V2 have 
the ability to help the joint venture to get the license of operation, contribute their 
knowledge of aircraft manufacturing to the joint venture, and cooperate smoothly 
with Company B based on the long-term past business association, whereas 
Company T can provide the FAL project with low interest finance, favorable tax 
policies and suitable land and facilities. Although the choice of Company B’s 
Chinese IJV partners was limited to three partners recommended by the NDRC 
of Chinese central government, the joint efforts of three Chinese partners can 
completely meet the Company B’s task-related and partner-related criteria of IJV 
partner selection and the confirmed purchase order of 150 aircrafts can also be 
guaranteed by the central Chinese government, because Company B took the 
NDRC’s recommendation. Mr. BP, the senior director of Company T told the 
researcher that “Com pany B has g o t a ll they desire fo r in Tianjin and  the  
investm ent risks o f  Com pany B  have been reduced to a m inimal. That is  w hy  
they dared to b ring both m oney and  technology to C hina.”
5.3.6 What obstacles in the partnership were the most difficult to overcome 
during the negotiation process?
Since the four parties signed the Framework Agreement on 26^  ^ March 
2006, the three Chinese IJV partners have conducted more than 20 rounds of 
business negotiations with Company B on issues such as infrastructure, tools 
and jigs, human resources and logistics before signing the official IJV agreement. 
The total negotiation period was lasting for one year and half. All of the parties 
agreed that Company B would be responsible for the quality of the aircrafts 
assembled in the FAL project, which should be at the same standards as the 
quality of those assembled and delivered in Europe, while the three Chinese 
partners would contribute local resources to support the project, such as
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infrastructure of factory buildings and a new runway, recruitment and training of 
local employees and logistics of moving aircraft components from Europe to the 
factory floor. Although the negotiation between Company B and its Chinese 
partners ended with a successful outcome, the research findings demonstrate 
that the most difficult obstacle to overcome during the negotiation process is how 
to raise the profitability of the FAL project and maintain the quality of assembled 
aircraft at the same time.
The research findings revealed that because the final assembly process 
only accounts for 4% work share of the whole aircraft manufacturing, the key 
concern of Chinese partners is about whether this FAL project will be profitable 
eventually. According to Company B’s requests, the joint venture shall buy the 
aircraft Supply Kits from Company B at a fixed price and Company B will pay the 
joint venture a fixed assembly fee at around 800,000 Euro per aircraft. After the 
FAL project is operated in full capacity of 50 aircrafts per year, the total income 
of the FAL project each year will be around 40 million euro. However, the initial 
equipment investments including the expenses on the equipment for carrying 
large aircraft parts from the port to the factory, the expenses on the equipment 
used in the assembly line and the expenses on the equipment for installing 
engines and testing flights are expected to be over 400 million Euro. Besides the 
initial investments on fixed assets, the operational cost of this Chinese FAL 
project is estimated to be higher than that of Company B’s European factories. 
The shipment of large aircraft parts from Europe to China will generate not only 
extra financial cost, but also three-month extra time cost, wasted in the transit. 
Mr. SF, the senior director of Company V1, explained his concern to the 
researcher that “every FAL is designed in accordance to the specification o f  
each type o f aircraft. B y the time when the FAL w ould de live r enough a ircra fts  to 
break even, the a ircraft assem bled in the Tianjin FAL pro ject m ight a lready have  
been out o f  date in the Chinese market. I f  so, those m ore than 400 m illion euro  
investm ents on equipm ent would be a huge waste, because the equ ipm ent
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designed fo r the current m odel o f  C om pany B ’s a ircraft w ould no t be suitab le fo r 
assem bling o the r m odels o f  C om pany B ’s aircrafts. Moreover, the Tianjin loca l 
governm ent has to invest ove r 500 m illion euro on the land  and  bu ild ings fo r the 
FAL pro jec t and  on ly  charge a fraction o f  in terest ra te accord ing to the 
Fram ew ork A greem ent between the IJV  parties. A ll o f  ou r three Chinese parties  
are concerned about when this FAL p ro jec t can bring p ro fit to us .”
In order to increase the profitability of the FAL project, the three Chinese 
parties suggested to Company B that the FAL project must purchase more 
factory equipment and aircraft parts from Chinese manufacturers. The interview 
data revealed that the delegation of Chinese parties conducted a fieldwork in 
Company B’s factory located in Germany in July 2006 and found that 80% of 
factory equipment can actually be sourced in China. One month later, the 
Chinese parties requested Company B to provide a list of factory equipment for 
them to source the alternative in China. However, Company B refused this 
suggestion and requested that all the factory equipment must be purchased from 
its European suppliers. In the interview, Mr. DL, the senior director of Company 
B for the FAL project, offered the reason by saying that the “Tianjin FAL p la n t’s  
design m ust be exactly the sam e as the Com pany B ’s p lan t in Ham burg. We 
have to copy Com pany B ’s new est p lan t in G erm any so as to reduce the risk  o f  
qua lity prob lem s from  the assem bly process. That is w hy we d id  no t in tend  to 
use Chinese equipm ent in o rde r to guarantee the qua lity  issues.” In addition, 
Chinese parties also requested that the percentage of aircraft components from 
China should be reach 20% to 30% instead of 5% as what Company B designed, 
because the FAL project may only be profitable when the percentage of 
Chinese-made aircraft parts achieves such a level. This suggestion was also 
rejected by Company B. Mr. LB argued that “Chinese parties expected Com pany  
B to m ove the m anufacturing process o f  the a irc ra ft’s m ain body  in to China. 
However, Com pany B  w ill no t duplicate its investm ent on m anufacturing the  
a ircra ft’s m ain body in China a t th is stage o f  cooperation with C h ina .”
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Both Company B and its Chinese parties have not reached an 
agreement on the purchase of factory equipment and aircraft parts for over 10 
months. The research results showed that Company B made compromises on 
15th May 2007 under Chinese parties' continuous requests and finally agreed 
that the FAL project can procure some factory equipment from local suppliers, 
such as transportation jigs and ground handling equipment and the percentage 
of Chinese parts can be kept between 15% to 20% under the condition that the 
quality of Chinese equipment and parts shall all meet Company B’s global 
purchase standards. Research evidence demonstrated that Company B’s strict 
control on purchase of equipment and parts seriously discouraged the 
enthusiasm of Company VI and Company V2, because they gradually realized 
that the knowledge gained from the labor-intensive assembly process is limited 
and the purchase orders which they expected from the FAL project may be very 
few. However, Company VI and Company V2 had no choice but accept 
Company B’s compromises, because of the pressure from the NDRC. According 
to the interview with Mr. JK, the Chinese solicitor of Company T, the negotiators 
of Company B has been dominating the whole negotiation process. When the 
negotiation went into deadlocks, they often reminded the negotiators from 
Chinese parties that “yo u r sen io r leaders in Beijing are m ore desperate than us. 
You w ill have to sign this agreem ent in the end even we do no t m ake any  
com prom ises.”
Additionally, the Chinese parties requested Company B to reduce the 
number of expatriates as the second method of increasing the profitability of the 
FAL project. Research findings revealed that Company B initially requested the 
joint venture to pay salaries for the 200 expatriates dispatched from Europe. 
According to the calculation of the Company T, the salary and living expenses 
each year for those foreign expatriates are expected to be over 40 million euro, 
which is almost equal to the whole income of the FAL project. Mr. LB, the senior 
director of Company B in China, explained in the interview that “in o rde r to
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ensure the qua lity  o f  o u r aircrafts, it  is  m andatory fo r the s ta rt o f  the FAL  
operation to have so m any expatriates, which w ill be qua lity  inspectors who w ill 
pass the ir know ledge to the loca l Chinese engineers. Once the production  
becom es stabilized, the to ta l percentage o f expatria tes w ill be reduced to around  
20 .” Research findings also showed that Company B has sought to avoid the 
mistake, which the US manufacturer, MD, has made in 1980s by taking a 
different approach to the FAL project in China. When MD assembled its aircraft 
in China in late 1980s with the help of Company VI, the US manufacturer only 
dispatched less than 20 engineers for the start-up of the FAL process. Because 
the US manufacturer relied heavily on Company VI to assemble the aircraft, the 
MD's Chinese joint venture was a failure and only two aircrafts were ever built, 
because Chinese airlines regarded those two aircrafts as unreliable 
Chinese-built aircrafts at that time. Therefore, Company B insisted on bringing 
European expertise to its Chinese factories in order to ensure that the “Company 
B’s way” would be followed.
After tough negotiations. Company B finally agreed that the number of 
European workers, which should be initially employed, can be reduced to around 
120. Both parties agreed that it will take Company B at least three to five years to 
train Chinese staff in China and Europe to be qualified for Company B’s 
standards, not just in technical aspects, but also in management, before the 
number of expatriates can be further reduced. The evidence from the interview 
suggested that such a compromise from Company B was reluctantly accepted 
by the Chinese parties. Mr. BP, the senior director of Company T, revealed that 
“the target o f  achieving a low er production cost in China can on ly  be realized, 
when the qua lified Chinese workforce w ill be fina lly  rep laced by  the fore ign  
expatria tes in five years. A lthough there is a high uncerta in ty in the fu ture  
pro fitab ility  o f  this project, the three Chinese parties s till s igned the IJV  
agreem ent with Com pany B, s im ply because they a ll believe that no m a tte r
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whether the p ro jec t is  pro fitab le  o r not, the Chinese governm ent w ill be the  
backup force as long as the p ro jec t can be successfu lly  estab lished.”
5.3.7 Why was the IJV formation successful?
On June 28th 2007, Company B signed the IJV contract with the Chinese 
consortium after overcoming the obstacles during the negotiation process. The 
Tianjin FAL project successfully delivered the first assembled aircraft to its airline 
customer in June 2009, two years after the joint venture was established. Mr. GL, 
the senior director of Company T, said that “the success o f  the FAL p ro je c t has  
been a grea t ach ievem ent fo r both China and  Europe. The European a ircra ft 
m anufacturer. Com pany B, has obta ined the opportun ity to en te r in to the vast 
Chinese aviation m arket and the Chinese m anufacturers have won the chance  
to accum ulate experience in m aking large aircrafts. The successfu l cooperation  
based on such a w in-w in stra tegy in th is FAL p ro jec t has se t a good  exam ple fo r  
the w orld .” y\lhy was this IJV formation successful? The empirical results of this 
study suggested that there are five critical reasons why the formation of the 
Tianjin FAL project succeeded.
Firstly, the interview data shows that Company B has chosen the right 
model of aircraft to assembly in China. According to the interview with Mr.LB, the 
senior director of Company B in China, the aircraft, assembled in China, is the 
most popular model of Company B’s products. The global sales of this popular 
model accounts for 70% of the total sales order of over 10,000 aircrafts, which 
Company B has ever sold. He explained to the researcher that “the C om pany  
B ’s single-aisle aircrafts on ly  accounted fo r on ly  23%  o f the to ta l num ber o f  
aircrafts opera ted in China in the early  2000s, la rge ly  because C om pany B  
entered into Chinese m arket 7 years la te than its Am erican com petitor. However, 
the sales figure had  c lim bed to 37%> before the FAL pro ject was established. ” 
The reason why Company B’s aircrafts started to gain popularity in China is not
only because Company B’s aircrafts have the cost advantage over its American
180
competitive models in high altitude flights, but also because Company B adopted 
the sales strategy suggested by the Chinese government by gradually 
increasing the purchase of aircraft parts in China and exploring new methods of 
cooperation with Chinese aviation industry besides component outsourcing. 
Back into May 2005, Chinese government sent two invitation letters respectively 
to both Company B and its American competitor. Company I, in terms of the 
possibility of manufacturing aircrafts together in China. Company I replied with a 
suggestion of assembling an old model of aircraft, which Company I has already 
stopped the production. In contrast. Company B was willing to share the 
technology of assembling its most popular model of aircraft with Chinese 
partners, with the ambition of eventually acquiring 50% of the Chinese market. 
Mr. SF, the senior director of Company V1 told the researcher that “the success  
o f the FAL p ro jec t is  m ain ly based on the Com pany B ’s a ircrafts assem bled in 
China have m et the requirem ents o f boom ed Chinese aviation m arke t and  are  
expected to be have rosy future prospects with Chinese airlines in the next 20  
years. The popu la rity  o f  this size o f C om pany B ’s a ircra ft in China guarantees  
the future orders o f  th is FAL project. Thus, both Chinese partners and  Com pany  
B have confidence in investing on this p ro jec t.”
The second reason, suggested by the research data is that Company B 
has chosen the right time to set up the assembly line. Mr. NC, the senior director 
of Company V2, described as follows: “a lthough China has m ade breakthrough  
progress in ca r and  vessel m anufacturing since its  opening doo r to the w orld  in  
1980s, it  has no t obta ined sign ificant achievem ents in the com m ercia l aviation  
sector."China’s first experience in marking large aircraft was in 1970s, however, 
this indigenous Y-10 aircraft project was canceled in 1983 due to cost and 
market concerns. The next experience was to work with American aircraft 
manufacturer, MD, on an aircraft assembly program, but this project also failed 
in the 1990s because of serious quality problems. Since then, the Chinese 
commercial aviation industry has been in the embarrassment of lacking of
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advanced technology, management experience, and talents. Starting from 
2000s, a project of manufacturing a large aircraft with updated design goals 
made its way into the 11th periodic strategic socio-economic development plan 
drawn by the Chinese government. A two-pronged strategy was adopted by the 
central Chinese government: one is to design and build its own indigenous 
aircraft, C919, and the other one is to work with foreign aircraft manufacturers to 
produce aircrafts in China in order to gain advanced skills of aircraft 
manufacturing. Therefore, the Company B’s FAL project encountered an 
excellent time when there was no direct competition from the Chinese-made 
aircrafts and the Chinese manufacturers were in big eager to learn the advanced 
knowledge of aircraft manufacturing from the experienced Western aircraft 
makers for their proposed C919 program.
Thirdly, this study provided evidence that Company B has chosen the 
right approach to identify its Chinese partners. Company B’s Chinese subsidiary 
was operated by a local Chinese, who understood the institutional environment 
of China clearly and employed an effective approach of searching and 
identifying Chinese partners for this FAL project. The research results 
demonstrated that Company B firstly discussed the main terms and conditions of 
cooperation with the NDRC, the representative of Chinese central government. 
Both the confirmed order of 150 aircrafts for the FAL project placed by the 
Chinese government on behalf of its state-owned airlines and the grant for the 
license of the FAL project committed by the Chinese government were the two 
major factors determining the success of the mutual cooperation between 
Company B and its potential Chinese IJV partners. After the fundamental 
agreements have been reached between Company B and Chinese government. 
Company B started to ask the NDRC to recommend suitable FAL sites for this 
project. Once the ideal FAL site was identified. Company B then proceeded to 
select Chinese IJV partners from the candidates shortlisted by the Chinese 
government based on task-related and partner-related criteria. Proved to be in
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line with China’s national conditions, this process of the partner identification 
successfully helped Company B to select the three Chinese partners for this FAL 
project and easily obtained the license from the Chinese central government in 
the meanwhile. Mr. GL, the Senior director of Company T, told the researcher 
that “the Chinese m anufacturers were no t keen to w ork with C om pany B  on this  
FAL project, because the technology o f  assem bling aircrafts m ere ly  accounts fo r 
less than 4%  o f  the added value o f a ircra ft m anufacturing and  the success o f  this  
FAL pro ject w ill defin ite ly exert m ore pressure on the future sa les o f  
Chinese-m ade aircrafts, C919. When Chinese a irlines can buy  a m ature m odel 
o f European a ircra ft assem bled and  delivered inside China, the poss ib ility  o f  
purchasing a Chinese new ly-deve loped a ircra ft w ill becom e very low. It was the 
Chinese governm ent, especia lly  the loca l governm ents, who have the m ost 
in te rest.” Because the existence of this FAL project may attract many other 
aviation programs and investments to the local region so as to boom the local 
economy and increase employment rate, the settlement of this FAL project in 
Tianjin was managed by the lead of the Mayor of Tianjin with the coordination of 
almost every department of the local authorities. Therefore, Company B has 
successfully taken advantage of the enthusiasm of Chinese government towards 
this FAL project and relied on the power of the NDRC to find the right Chinese 
IJV partners for this assembly line in China.
Fourthly, further analysis of the implications of this study suggests that 
Company B has chosen the right location for this FAL project. At the end of 2005, 
Company B conducted an investigation on the four candidate sites of this FAL 
project from the aspects of transportation facilities, land for factory and buildings, 
meteorological conditions, natural environment, political environment and living 
environment. In the words of a senior manager (Mr. MR), “Tianjin was se lected  
m ain ly because o f  its geographica l advantage. The c ity  o f  Tianjin, as a northern  
po rt o f  China, can not on ly  save the FAL p ro jec t huge transportation costs, bu t 
also o ffe r large free airspace fo r the test flights o f  assem bled a ircra fts .” Moreover,
183
The Binhai New district of Tianjin has been classified into the national 
development strategic plan and become the investment focus of Chinese 
government since the Prime Minister of the Chinese State Council, Mr. Wen was 
in power from 2003. The State Council's approval of the Tianjin Free Trade Zone 
is another significant step to support the development and opening up of Tianjin 
Binhai New District. The functions of this new district is orientated by the 
Chinese government as the opening door of the North China, the base for 
high-end manufacturing and R&D transformation, as well as the international 
shipping and logistics center in the North China. Those institutional policies not 
only effectively ensure completion of the Tianjin FAL project, but also play an 
important role in attracting other aviation programs to provide supporting 
facilities to the FAL project. The senior director of Company B, Mr. LB, explained 
that “Zhuhai and  Tianjin were in itia lly  both considered b y  Com pany B as the  
suitab le candidate sites because both o f  these cities are close to the po rt with 
suffic ien t airspace fo r test fiights. However, it was Tianjin ’s advantage in 
enjoying pre ferentia l governm ent po lic ies that a ttract Com pany B to m ake fina l 
decision on investing the FAL p ro jec t in Tianjin. In addition, the Tianjin loca l 
governm ent com m itted to finance the investm ent on land and build ings and  
lease them to the FAL p ro jec t a t a low  cost in o rde r to attract C om pany B ’s 
interest. Such a financia l innovation, o ffe red b y  the Tianjin loca l governm ent, 
sign ificantly reduced the investm ent risk  o f  Com pany B  as w e ll as the financia l 
burden o f  the FAL p ro jec t.” On the whole. Company B has made the right choice 
of the FAL's location based on the geographical factors and the consideration of 
favorable governmental policies.
Last but not the least, it can be deduced from the data that the reason 
why this FAL formation was successful is that Company B has chosen the right 
Chinese IJV partners. Luo (1998) argues that it is essential that the potential 
Chinese IJV partners possess complementary skills and resources and share 
compatible strategies. The research results found out that although the Chinese
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central government is not one of the companies, who signed the final IJV 
agreement with Company B, it can also be regarded as one of the important 
Chinese IJV partners in this case, because it signed the Framework Agreement 
with Company B by committing to the confirmed sales order for the FAL project 
as well as the grant of the business license of the assembly line, both of which 
can be regarded as the skills of the Chinese central government. Research 
findings demonstrated that the main NDRC’s strategic motive of supporting this 
FAL project is to help its state-owned Chinese airlines to receive those ordered 
aircrafts within a shorter delivery time and enjoy better after-sales services. The 
order of those required aircrafts had to be given either to Company B or its 
American competitor, so that the Chinese government adopted an “exchange” 
strategy of offering the 150 aircraft order to the company, who should not only 
teach the Chinese manufacturers how to assembly the aircrafts, but also 
increase the purchase of aircraft parts from Chinese suppliers. Both of these two 
requests of Chinese central governments are the main Company VI and 
Company V2’s strategic motives of joining this FAL project, because these two 
Chinese aircraft manufacturers can not only gain the advanced skills in aircraft 
assembly for their own large aircraft, C919, but also obtain more purchase 
orders of aircraft parts from the FAL project for their 200 subsidiaries. As the two 
largest Chinese aircraft manufacturers with the industrial experience in aircraft 
manufacturing in China, Company VI and Company V2 can help Company B 
effectively and efficiently source the local Chinese suppliers. With regard to the 
Company T’s strategic motive of allying with Company B, the research data 
revealed that the aim of upgrading the local industry into an international aviation 
industrial base encouraged the local Tianjin government to provide Company B 
with substantial financial support and preferential policies of usage of land, 
runways as well as airspace. In contrast, the Company B’s strategic motive is 
mainly related with increasing the future market shares in China and providing 
better after-sales services to Chinese customers, including punctual delivery and 
timely repair and maintenance. Analysis of the data also suggested that
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Company B has the skills of assembling aircrafts and the ability of placing high 
value purchase order of aircraft parts, which are both required by the Chinese 
central government and the Chinese aircraft manufacturers. Company V1 and 
Company V2. The Company B’s third skill is its image and reputation in the 
global aviation industry, so that the settlement of Company B’s FAL project will 
help the Tianjin local government to attract more aviation companies to invest in 
this region and achieve the strategic motive of promoting the local economy. 
Therefore, it can be deduced from the research data that the strategic motives of 
four Chinese parties (the NDRC, Company V1, Company V2 and Company T) 
are compatible with the skills of Company B and the skills of four Chinese parties 
can be summarized as the partner selection criteria for this FAL project. The 
research findings also showed that, although the NDRC’s strategic motivation of 
helping the Chinese airlines to receive those ordered aircrafts within a shorter 
delivery time and enjoy better after-sales services is compatible with the main 
strategic motive of Company B, Chinese parties also have other multiple 
strategic motives, which are not based on economic interest. Moreover, it can be 
found that the complementary skills of both Company B and all its four Chinese 
IJV partners contribute to the success of the formation of this FAL project. 
Exhibit 5.2 illustrates the interplay among the strategic motives and skills of 
Company B and the strategic motives and skills of all four Chinese partners.
To sum up, based on the above analysis, the reasons leading to the 
success of Company B’s FAL project in China can be largely attributed to a 
combination of choosing the right product for the Chinese aviation market, the 
right time to enter into the Chinese aviation industry, the right approach to 
identify the partners, the right location for the FAL site, and most importantly the 
right Chinese partners to work with.
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Exhibit 5.2: The interplay among the strategic motives and skills of all IJV parties
(Source: present author)
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5.3.8 Summary of Case Two
In conclusion, the Case Two, a successful case of IJV formation, offers an 
insightful analysis of research data collected from both documentary evidence 
and semi-structured interviews. Both the strategic motives of Company B and its 
Chinese partners are provided in Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.3.3. Company B 
mainly intends to increase its market shares in China by establishing this FAL 
project, but the Chinese parties aim to learn knowledge of aircraft assembly and 
obtain more purchase orders from this FAL project. It has been found out that 
both the nature of the Chinese aviation industry and the Chinese institutional 
environment affect Company B’s decision in partner selection. With regard to the 
partner identification. Company B has adopted a “Top to Bottom" process by 
making an agreement with Chinese central government first before searching for 
suitable FAL site and IJV partners. The research results also revealed that the 
IJV partner selection of this FAL project was based on the following task-related 
and partner-related criteria: the ability to get the governmental approval 
(task-related criterion), industrial experience (task-related criterion), favorable 
past business association (partner-related criterion), the ability to provide 
favorable tax policies for the FAL project (task-related criterion) and the ability to 
offer suitable land and facilities for the joint venture (task-related criterion). 
Evidence from the interview confirmed that the main conflict between Company 
B and its Chinese partners during the IJV negotiation process is on whether the 
FAL project can increase project profitability by increasing the percentage of 
Chinese parts and equipment suppliers and reducing the number of foreign 
expatriates and keep the high quality level of the aircraft at the same time. At last, 
this case study identified that it was five main factors, the right product, the right 
time, right approach, right location and right people that jointly contributing to the 
successful outcome of this IJV formation.
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5.4 Case comparison and analysis
In this chapter the two case studies are compared to each other and 
analyzed in relation to the research questions. Because the researcher was 
involved in the first failed case of IJV formation as interpreter for Company L, he 
has witnessed over 20 rounds of negotiation between Company A and Company 
L as a “Participant Observer”. The research data of Case one was based on a 
triangulation of documentary evidence, observational evidence and interview 
data, whereas the research data in Case two was collected from semi-structured 
interviews and historical business documents obtained from the researcher’s 
personal visit to the established FAL project. Both cases are comparable in 
many aspects. Like Case one. Case two is an aircraft FAL project in Chinese 
HEM sector. Both of the cases are also very similar in the shareholding structure 
between the French foreign investors and Chinese IJV partners. In both of the 
cases, the foreign HEM investors have 51% shares, while the rest of 49% are 
owned or jointly owned by Chinese partners. Belonging to the same European 
aviation group company, both of the foreign investors in each case expected to 
use their advanced technology in exchange for the increase of market share in 
China. Furthermore, both of the cases occurred in the same period around the 
mid-2000s.
Despite these similarities, there are a number of marked differences as 
follows. First of all, the cross case analysis found out that the models of aircrafts 
in Case one and Case two had different levels of popularity in the Chinese 
aviation industry. In Case one, the Company A’s aircrafts are turboprop regional 
aircrafts, which are mainly popular with regional airlines. However, due to the 
effect of the gloomy Chinese aviation market in the mid-2000s and the lack of 
support from the Chinese government, many Chinese regional airlines, most of 
which are owned privately, have experienced serious loss and had difficulties of
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purchasing new aircrafts during the period when Company A looked for its 
Chinese IJV partners for the FAL project in China. In order to prevent bankruptcy 
of private airlines, Chinese government stopped issuing licenses to new 
private-owned regional airlines. Therefore, Company A has not sold any new 
aircrafts to the Chinese market ever since it firstly delivered 4 aircrafts to 
Chinese airlines in 2001. In comparison to Company A’s aircrafts. Company B’s 
single-aisle aircrafts, normally bought by Chinese state-owned truck airlines, 
were more popular in the Chinese aviation market. Because Company B 
adopted a new Chinese strategy by increasing its purchase of aircraft parts from 
Chinese and strengthening its investments in the Chinese aviation sector in the 
early 2000s, the market share of Company B’s single-aisle aircrafts in China has 
increased from less than 15% in 2001 to 37% in 2007 before the establishment 
of the FAL project. Although the Chinese aviation market was gloomy, the 
Chinese state-owned airlines backed up by Chinese central government still 
maintained a high level of demand of the Company B’s aircrafts because of their 
long-term confidence towards the future Chinese aviation market.
Secondly, the cross case analysis also revealed that the Company A’s 
aircrafts and Company B’ aircrafts had different levels of competition in Chinese 
aviation market. Unlike Company B’s airplanes. Company A’s airplanes belong 
to the category of 40-70 seats regional aircraft submarket. Besides the turbofan 
aircrafts produced by Company A’s existing Western competitors in this 
submarket. Company A’s aircrafts had strong Chinese competitors, which were 
the similar turboprop regional aircrafts made by Company X, a subsidiary of 
Company V2. When Company A started its negotiation with Company L in 2007, 
Company X’s aircrafts have already been banned by Chinese Aviation Authority 
for over 6 years due to previous quality problem. However, the market situation 
changed after Company X worked with China Eastern Airline and jointly 
established a new airline, which obtained a license from Chinese Aviation 
Authority to operate Company X’s 15 regional aircrafts in the Chinese aviation
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market. The enthusiasm of Company L in this FAL project was greatly affected 
by the reappearance of Company X’s aircrafts in Chinese market, because it 
would have been easier for Company L to obtain governmental approval on its 
proposed new regional airline by operating Chinese-made aircrafts. This 
research has demonstrated that Company A missed the opportunity of entering 
into Chinese aviation market because both parties in Case one have not 
researched the final IJV agreement before the Company X’s aircrafts were 
accepted by Chinese government at the end of 2008. In contrast to Company A 
in the Case one. Company B’s aircrafts did not have any Chinese competitors at 
the time of the IJV negotiation process. Although Chinese government intended 
to have its own large aircraft manufacturing project in the 11th National Plan, this 
proposed project still had remained at the theoretic study stage until both 
Company B and its Chinese partners signed the final IJV agreement in June 
2007. One of the critical reasons why both the Chinese central government and 
the Chinese aircraft manufacturers have interest in supporting this Tianjin FAL 
project is that the advanced knowledge of assembling large aircrafts can be 
learned from the Company B through the cooperation of managing this FAL 
factory.
Thirdly, examination of the data further showed that both Company A and 
Company B adopted different approaches in searching and identifying their 
Chinese IJV partners. According to the regulations of Chinese Commercial Law 
in relation with foreign investments, all the foreign-related IJV agreements must 
be approved by the NDRC before the execution of the contracts. The 
identification process of Chinese IJV partners in Case one was a “Bottom to 
Top” approach. Company L was identified as the potential IJV partner 
opportunistically at the Zhuhai Air Trade Show in 2006. By relying on the 
assistance of Company A’ Chinese office in Beijing, Company A identified the 
other five Chinese IJV partner candidates for the FAL project. Company A aimed 
to find its Chinese partners by itself first and then submitted the IJV contract to
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the NDRC for approval. Because Company A believed that Company L had 
special connections with the NDRC, which would only issue the approval on the 
condition that Company L should be the Chinese IJV partner for Company A on 
the contract. Company A has not spent any efforts on other five IJV partner 
candidates but has only negotiated with Company L exclusively for more than 
four years. However, Company L, as a private enterprise, could not have 
guaranteed that its IJV agreement with Company B would have definitely been 
authorized by the Chinese government, even if the IJV contract had been finally 
agreed by both parties. Results from the interviews demonstrated that this is one 
of the important reasons why the IJV project in Case one failed. On the contrary. 
Company B adopted a “Top to Bottom" approach by reaching a fundamental 
agreement with the NDRC first before relying on the Chinese central 
government to recommend suitable FAL sites and Chinese IJV partners for this 
FAL project. The research findings revealed that this approach with the help of 
the NDRC not only obviously guaranteed the governmental approval of this FAL 
project, but also successfully identified the Company B’s three Chinese IJV 
partners, although both Company V1 and Company V2 seemed to be the 
mandatory IJV partners as what the NDRC requested.
Fourthly, the empirical study also indicated that the FAL sites, selected in 
each of the two case studies, differ to each other. The research also confirmed 
that Company A selected the Hefei new airport as the FAL site, simply because 
the headquarter of Company L is located in Hefei and the head office of the 
proposed Company L’s regional airline is also in Hefei. However, Hefei, as a 
growing inland city in the middle part of China, has neither its own existing 
aviation industry nor relevant preferential policies of supporting the local aviation 
industry. Furthermore, the new Hefei aircraft was still under construction during 
the IJV negotiation process and there was no clear indication of when it can be 
used. The research findings indicated that Company A overestimated the 
Company L’s ability to create favorable conditions required by this FAL project in
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the Company L’s local region. Unlike Hefei, Tianjin Binhai New District, as the 
FAL site in the Case two, has many advantages over other FAL candidate sites. 
Tianjin is an international port, which can help the FAL project reduce cost in the 
transportation of large aircraft components. Most importantly, the development 
of Tianjin was the priority of the Chinese State Council in power from 2003 to 
2013 and the local government aimed to upgrade Tianjin’s existing old light 
industry into an international aviation industrial base during this period. Because 
the establishment of Company B’s FAL project in Tianjin would help the Tianjin 
government to realize such a goal, many preferential policies in terms of finance, 
tax and usage of land had been granted to this FAL project. In addition, the local 
government was willing to build an exclusive runway for the FAL project as well 
as reserve dedicated airspace for the test flights of assembled aircrafts. 
Therefore, the empirical results of this study suggested that the Tianjin FAL 
project could not be easily set up without the support from the local Tianjin 
government.
Lastly, the cross case findings of this exploratory investigation support the 
idea that there is a difference between the ownership type of Chinese IJV 
partner in Case one and the ownership type of Chinese IJV partners in Cast two. 
Company A’s Chinese partner in Case one is a private-owned enterprise with a 
registered capital of 12 million euro and 60 million euro worth of assets covering 
trading, mining, and property development, while all of Company B’s three 
Chinese partners. Company VI, Company V2 and Company T, are state-owned 
companies. Company VI and Company V2, owned by the Chinese central 
government, are now merged into one of the World Top 500 largest companies, 
whereas Company T is invested by the tax income of local Tianjin government. 
Since the nature of the ownership of Chinese partner in Case one is different to 
the nature of the ownership of Chinese partners in Case two, there are 
differences in their strategic motives and their skills which can be contributed to 
the FAL projects. Company L in Case one aimed to purchase the aircrafts
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assembled by this Hefei FAL project at a good bargain for its proposed regional 
airline, while the three state-owned Chinese partners in Case two hoped to gain 
advanced technology of assembling aircrafts from the FAL project, obtain more 
purchase orders of aircraft parts from the FAL project, and attract more aviation 
manufacturers to invest in the local region by supporting the FAL project. The 
main reason why the IJV formation in Case one failed is that the Chinese party 
cannot guarantee the previously agreed order of 50 aircrafts for the FAL project, 
the preferential tax policies for the FAL project, as well as the suitable land, 
airspace and runway requested by the foreign investor on the IJV contract, 
because Company L, as a private-owned company with limited finance, might 
not have the financial ability to purchase the first 50 aircrafts from the FAL 
project and also cannot act on behalf of Chinese government to offer those 
favorable conditions for the foreign investor in Case one. In contrast, the three 
Chinese IJV partners in Case two did not have to be concerned about the 
confirmed order of 150 aircrafts and the governmental approval of the project, 
because both of these conditions have already been provided by the central 
government. In order to attract the foreign investor to proceed the investment 
and reduce the initial financial burden of the project, the local Tianjin government, 
as one of the Chinese IJV partners in Case two, was willing to provide land, 
buildings and runway for the FAL project as the separate investment and only 
charge a minimal interest. Moreover, although the profitability of the FAL factory 
was designed by Company A as around 8%, Company L expected a higher 
investment return rate matching the 35%, which it can normally achieve from its 
development of property projects. This is why Company L insisted that the joint 
venture source aircraft parts globally on the tendering basis so as to increase its 
investment return from the FAL project. However, in the Case two, the 
state-owned IJV partners finally made concessions to Company B on the issues 
of project profitability in order to reach the final IJV agreement, although the 
Chinese partners initially requested the Company B to raise the profitability of 
this FAL project by increasing the percentage of Chinese suppliers and reducing
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the number of foreign expatriates. Analysis of the research data showed that 
those concessions were mainly balanced by Chinese IJV partners against the 
benefits, which the whole local economy could obtain from this FAL project.
In general, it is clear that there are significant differences between the two 
case studies despite of many similarities, which are illustrated in Exhibit 5.3. The 
models of aircraft in each case have different levels of popularity in Chinese 
aviation market as well as different levels of competition from the aircrafts made 
by Chinese manufacturers. Additionally, the foreign investors of each case 
adopted different approaches of searching and identifying their Chinese IJV 
partners. It can also be found out that the city, Tianjin, in Case two has more 
advantages of being a suitable FAL site over Hefei, in Case one. Most 
importantly, the Chinese partner in Case one and the three Chinese partners in 
Case two have different ownership types, which determine their abilities of 
contributing to each of the FAL projects respectively. All of these differences 
between both cases seem to serve as explanations for the different outcomes of 
these two projects: one FAL project failed after four-year negotiation, while the 
other one succeeded only after one year and half negotiation.
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Exhibit 5.3: Similarity and Differences between two case projects
(Resource: present author)
Case One(Failed) Case Two(Successful)
Similarity
Business nature an aircraft FAL project in Chinese 
HEM sector
an aircraft FAL project in Chinese 
HEM sector
Shareholding Of 
Foreign investor
51% 51%
Shareholding Of 
Chinese Partner
49% 49%
Motives of foreign 
investors
. Increase sales and market sales Increase sales and market sales
Year of initial contact 2006 2006
Differences
levels of popularity in 
Chinese aviation 
market
Low High
levels of competition 
in the Chinese 
aviation market
High Low
Approaches in 
searching and 
identifying Chinese 
IJV partners
A Bottom-Up approach
Identify partners first
Then get governmental approval
An Up-Down approach 
Replying on government to 
identify partners
the FAL sites Inland city with no existing 
aviation industry no relevant 
preferential policies of supporting 
the local aviation industry
Sea port with many preferential 
policies in terms of finance, tax and 
usage of land
the ownership type 
of Chinese IJV 
partner
Privately-owned enterprise State-owned companies
Outcome of the IJV 
formation
Never took off after four-year 
negotiation
succeeded only after one year and 
half negotiation
196
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter provided the data analysis, which is structured into three 
major parts: analysis of Case one, a failed IJV formation, examination of Case 
two, a successful IJV formation, and the cross case analysis of the both FAL 
projects. While the data analysis was mainly guided by the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1 and the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, the 
analysis incorporated additional constructs, which had emerged. The first case 
study offers a detailed analysis of why the FAL project was formed, how the FAL 
project was formed and why the formation of this FAL project failed. The second 
case study focuses on analyzing the interview data with regard to a similar set of 
research questions, except the last question is about why the formation of the 
FAL project in Case two was successful. The similarities and differences of the 
two case studies are presented in the third part of this Chapter in order to further 
support the research findings of this study. The next Chapter will provide a 
summary of those main findings, which will be also related with the extant 
literature.
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Chapter 6 Research Findings
6.1 introduction
After both of the within-case analysis and cross-case analysis of the 
empirical data (Eisenhardt, 1989) were presented in Chapter 5, this Chapter now 
summarizes the main research findings and also compares these research 
results of this qualitative empirical study with existing theories. The literature 
review in Chapter 2 has unearthed a list of research questions based on the 
extant research, and the following research findings are provided to answer 
those research questions identified in the introduction chapter. Thus, the key 
findings will contribute to current theoretical development on IJV partner 
selection in the broader domain of the international business literature on IJVs 
and the important research gaps in the literature on IJV partner selection will 
have been filled. The findings of this study also create a holistic analytical model 
for IJV partner selection process in Chinese HEM sector, which will be presented 
in Chapter 6 as well.
6.2 Research Question 1 
Why do foreign high-end equipment manufacturers invest IJVs in China?
The chapter 2 has reviewed eight existing organizational theories to 
explain the motives for companies entering partnerships. These have included 
transaction cost theory, resource-based views, resource dependency theory, 
strategic choice theory, network theory, organizational learning theory, 
institutional theory and social psychology theory. The investigation of the IJV 
partner selection in two case studies confirms that a number of motives for IJVs 
in China HEM sector from the perspective of foreign investors exist in line with 
those noted from the literature. Consistent with past research on strategic choice
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theory (Fuller, 1986; Kogut, 1988; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hamel, 1991; 
and Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Barringer and Harrison, 2000), this research 
firstly has demonstrated that the principal reason why foreign HEM investors 
have interest in investing IJVs in China stem from the company development 
strategies of increasing organizational competencies and market share in China 
HEM sector. The research confirms the views expressed in the extant literature 
that foreign HEM investors hope to speed up the delivery time of their popular 
products in China by investing a new production facility, provide their Chinese 
customers more comprehensive range of after-sales services as well as transfer 
their old technology of manufacturing to Chinese manufacturers, who believe the 
knowledge is still valuable, in order to win a greater share in the fast growing 
Chinese market and create strong entry barriers to limit the effective competition 
in a given product or geographic market in China. One surprising finding is that 
foreign HEM investors aim to take advantage of the “National Dignity” of Chinese 
buyers as the sales incentives, because many of Chinese customers may regard 
the products made by foreign-invested IJV factories in China as “Chinese 
Products”, which they can be proud of. Another interesting finding is that some of 
the foreign HEM investors want to be a long-term strategic partner rather than an 
opponent of the ambitious and rapidly growing China HEM sector, because 
Chinese potential competitors will be converted into allies instead of companies 
against which to compete after being selected as Chinese IJV partners. 
Moreover, the research results also extend the previous research on both 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991) and resource based theory (Das 
and Teng, 2000) by suggesting that foreign HEM investors may increase the 
profitability margin of their products by taking the advantage of the lower labor 
and production cost in China as well as the lower duty expenses of importing 
components compared with importing the assembled products into Chinese 
market. This empirical study also corroborates Powell et al.’s (1996) view of the 
motives for companies entering partnerships from the organizational learning 
perspective by revealing that foreign HEM investors may seek to gain local
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market knowledge of selling their products in China. The findings of this study 
further offer strong support to the theoretical arguments of the institutional theory 
(Barringer and Harrison 2000) by identifying that one of important motives of 
foreign HEM investors is that establishing a joint venture with local Chinese 
partners will assist them to get the business license of the IJV project from the 
Chinese government. Overall, it can be found that a combination of strategic 
choice theory, transaction cost theory, resource based theory, organizational 
learning theory and institutional theory together may explain the complexity of 
IJV partner selection decision in China HEM sector from the foreign HEM 
investors’ perspective.
6.3 Research Question 2
Why do Chinese partners have interest in forming IJVs with foreign 
high-end equipment manufacturers?
Based on the prior literature and the discussion of research data, the 
research results has identified a set of strategic motives for allying with foreign 
HEM investors from the Chinese partners’ perspective. The results of this study 
show that there might be some differences between the motives of 
privately-owned Chinese enterprises and the motives of state-owned Chinese 
companies despite of the similarities. As for the privately-owned small and 
medium enterprises, like Company L in Case one, which are not in the same 
manufacturing industry as the foreign HEM investors, the main possible reasons 
of joining IJV projects are that Chinese IJV partners may seek for high financial 
return on capital investment, saving costs of purchase for other business 
activities in the same group company and enhancing the company’s image and 
reputation, which may promote other business activities. These three findings 
have provided support for the Powell’s (1990) strategic choice theory, 
Williamson’s (1988) transaction cost theory and Gulati’s (1995) strategic network
theory respectively. Although the state-owned Chinese companies, such as the
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three Chinese IJV partners in Case two, also care about the investment return of 
IJV projects, the findings of this study suggest that they have other different 
motives. One of the most important motives is that Chinese IJV partners may 
want to learn advanced technology, supplier connections, modern managerial 
techniques as well as international experience from the foreign HEM investors. 
This finding supports the March and Levitt’s (1999) notion that firms involved in 
IJVs seek to learn from the experience of others, one of the most productive 
means of organizational learning and also emphasizes the importance of 
organizational learning theory as a basis for partner selection. Furthermore, the 
finding that Chinese IJV partners expect the joint venture to purchase more 
materials and equipment from Chinese manufacturers through localization 
process tends to not only confirm Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource 
dependency theory, which states that firms can acquire control over resources 
that maximize the dependence of other firms on it, but also support Powell’s
(1990) finding that firms can find strategic IJV partners to gain fast access to new 
technologies or new markets by joining the IJV project. Much IJV literature 
concentrates on motives of allying with foreign investors from the perspective of 
Chinese manufacturers (Glaister and Wang, 1993; Wang and Kess, 2006), while 
ignoring the motives of the Chinese government. Nevertheless, this empirical 
study shows that the Chinese government, especially the local Chinese 
government, eagerly seeks the investment from foreign partner firms with high 
international reputation in their industry, because they may stimulate their 
suppliers and other foreign HEM investors in the industry to invest in the same 
region so as to promote the local economic prosperity. Although the 
privately-owned Chinese enterprises may also expect that the IJV project would 
bring prosperity to their local region, results from the interviews demonstrate that 
their motives of forming IJVs are mainly based on the economic interests of their 
own company.
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6.4 Research Question 3
What are the contextual factors influencing the partner selection process 
in Chinese HEM sector?
This research also contributes to a great understanding of the contextual 
factors that influence partner selection and attractiveness (Glaister and Buckley, 
1997; Luo, 1997) by identifying that the motivation of IJV parties, the nature of 
HEM industry and the institutional environment of China strongly influence the 
decision making of partner selection and have significant effects on the selection 
criteria used for evaluating the potential IJV partners. More specifically, the 
research results of this study are consistent with Geringer's (1991) finding that 
the relative importance of partner selection criteria is contingent upon the 
strategic context of IJV projects. As demonstrated by the Case one in this thesis, 
the irreconcilability between the Chinese partner’s expectation of high return rate 
from the IJV project and the stable but long-term return rate proposed by the 
foreign investor becomes one of the fundamental reasons leading the IJV 
formation to failure. In contrast, the study indicates that the IJV project in Case 
two can be successfully formed, because the motive of increasing market shares 
in China is compatible with the Chinese manufacturers’ motive of obtaining 
advanced technology from the IJV project and Chinese local government’s 
motive of attracting more investment projects to the local region. The results of 
this study also support and extend Buckley and Glaister’s (1997) argument that 
the relative importance of the criteria was strongly influenced by the nature of 
industry of the joint venture and the respective industries of the venture partners, 
by finding out that not only the level of popularity of the product manufactured by 
the IJV project in Chinese market, but also the level of competition from the 
competitive models made by Chinese manufacturers exert influence on the 
partner selection process in China HEM sector, which has a great level of 
competitive dynamics as well as environmental uncertainty. The research
findings of this study further lend strong support and extension to the Hitt et al.’s
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(2000) findings by showing that strategic decisions of IJV partner selection in 
China HEM sector are significantly influenced by the institutional environments 
in which the foreign HEM investors must operate. This study provides evidence 
that the final decision on which Chinese partner the foreign HEM investors 
should select may be decided by the Chinese partner’s relationship with the 
central Chinese government. The research results are also highly consistent 
with researchers who state that governmental and socio-cultural factors 
predominate in the national and local investment environments (Beamish, 1993; 
Shenkar, 1990) by demonstrating that it would be easier for the IJV project to 
enjoy favorable tax policies and other governmental support if it is located in a 
“National Strategic Development Center”, which is strongly supported by 
Chinese central government in power in that period. On the whole, this study 
might be the first to demonstrate empirically the differential influence of three 
contextual factors on IJV partner choice in China HEM sector.
6.5 Research Question 4
How should potential IJV partners in Chinese HEM Sector be identified?
In addition, the research findings confirm that neither of the foreign HEM 
investors in Case one and Case two has adopted the traditional research on 
partner selection, which follows a linear process where a large number of 
candidates are systematically screened via market research (Bivainis, 2006). 
Although Company L in Case one was opportunistically identified by the foreign 
HEM investor in the business trade show, the other five partner candidates were 
identified by the China office of the foreign HEM investor based on the existing 
business networks in China. The research results provide support for Wong and 
Ellis’s (2002) finding that few companies employ formal search procedures in 
practice and most of foreign investors try to identify partners by heavily leaning 
on existing social networks, which can be defined in terms of business, familial 
and friendship ties. Moreover, the research results also suggest that the foreign
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investor in Case one has adopted a “Bottom to Up” approach in IJV partner 
identification and the final approval on whether or not the selected Chinese 
partner is qualified is decided by the department of central Chinese government, 
the NDRC, no matter which Chinese partner the foreign investor has chosen to 
sign the final IJV agreement either through opportunistic identification or through 
existing social networks. The cross case analysis reveals that it would be more 
effective to reply on the NDRC to provide a short list of suitable IJV partner 
candidates in China HEM sector, because it is more than likely that the NDRC 
will issue license to the IJV project having the Chinese IJV partners, which have 
already met the requirements of the NDRC. Such a “Top to Down” approach of 
IJV partner identification, as one of the surprising findings in this research, might 
offer the foreign HEM investors more opportunities to identify the right IJV 
partners for the IJV project and increase the success rate of obtaining the 
license of IJV project from the central Chinese government. However, this 
finding fails to fully support the Gulati’s (1995) assumption of the dominant 
network theory that existing network ties directly and indirectly determine partner 
identification, because the central Chinese government might be able to find the 
right IJV partners for the foreign investors.
6.6 Research Question 5
What are the partner selection criteria foreign high-end equipment 
manufacturers use to evaluate the potential Chinese IJV partners?
The investigation of the IJV partner selection in both of the case studies in 
China HEM sector also provides a deep insight into the criteria employed by 
foreign HEM investors to evaluate prospective IJV partners in China. The 
research results on partner selection criteria depart significantly from Geringer’s
(1991) classification of “task-related” and “partner-related” criteria and identify 
that a set of selection criteria, including confirmed future sales orders 
(task-related criterion), obtaining the governmental approval (task-related
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criterion), product-related industrial experience (task-related criterion), past 
business cooperation experience (partner-related criterion) providing suitable 
land and buildings (task-related criterion) and offering favorable tax 
policies(task-related criterion) is critical to the success of IJV formation in China 
HEM sector. Hence, it seems hardly surprising that there is a greater consensus 
among foreign HEM investors in the case studies on the relative importance of 
task-related selection criteria than on the importance of partner-related criteria 
when selecting Chinese partners for an IJV project. The first identified criterion, 
confirmed future sales orders, supports Geringer’s (1991) and Glaister and 
Buckley’s (1997) suggestion that a primary criterion for looking for IJV partners is 
market knowledge and access. The second criterion on obtaining the 
governmental approval support the findings that partner’s possession of 
regulatory permits is one of the most important task-related criterion in 
developing countries (Arino et al. 1997; Tatoglu, 2000) but not in other developed 
countries (Glaister and Buckley 1997; Glaister et al. 2005). The third criterion, 
product-related industrial experience, confirms the research finding of Glaister 
and Buckley (1997), who state that “in the newly emerging market economy 
context, local partner's length of industry experience has a significantly positive 
influence on IJVs profitability, local market expansion and risk reduction.” 
Furthermore, the fourth criterion, past business cooperation experience, 
supports the view suggested by several scholars that foreign parents that had 
past association with the local partners assess trust on the basis of past dealings 
(Glaister and Buckley 1997; Tatoglu 2000; Glaister et al. 2005). In addition, the 
fifth criterion, partner’s ability to provide facilities, identified from the case studies, 
resonates with the resources-based views of partner selection and supports the 
Arino et al.’s (1997) finding that industrial facilities are considered to be one of 
the main contributions from local partners. The last criterion, partner’s ability to 
provide favorable tax policies, also supports institutional theory’s prediction that 
legitimacy concerns in the host market underlie the foreign investors’ need for 
IJV partners and associated partner selection criteria (Bianchi, 2002; Di-Maggio
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and Powell, 1983). Drawing on institutional theory, this research also surprisingly 
contributes to a greater understanding of the effects of ownership type of 
Chinese IJV partners on partner attractiveness and partner selection process. 
Although privately-owned companies in China HEM sector are sensitive to the 
market changes and customers' needs, their resources are always limited 
compared with that of state-owned Chinese partners in terms of having the 
ability and Guanxi to possess regulatory permits, obtaining confirmed sales 
orders from the government, applying for competent project location and 
enjoying almost unlimited finance from the government. Therefore, this study 
provides strong evidence to support the view that only the state-owned 
enterprises working together with the Chinese government may be able to 
provide all of the complementary assets and skills which foreign HEM investors 
tend to seek from the Chinese IJV partners.
6.7 Research Question 6
What are the obstacles in the partnership during the IJV negotiation 
process in China HEM sector?
The results of this research further contribute to the literature with regard 
to the relationship between IJV partner selection and IJV negotiation process or 
outcomes, which has been far less in the focus of the current debate of IJV 
partner selection research (M un roe et al., 2004). The research results support 
Munroe et al.'s(2004) findings by revealing that poor selection of IJV partners 
may lead to the failed outcome of the IJV negotiation, while the right choice of 
IJV partners tend to enable IJV parties to reach a final IJV agreement after 
mutual negotiation. In Case one, the Chinese partner, as a privately-owned 
enterprise, cannot guarantee the confirmed orders, favorable tax policies and 
governmental approval on project license, which are requested by the foreign 
HEM investor. In the meanwhile, the foreign HEM investor refused the Chinese
partner's requests of allowing the IJV to have the freedom of selling products
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globally and purchasing materials and equipment on the global tendering basis 
in order to enlarge the short-term profitability of the IJV project. Moreover, the 
return rate of the IJV project proposed by the foreign HEM investor is also found 
to be much lower than the Chinese partner's expectation. Therefore, it is the 
limited resources and the short-term financial expectation of the privately-owned 
Chinese partner that cause the failure of the IJV negotiation. On the contrary, 
with the help of the Chinese central government, the three state-owned 
companies in Case two can provide all the six partner selection criteria 
requested by the foreign HEM investor. Moreover, although the Chinese IJV 
partners in Case two also request to raise the profitability of the IJV project by 
increasing the percentage of Chinese suppliers and reducing the number of 
foreign expatriates, they have other motives of investing in this project besides 
the economic interests. Because the value of the advanced technology learned 
from the IJV project and the value of whole industrial chain created by the IJV 
project in the local region might contribute to the Chinese economy in the long 
term, the Chinese state-owned enterprises are less concerned about the 
investment return of this IJV project and accept the stingy compromises made by 
the foreign investors in the negotiation. It is, therefore, suggested from the 
research results that the strong complementarities of motives and skills of IJV 
parties help to overcome difficulties that arose in the IJV negotiation.
6.8 Research Question 7
How should HEM investors select local IJV partners in China?
Building on the important studies of past researchers (Tomlinson,1970; 
Geringer, 1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1997; Buckley et al., 2002; Wong and Ellis 
2002; Hitt et al., 2004), this study adopted a process-oriented view of IJV partner 
selection, leading to identification of a new model of IJV partner selection, which 
might be able to increase the success rate of IJV formation in China HEM sector. 
The case analysis reveals that the foreign HEM investors might have to firstly
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examine their own motives of investing in the IJV project as well as their current 
and potential future resources and capabilities in terms of required for IJV 
success and then investigate whether their own strategic motives of forming the 
IJV are compatible with the strategic motives of Chinese IJV partners, because 
complementary goals have been found important to the success of strategic 
alliances (Harrigan, 1985) and there is a strong relationship between the motives 
of IJV formation and the relative importance of selection criteria (Nielsen, 2003). 
Analysis of the data further shows that there is a high possibility both parties 
would establish successful cooperation, when the strategic motives of Chinese 
IJV partners are either the same as those of the foreign HEM investors or 
compatible with the resources and capabilities that foreign HEM investors can 
contribute to the IJV project.
Secondly, the foreign HEM investors might have to study the industrial 
environment and institutional environment of Chinese HEM sector or its 
subsectors, because the location-specific factors may also be viewed to have an 
influence on the relative importance of various selection criteria (Dong and 
Glaister, 2006; Hitt et al., 2000). Consistent with the finding that the competitive 
ability of the manufacturer's product is a critical basis for the future commitment 
in the partnerships (Wang and Kess, 2006), the cross case findings of this 
exploratory investigation suggest that foreign HEM investors might need to 
select the right time to enter into China HEM sector when their products are still 
popular in the Chinese market and there is little competition from the similar 
models made by Chinese manufacturers. This empirical study also indicates that 
an “Up to Down” approach might have to be adopted in order to identify Chinese 
IJV partners in the unique institutional environment of China. Because most of 
the products in China HEM sector are purchased by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises, only the central Chinese government has the ability to guarantee 
the sales of certain number of products produced by the IJV projects. Another
reason is that the Chinese central government could reject the application
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because of the dissatisfaction of the Chinese IJV partners, even the 
foreign-related IJV contracts might have been signed by the IJV parties. 
Therefore, replying on the Chinese central government to search and identify 
IJV partners is undoubtedly advisable prior to IJV partner selection.
Thirdly, one interesting finding of this study is that the decision-making of 
choosing project location is separated from the IJV partner selection process 
and foreign HEM investors might have to choose a right location in China for the 
IJV projects before selecting IJV partners, not only because a suitable location 
might offer geographical advantages over other location candidates in terms of 
saving transportation costs and offering satisfactory land and space according to 
the characteristics of the industry, but also because an ideal location might enjoy 
preferential governmental policies on finance, land and tax. Therefore, this study 
also contributes to the literature that has argued that the nature of industry and 
the institutional arrangements affect the strategic choices in IJV partner selection 
by demonstrating that both of these two factors also influence the choice of 
location for the proposed IJV project.
Fourthly, the results of this study are in substantial agreement with 
Geringer’s (1991) theoretical contributions in the sense that foreign HEM 
investors might have to select Chinese IJV partners from the shortlisted 
candidates provided by the NDRC based on a set of task-related and 
partner-related criteria. One surprising finding in this study is that the central 
Chinese government can be regarded as one of the foreign HEM investors’ 
Chinese IJV partners, because it may provide two critical task-related criteria for 
the IJV project, the confirmed future sales orders and the governmental approval, 
which foreign HEM investors care about the most. This study has also shown 
that the product-related industrial experience (task-related criterion) and past 
business cooperation experience (partner-related criterion) may be provided by 
Chinese manufacturers, which may be in the same industry of foreign HEM
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investors and are in eager to learn advanced HEM knowledge from the IJV 
project. One further finding is that the local Chinese government or its related 
subsidiaries located in the area, which has been chosen as the IJV site, may 
provide foreign HEM investors with the other two important task-related criteria, 
providing suitable land and buildings and offering favorable tax policies. Taken 
together, these findings demonstrate that only if the central Chinese government, 
the state-owned Chinese manufacturers and the local Chinese government of 
the IJV site jointly work together, all the six main partner selection criteria of 
foreign HEM investors would be met, leading to the successful formation of IJV 
project in China HEM sector.
Lastly, if the six major criteria are met by Chinese IJV partners, the 
research evidence suggests that the main conflict between foreign HEM 
investors and their Chinese partners would seem to be the issue on the 
economic benefits of the IJV project left for negotiation. The foreign HEM 
investors may have to make a choice between maintaining the expected profit 
from supplying materials and components to the IJV project and increasing the 
profitability of the IJV project by allowing more Chinese suppliers. As for the 
Chinese IJV partners, a decision has to be made after balancing the risk of low 
profitability or even potential loss from investing the IJV project against the value 
of the foreign advanced HEM knowledge gained from the IJV project and the 
value of the contributions from other investment projects attracted by the 
existence of the IJV project to the local region. Analysis of the research data 
indicates that under the condition that the technical content of the IJV project is 
not high, but is urgently needed by Chinese manufacturers and the foreign HEM 
investor has a high reputation and image in its related industry, the final IJV 
agreement may be achieved between IJV parties, because the foreign HEM 
investor could still make higher profit from the IJV project itself despite of 
increasing the percentage of Chinese suppliers and the value created by the
whole industrial chain with the lead of the reputable foreign HEM investor would
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be much higher than the value created by the IJV project as an individual.
6.9 Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has undertaken a process of theoretical 
synthesizing. Exhibit 6.1 presents a holistic conceptual model for IJV partner 
selection in China's HEM sector. By contributing such a holistic approach to the 
study of IJV partner selection process in China HEM industry, this chapter has 
provided answers to the seven research questions and main research problems 
from a foreign HEM investor perspective. The research findings arising from the 
within-case analysis of both a failed case and a successful case and the cross 
case analysis between them are evaluated against the theoretical insights 
derived from the extant literature from Chapter 2. By so doing, both the data 
triangulation and theory triangulation (Patton 1990) have been fulfilled according 
to the requirements of case study method, which aimed at deriving theoretical 
generalizations rather than statistical generalizations (Yin 1994). The case 
analysis in Chapter 5 and theoretical summary in Chapter 6 together provide the 
empirical and theoretical base for the conclusions of this thesis in Chapter 7. 
Implications for both theory and practice as well as suggestions for future 
research will also be considered in the next Chapter.
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Exhibit 6.1: A holistic conceptuai model for IJV partner selection in China’s HEM sector
(Source: present author)
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
As the beginning of Chapter 7, a brief summary of the study is provided 
(7.1). Following the summary, this chapter presents conclusions of the study (7.2) 
and then expands the research findings to explore the contributions for theories 
and practice (7.3). Limitations of the research, as well as various starting points 
for future research are also delineated in order to giver other researchers a 
better understanding of what still needs to be done and how it might be 
undertaken (7.4). At last, this chapter concludes the study with final remarks 
(7.5).
7.1 Summary of the study
In summary, this thesis contributes a holistic approach to the study of the 
IJV partner selection process with reference to the relatively neglected HEM 
sector in China. This research has provided answers to the research problems 
from the perspective of foreign investors by laying out IJV management 
strategies adopted by foreign investors in the two case studies relating to 
motives of IJVs, IJV partner identification, partner selection criteria in IJV 
projects and IJV negotiation process. Chapter one introduced the importance of 
the thesis, the research gaps, the research questions, and the structure of the 
study. The main research question of the dissertation was outlined as “How 
should HEM investors select local IJV partners in China?” and further detailed 
into seven sub-questions providing the research agenda. The extant literature on 
IJV partner selection was reviewed in Chapter two as the theoretical part of the 
study. The deep insights from eight organizational theories, past IJV partner 
selection criteria research following the lead of Geringer (1988), analyses 
concerning the relationship between contextual variables and the relative 
importance of the selection criteria, process-oriented IJV partner selection
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research and IJV partner selection criteria research in China, provided a 
conceptual platform for this exploratory study and showed deficiencies and gaps 
in that literature. The methodological choices of the study were presented and 
discussed in the third chapter, which identified interpretivism as the appropriate 
paradigm for this research, qualitative and inductive methods as the most 
appropriate research design, and subsequently the longitudinal case study 
method as the most appropriate strategy for finding answers to the research 
questions. Chapter four offered the case narratives as the background 
information of the research. Both the foreign investors and Chinese partners of 
each case were introduced. The within and cross case analysis of the research 
data were then presented in Chapter five. The Case evidence highlighted the 
answers to research questions and the research findings were summarized in 
Chapter six. After the summary of the study, the last Chapter comprises the 
conclusions and contributions of the study for theory and practice. Furthermore, 
this study’s limitations and further research avenues are also discussed in the 
end.
7.2 Conclusions of the study
To conclude, although partner choice is considered as an important factor 
behind the success of IJV formation (Dawson, 1994), there may be no studies 
that specifically focus on how HEM investors identify and select JV partners in 
China. Based on the case evidence from one failed case and one successful 
case, this exploratory dissertation, aimed to address this research gap by 
showing the complex and multifaceted nature of IJV partner selection process in 
China’s HEM sector and developing a business model to guide the foreign 
investors to establish successful IJVs with Chinese partners. Overall, the 
research findings have filled the gaps in the existing research on partner 
selection and identified the following issues.
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Firstly, the study argues that the partner selection criteria in China’s HEM 
sector were influenced by three decisive factors including the motives of IJV 
projects from perspectives of foreign investors and Chinese IJV partners, the 
characteristics of HEM industry, and the institutional environment of China. The 
foreign investors should study those factors in details before they search for right 
partners, because the better understandings of context effects on IJV partner 
selection criteria will be beneficial for the identification of right IJV partners.
Secondly, the evidence shows that the foreign investors should utilize 
Chinese government authorities, in particular, the National Development and 
Reform Commission of China (NDRC) to establish initial partner listings and 
conduct JV negotiations with different prospective partners during the same 
period, when they tend to enter culturally and geographically distant Chinese 
HEM market. This “Top down” approach might offer the foreign investors more 
opportunities to identify the right IJV partners.
Thirdly, one interesting finding of this study is that foreign HEM investors 
might have to choose a right location in China for the IJV projects before 
selecting IJV partners, because the geographical advantages of a suitable 
location will help the IJV project save costs in transportation and obtain the 
satisfactory land and facility from the local government, which might also offer 
other preferential governmental policies in terms of finance and tax to the IJV 
project.
Fourthly, the research results particularly present that IJV partner selection 
in China’s HEM industry might have to be based on six partner selection criteria, 
including the confirmed future sales orders, the governmental approval, the 
product-related industrial experience, the past business cooperation experience, 
the ability of providing suitable land and buildings and the ability of offering 
favorable tax policies. Another surprising finding in this study is that only if the
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central Chinese government, the state-owned Chinese manufacturers and the 
local Chinese government of the IJV site jointly cooperate with the foreign HEM 
investors, all the six main partner selection criteria would be met, leading to the 
successful formation of IJV project in China’s HEM sector.
Lastly, this study also finds out that if the foreign investors in China’s HEM 
sector choose Chinese IJV partners which lack of the above six main criteria, 
these foreign HEM investors might encounter many unsolvable conflicts during 
the following IJV negotiation process, which might end up with failure even after 
years of efforts from both IJV parties. On the contrary, if the Chinese local 
partners selected by the foreign investors possess the above six criteria, the IJV 
negotiation process might speed up and end with a successful outcome.
7.3 Contributions of the study
These fresh insights into IJV partner selection may contribute to both 
theoretical studies and practical application. The following two subsections 
relate the research results to both areas by discussing theoretical implications in 
relation to past IJV literature in subsection 7.3.1 and identifying how IJV 
practitioners can benefit from the fruitful findings in subsection 7.3.2.
7.3.1 Implications for Theory
In the broader domain of the international business literature on IJVs, the research 
findings not only make several confirmatory theoretical contributions to an understanding of 
the selection of Chinese IJV partners in China’s HEM sector from the perspective of foreign 
investors, but also provide some fresh thoughts to the knowledge of IJV partner selection 
process.
Firstly, drawing on Hymer’s theory, the OLI paradigm and the internalization theory,
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which are all frequently used in the IB literature, this study provides insights into the 
challenges or liabilities of foreignness (LOF) for foreign investors during the IJV formation 
process in China. The findings are consistent with Hymer's (1960) theory that foreign 
investors are disadvantaged in comparison to domestic firms in Chinese aviation market, 
because they generally lack of market access for their products. This research’s findings 
also add to the Dunning(1977)’s OLI framework by concluding that the location of IJV 
projects in HEM industry should be at places where relevant preferential policies from the 
Chinese government are available and transportation costs of shipping imported 
components or parts can be reduced. In addition, the study makes a value-added 
contribution to the understanding of Rugman’s (1981) country specific advantages (CSAs) 
by uncovering that the main motive of setting up a FAL plant in China is to break tariff barrier 
of exporting products directly to Chinese market. Moreover, the research findings contribute 
to literature on regionalization by analyzing the fact that foreign HEM manufacturers are 
trying to use the increased percentage of Chinese components on their products assembled 
in China as incentives in exchange for more market share in China.
Secondly, this research with a focus in China’s HEM sector is both timely and 
relevant and adds to current theoretical development on IJV partner selection (Geringer, 
1991; Hitt et al., 2000, 2004). With regard to the contributions to various organizational 
theories, the research findings firstly supported TCT theory, which argues that an IJV 
investor should select its optimal candidate partner, which necessitates the lowest 
transaction costs (Varis and Conn 2002), by providing that working with Chinese partners to 
form an IJV project will help foreign HEM investors to avoid high duty and tax on their 
products manufactured outside of China and make those products cheaper and thus more 
appealing to Chinese market. From the views of Resource-based theories (Hamel, 1991; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Das and Teng, 2000), the 
case evidence provided support for the criticality of resources in both partner identification 
and partner selection criteria and particularly confirmed that foreign HEM investors may 
make take advantages of confirmed orders given by Chinese partners to break into Chinese
market at a faster speed and minimize investment risks. The findings suggested, however,
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that it is not only the resources that determine the attractiveness of a partner, but also 
strategic compatibility that is essential to an effective relationship between IJV partners. The 
research findings contributed to Strategic Choice Theory (SCT) (Barringer and Harrison, 
2000) by finding out that that foreign investors in HEM sector tends to emphasize stable and 
long-term return on capital, however, some potential Chinese partners might emphasize 
short-term profitability of the IJV projects. Such results might lead to different priorities for 
investments and a lack of cooperation between the parent companies and within the mixed 
management team. Moreover, the research results also showed that organizational learning 
theory (Hitt et al. 2000) had great influence on the IJV partner selection process in China 
and some Chinese executives hope to become regional, national, or even global players by 
forming IJVs with foreign investors, however, this aspiration can make it difficult to agree on 
the scope of the partnership if it is to be limited to China or to specific products. Furthermore, 
the findings of this study lend stronger support to the theoretical arguments of the 
institutional theory (Barringer and Harrison 2000) by identifying the influence of Chinese 
economic structure and Chinese governments’ industrial policies on IJV partner selection 
process in China. Last but not the least, although some foreign investors might identify and 
select previously unknown partners, the research results have broadly supported both the 
network theory, which assumes that existing network ties directly and indirectly determine 
partner choice (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995) and interpersonal psychology theory, which 
believes that trust, personal chemistry, reputations, history, and interpersonal affinity might 
be playing a great role in partner selection ( Varis and Conn, 2002). To put it into a nutshell, 
there is no single organizational theory, which can explain the complexity of IJV partner 
selection process in Chinese HEM sector and a combination of TCT, RBV, SCT, OL, IT, NT 
and IPT may provide a complete understanding of the motives of IJVs and the related 
partner selection decision process in China’s HEM sector.
Thirdly, this study also contributed to the prior theoretical knowledge on how the 
different dimensions of the IJV context and the strategic contingencies influence different 
IJV partner selection criteria (Glaister and Buckley, 1997; Luo, 1997), by demonstrating that
the motives of IJV projects, the characteristics of HEM industry, and the institutional
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environment of China are extremely important factors in determining partner selection and 
the particular criteria that partners bring to bear on the decision to establish an IJV in China’s 
HEM sector. This finding is highly consistent with emerging arguments by various scholars 
(Hitt et al., 2000; Varis and Conn, 2002; Pan, 2010) and adds to a more detailed explanation 
of why selecting IJV partners is often characterized as case-specific.
The fourth theoretical contribution is that this study provided further empirical support 
for Geringer’s (1991) typology of partner selection criteria and identified the insightful 
distinction between task and partner-related selection criteria (Glaister and Buckley, 1997), 
which can be used by foreign HEM investors to evaluate potential IJV partners in China. 
Several selection criteria including the confirmed future sales orders, the governmental 
approval, the product-related industrial experience, the past business cooperation 
experience the ability of providing suitable land and buildings and the ability of offering 
favorable tax policies have been found to extensively influence why specific partners.should 
be chosen. Those six proposed partner choice criteria may be good resource materials for 
future work in these areas.
Fifthly, the present study also supported and extended the important work of past 
researchers (Buckley et al., 2002; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Glaister and Buckley, 1997; Hitt 
et al., 2004), being the first in IJV literature to develop a business model, which offers a 
different and interesting framework for IJV partner selection and negotiation in China’s HEM 
sector and also highlights main issues that can lead to more successful partner selection. 
Such a model provides significant support for the arguments (Geringer, 1991; Glaister and 
Wang, 1993) that IJV formation should be carefully planned to avoid wasting time and 
money, however, this study did not support the views made by Al-Khalifa and Peterson 
(1999), which implied that IJV formation and IJV partner selection should clearly be 
considered two separate decision processes. The present study believes that IJV partner 
selection is an important part of IJV formation process and cannot be separated from the IJV 
formation process.
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Sixthly, another important contribution of this existing research to IJV theory is that the 
research results supported the argument that IJV negotiation process constitutes a critical 
part of IJV partner selection process (Young et al. 1989; Bivainis 2006; Duisters et al. 2011). 
This study also shed some more light on critical problems occurred during the IJV 
negotiation in China’s HEM sector, such as management control, IP rights protection, and 
the role of directors, etc. and increased the knowledge of how to choose adequate 
negotiation strategies and build tactics under the continuous changes of context in order to 
increase the possibilities of successful IJV agreements (Munroe et al. 2004; Faure, 2000).
The last confirmatory contribution of this study lies in its implication for the current 
literature on IJV formation in emerging economies, in particular, those countries currently or 
formerly practicing communism. It has been argued by many scholars that emerging 
economies like China “offer fascinating grounds to refine and test existing theories and 
develop new ones” (Nee and Matthews, 1996). China has entered a new era by focusing on 
its domestic growth in the recent years, especially after the global financial crisis in 2008 and 
the just-enacted China’s 12th Five-Year Plan in 2011. As limited efforts have been made in 
studying IJV issues under the “New China" environment, the present study provided 
significant insights for the importance of partnering skills in choosing IJV partners to break 
into Chinese market or increase market share in China. The research results of this study 
not only supported previous research on IJV partner selection in China based on Geringer’s 
(1991) typology of task-related selection criteria and partner-related selection criteria 
(Glaister and Wang, 1993; Dong and Glaister 2006; Wang and Kess, 2006), but also backed 
up the research findings of Luo( 1998), who presented three categories of partner selection 
criteria: strategic (operation-related), organizational (cooperation-related), and
financial(cash flow-related) criteria, which are all critical to the survival and growth of foreign 
companies active in China. Moreover, these results were also highly consistent with 
researchers who emphasize the important influence of two Chinese special circumstances 
(“Guo Qing”), ownership type and Guangxi (Land and Cavusgil, 1996; Yan, 2004), on 
partner selection process in China.
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Apart from those contributions which confirm most of the findings of previous studies on 
IJVs, this research does offer some fresh thoughts on the IJV partner selection process. In 
contrast to prior empirical research, this study emphasizes understanding the importance of 
“Role of State” (Luo, 1997) in China. In such a strictly protected and highly regulated 
industry like aircraft manufacturing, the researcher found out that foreign investors might 
have to select at least two types of Chinese partners for their IJV projects, one from 
state-owned manufacturers providing local knowledge of manufacturing and the other one 
from local-government-owned companies assisting finance, land and favorable tax policies 
in order to access all the important CSAs which they look for in Chinese market. In addition, 
the research findings surprisingly conclude that it is better off for the foreign investors in 
HEM sector to reply on the Chinese central government to shortlist the IJV candidates, since 
the IJV agreements have to be authorized by the Chinese government before a license of 
manufacturing can be obtained. Furthermore, the research finding seems to also suggest 
the level of support from the Chinese government for the IJV formation is mainly decided by 
the degree of competition between foreign brands and domestic products made by SOEs in 
those almost protected HEM industries. Therefore, the timing of moving manufacturing 
facilities into China via IJV approach is critical for the success of IJV formation. Another 
interesting finding is that a good Guanxi with Chinese government at an individual level 
should not be considered as an advantage of Chinese IJV partners, because concentrating 
on an individual Guanxi might sacrifice the opportunities of building a whole guanxi web in 
China. Last but not the least, the study calls into question much of the prior empirical 
research that does not account for by pointing out that foreign HEM manufacturers are 
transferring their old technology to Chinese rivals for the main purpose of delaying their R&D 
progress so as to maintain their leading position in the market for a longer time, even their 
actual manufacturing costs increase after moving into China due to higher transportation 
cost of shipping components and higher salary costs paid to expatriates.
In summary, the key theoretical contributions of this study arise from a qualitative 
approach of studying the IJV partner selection phenomenon in China's HEM sector. The
combination of studying IJV partner selection criteria and IJV formation process clearly
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produces a more holistic perspective into the phenomenon. The aircraft manufacturing 
cases used as the domain provides a deep and narrow research which may later be 
extended and generalized into a partner selection theory in combination with the existing 
literature and many school of thoughts noted previously. However, given the limitation of the 
research design, it has to be acknowledged that these contributions are somewhat tentative 
and the generalizability of the research findings of this study has to be tested in future 
studies.
7.3.2 Implications for Management
In addition to implications for theory, the findings of this study have 
implications for practitioners. IJV is likely to play an increasingly important role 
among firms' growth strategies, but many IJVs have been cancelled even after 
years of negotiations and costly feasibility studies. The selection of the 
appropriate partner is of considerable importance to decision makers and 
managers following this highly demanding organizational mode and will reduce 
the possibility of IJV failure. Consequently, the following paragraphs aim to 
provide practical implications derived from the key findings.
This study firstly contributes a new dimension to IJV management by adding 
the influence of institutional context in China on strategic actions of foreign 
investors. Newman (2000) argues that the partner selection process may be 
particularly sensitive to differences in institutional environments. When being 
considered as potential IJV partners in Chinese HEM sector, state-owned 
companies have an advantage over privately or collectively-owned firms in terms 
of accessing to scarce resources, materials and capital, and the hierarchical 
state-owned enterprises also have a better support from various governmental 
institutions, because all the senior management team of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises are holding “government posts”, which may be higher than those of
local government officers, implying that IJVs with such state-owned companies
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may more readily succeed in preempting scarce resources and maintaining 
market power in the industry. Moreover, this research revealed that China is a 
government-led developing country with unbalanced economic development 
among Eastern and Middle-Western regions of China. Most of the industry’s 
main forces lie in the eastern coastal areas in terms of the number of the 
corporations and the industrial added value and profits. Therefore, the 
state-owned companies located in Middle-Western part of China may not have 
sufficient finance and capability to support IJVs in HEM sector, which normally 
requires heavy financial investments. The research findings also guide IJV 
managers to look for the ideal project location where the leaders of Chinese 
Communist Party were grown up and then the local government has special 
“Guangxi” with Chinese central government in Beijing. The local governments in 
those regions will be more likely to get licenses for developing giant HEM 
projects with almost unlimited financial support from central government. China’s 
dynamic and complex institutional environment makes foreign investors 
pursuing a long term market position in China pay more attention to the ways of 
collaboration which their Chinese partners develop and maintain.
Another managerial contribution is that IJV managers can benefit from 
information provided on the status quo of Chinese HEM sector, in particular, 
aircraft manufacturing sector. The global HEM industry based on knowledge, 
innovation and high quality products has been restructuring and relocating from 
developed countries to China in the recent years frequently through an assembly 
plant in order to take advantage of this fast-growing market with a huge demand 
for high-tech products and production techniques. However, Chinese central 
government tends to protecting native HEM industry by only allowing new IJV 
projects to be located in economic zones which are far away from areas where 
Chinese enterprises have already produced similar and competitive products, 
because the competitive salary offered by foreign-related IJVs may cause brain 
drain in those Chinese companies if the new IJV projects are situated in the
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same industrial areas. Timing of entry is also critical for IJV project in Chinese 
HEM sector, because Chinese central government is inclined to grant a license 
to a new IJV project which will not hinder the development of native industry. 
Opportunities for foreign companies lie in the areas of technology transfer, pro­
cess engineering, sustainable production methods and export of high 
value-added components when local Chinese companies are not capable to 
compete in those advanced technical areas. However, if Chinese state-owned 
companies have already had the ability of producing competitive products 
compared with foreign technology, Chinese central government is normally 
prone to prevent those state-owned companies from the pressure of competition 
from foreign investors by maintaining a high import duty and refusing to grant IJV 
licenses. The understanding of China HEM industry can assist IJV managers to 
face the various challenges of IJV formation, especially the implications of recent 
economic policies enacted by the Chinese central government for foreign 
businesses in HEM sector and then adopt appropriate strategies in China.
The study has also plugged a major gap in IJV partner selection 
management research by offering a holistic conceptual model of partner 
selection, which might offer a sound and logical process for foreign investors to 
increase the success rate of IJV projects in Chinese HEM sector. The four steps 
of forming successful IJVs were identified can indicate IJV managers what and 
when to consider and implement during IJV project management. By providing 
sufficient information about the process and factors to consider as important for 
IJV partnerships, this model can allow IJV managers to save time and choose 
among potential partners in a more structured and systematic approach, which 
may considerably enhance the foundation for eventually successful IJV 
formation. This model also offers insights into a clear understanding of what to 
be negotiated during IJV formation, what major conflicts are in the drafted IJV 
contracts and how IJV managers in the similar negotiation situation create 
conflicts resolution strategies leading to joint venture agreements. However, a
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degree of discretion should be used in applying this model to a unique project, 
because some factors may be more important than those in other cases and 
need to be considered at different times from those suggested by the model.
Furthermore, the above managerial contributions are also valuable to 
managers responsible for IJV projects from Chinese enterprises as well as 
Chinese governments or other organizations involved in establishing standards 
and limitations for IJV cooperation. The perspectives of the local Chinese 
partners and IJV management itself have been considered in this study with the 
purpose of acquiring a more comprehensive understanding of partner selection 
process. The research findings may assist IJV managers of Chinese companies 
to obtain the important criteria sought by foreign investors with the aim of 
increasing the attractiveness as potential IJV partners. The study will also be of 
interest to Chinese central and local governments, which can better offer 
attractive investment environment of HEM sector and further assist foreign 
investors to identify potential Chinese IJV partners.
Finally, an important managerial implication derived from this research 
relates to how to proactively manage IJV formation process in order to avoid the 
damaging costs in their failure. Although this process is highly demanding in 
terms of energy, time, persistence and diplomatic ability, a great deal of attention 
should be given to a detailed succession planning of IJV partner selection 
management. It can be argued that it is better for the money spent on planning 
to be wasted, rather than greater losses being risked by a failed IJV project. The 
findings of case A in this study revealed that personnel changes can have a 
significant impact on the successful outcome of IJV negotiation. The parent 
companies should make careful plans for management succession in order to 
minimize disruption to IJV formation.
Overall, this thesis has provided a new model of IJV practice based on the
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theoretical underpinnings of the strategic alliances, task-related and 
partner-related IJV partner selection criteria as well as the practical experience 
of IJV management in China. Given both positive and negative lessons learned 
from this research, foreign investors entering IJVs with local Chinese partners 
must consider partner’s motivation as well as their own, the influence of industry 
and the impact of institutional environment before identifying and selecting 
potential partners. The research findings could be also used to define IJV 
management strategies for new cross-border venturing activities in both 
developed countries and emerging economies in order to avoid strategic drift.
7.4 Limitations of the study and future research avenues
In spite of some contributions to the literature and practice, this research 
has several limitations that might lead to additional work in future IJV partner 
selection research. The first limitation of this study is clear because the findings 
are based on a limited sample size of two case companies, which may not be 
fully representative of all IJVs in HEM sector of China. The case study approach 
used in this research was appropriate to provide preliminary and valuable data, 
but the results cannot be generalized and future research on partner selection in 
HEM sector of China will be needed to provide a larger sample of IJVs for an 
expanded theory.
Secondly, even though triangulation and various other measures to increase 
reliability and validity of the study were included and the rich set of interview data 
of this study did allow deep and narrow research, the qualitative research design 
with a small number of interviewees limited the applicability of these research 
results to a larger set, because the participants of two case companies could not 
be considered representative and the findings of the research could not make 
inference about the whole population (Yin, 2003). In the future studies of a large
data sample of companies, quantitative statistical methods, such as regression
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analysis might be used to establish the relationship between key variables from 
the survey data.
Thirdly, although this research has succeeded in analyzing the process of 
selecting suitable IJV partners in HEM sector of China, but a limited type of 
partnership, joint venture, may further limit the applicability and generalizability 
of the results. Future research should extend this context by looking at different 
types of alliances, such as licensing agreements, research and development 
agreement, marketing alliances, etc., because the general applicability of this 
research results across a broad range of strategic partnerships is possibly 
limited.
Fourthly, further studies should expand the sector coverage and investigate 
the influence of industry on the partner selection criteria to determine whether 
the highly significant results of this study are stable. This study was based on 
aircraft and aerospace manufacturing industry, which is only one type of 
sub-sectors of HEM industry in China. Although within-industry samples offer 
several advantages in terms of comparison and evaluation of certain variables, 
this study did not include companies from other important sectors, such as 
railway equipment manufacturing, marine equipment manufacturing and 
intelligent equipment manufacturing. Future research on the IJV partner 
selection in these sectors may not only raze new or sector-unique IJV partner 
selection criteria, but also may draw fresh insights from systematic variation 
across industry sectors, because joint ventures with different strategic objectives 
operating in different industries in China may encounter idiosyncratic pressure 
from market demand and industrial competition and face varying governmental 
policies and institutional support (Luo, 1997)
Fifthly, it would seem important that future studies be carried out among 
IJVs in a variety of location and cultural contexts to enhance the generalizability
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of presented findings. This research embodied a narrow or biased focus on IJVs 
between French investors and Chinese local partners, thus limiting the 
applicability of the research results. In order to empirically verify the research 
findings of this study and lessons drawn from China, similar research on how 
different sized companies from other developed countries select local partners in 
other emerging economies such as South-Eastern Asian countries and Africa 
seems a fruitful avenue for future research. Due to unique cultural heritage, 
distinct ideologies, and differing economic and political infrastructures (Lodge 
and Vogel, 1987), it is imperative that multinational firms need to adapt their 
approaches for establishing IJV in emerging market countries which have 
different needs and seek different types of partners for IJVs. However, it may be 
argued that studies which control for industry and partner nationality are in fact 
required in order to build a base that can subsequently be tested for 
generalizability (Parke, 1993).
Finally, this research focused on IJV formation stage and did not address 
the relationship between partner selection and IJV performance as the venture 
evolves. Luo (1997) argued that many IJVs undoubtedly do not have inter-parent 
fit in strategic, organizational, and financial areas during the formation stage, but 
they survive, sustain, and evolve in the country. Due to the subjective nature of 
particularly the partner selection process and the time-lag between partner 
selection and observed performance, it is very difficult to observe and record the 
process from the time where the partner was actually selected to the time where 
sufficient performance data were available. However, it would be important for 
future research to focus on identifying partner selection criteria associated with 
successful IJV projects and examining how partners longitudinally and 
dynamically maintain fit or adjust unfit for the attainment of mutual benefits 
during the operation and management of IJVs.
On the whole, the findings of this research are limited to the case
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companies studied due to budgetary and time limitations. However, for both 
academics and managers alike, this study offer avenues for follow up studies to 
develop and nurture a better understanding of the complexity and dynamism of 
IJV formation process in China and other emerging economies.
7.5 Closing Remarks
The last chapter reviewed the structure of the study, summarized the main 
conclusions of the study, presented the implications for theory and practice, 
addressed the limitations of the research and provided suggestions for future 
research. Being an irreversible trend, the HEM industry is one of the seven 
areas of the strategic new industry in China, according to its National 
Twelve-Five plan. Due to governmental support, accelerating urbanization and 
rising domestic consumer power, more and more foreign companies have 
viewed China as one of the world's growth markets for their technology and 
products in HEM industry. A very recent example is that the British government 
has deepened its ties to China's space sector with bilateral agreements on future 
IJV projects since the end of 2013. Although being grounded in the specific 
limitations of a qualitative case research, this dissertation provided interesting 
insights and substantial guidance for both practitioners and academics in terms 
of selecting right partners to form successful IJVs in Chinese HEM sector.
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Reflective Diary
This part of the paper provides a personal reflective diary describing my 
research journey of this study and also discusses how my research experience 
have helped me to be a better practitioner researcher. The diary not only reviews 
my experience of being a taught student on campus in the first Phase of this 
DBA program, but also shares the personal experience in conducting a DBA 
thesis off campus in the Phase two of the DBA study. Both the benefits of this 
study and the difficulties during the research journey have been offered.
Since I left university in 2002 with a Master degree in Accounting and 
Finance, I had worked for two UK companies for 7 years in the area of 
international business management, which included importing household 
products from China to Europe or exporting European High-end machinery 
products to the Chinese market. As a Chinese, who used to live and study in 
China for more than 20 years before coming to the UK and then worked in a 
complete English-speaking environment, I had the opportunity in enjoying being 
a “bridge” between Western and Eastern culture constantly through my daily 
working practice. Because I was fascinated by business cooperation and various 
strategic alliances between Western companies and China, I decided to go back 
to university for higher level of studies in international business management 
and looked for a doctoral programme designed for practitioners in order to 
further enhance my knowledge and further develop my career. Luckily, the DBA 
programme of Surrey Business School, one of the most admired business 
doctoral programmes in Europe, enrolled me in October 2009. It was the 
combination of a world-renowned business school and a top UK university that 
really sparked my interest in this DBA programme. I am glad that I made this 
decision and have truly enjoyed being a part-time DBA student in this school for 
a fantastic 4 and half years.
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During my studies in Surrey Business School, I not only gained 
professional knowledge and academic skills because of the inspiring intellectual 
environment, the highly qualified faculty and the well-designed stimulating 
modules, but also got continuous support and care from friendly teachers and 
supporting staffs. Our class included students from diverse cultural, educational 
and professional backgrounds. It is very enjoyable to make friends with them 
and learn management knowledge from their practical working experience. 
Overall, with a beautiful campus and perfect location close to London, the reality 
of Surrey Business School exceeds its world-wide reputation and deserves to be 
coined as one of the top leading management schools in UK.
The fundamental aim of this DBA programme is to help students to make 
contributions to organisational and managerial practice through the application 
and development of appropriate theories and research paradigms. After 
completing the “Phase One” courses of this DBA programme, interacting with 
the faculty and fellow students and immersing myself into my field of research in 
the “Phase Two” study, I think I have learned how to gain knowledge from 
powerful theories and models, how to improve skills in academic research and 
writing and howto generate new knowledge from conceptualising, designing and 
implementing research projects.
During my Phase One study, my research and scholarship skills have 
been greatly strengthened by attending 5 modules of this DBA programme, 
which were taught by four excellent scholars of the school and required passing 
five challenging module assignments. The first module helped me to appreciate 
the significance and implications of different epistemologies and paradigms 
which underpins management literature and then develop an appropriate 
conceptual framework related to my own management research topic. The 
second module, in relation to qualitative research method, assists me to 
understand a full range of qualitative research collection and analysis techniques
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and also to apply chosen research methods rigorously and critically. Moreover, 
from completing the module 3 ,1 have learned how to apply quantitative research 
designs and techniques to the collection and analysis of management data in a 
real world setting and how to link the development of a research question with 
the parallel choice of the selection of an appropriate research design approach. 
Among the 5 taught modules, the module regarding literature review impressed 
me the most by improving my critical assessment skills of published texts and 
research as well as critical writing skills to write in a self-critical way. The last 
taught module related with research proposal helped me set up a detailed 
project plan before the action and systematically build theoretical, empirical and 
methodological bases on which my thesis is built. Although the five taught 
courses are designed mainly for training the research skills of DBA students, 
these modules have also enabled me to develop transferable skills, such as 
conducting a quantitative SPSS research analysis and writing a critical research 
report or a well-structure research proposal as required in a workplace 
management situation.
My research and scholarship skills have been further developed during 
the second phase of my DBA study, which requires designing and executing a 
practice-oriented piece of thesis that can investigate and generate new 
knowledge in a management related topic area with the help of two supervisors. 
My research is a qualitative, theory-building case research, positioned within the 
realism paradigm. I was very honoured to get the supervision from two 
knowledgeable and experienced scholars. Professor Bachmann and Dr. Gore, 
who have provided me valuable guidance and support to my whole research 
process. I still clearly remember that Professor Bachmann invited me to attend 
an academic conference of aviation industry organised by I CAROS after I 
discussed with him my research interest towards strategic alliance in Chinese 
aviation industry. I was greatly inspired by the presentations delivered by 
researchers studying aviation sector from various institutions around the world
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and hoped to present my research findings in the future conferences of I CAROS 
one day. During my stage of collecting relevant literature, Dr. Gore shared her 
precious experience with me and suggested me to look for “research heroes” in 
my selected topic area. Finding the key academic paper written by Geringer 
(1991) is a big cornerstone for my thesis and his academic contributions have 
been frequently referred in many other extant literature. With regard to narrowing 
down the main research topic. Dr. Gore encouraged me to focus on 
management problem in which I have the most interest and not to write 
something aiming for getting closer to the research interests of supervisors. After 
two-year research practice, I submitted my first draft of thesis to my supervisors 
in May 2013, however, it was not satisfactory in many aspects. My main problem 
was lack of research focus and the whole thesis was more like a story-telling, 
which merely describes my past working experience. During the review 
meetings. Professor Bachmann inspired me to summarize my research findings 
by using one sentence in order to find my research focus. Dr. Gore suggested 
me to visit British Library and improve my academic writing ability from reading 
more past doctoral thesis of management research. I am indeed grateful for their 
precious suggestions for improvement on each section of my thesis and also 
their kind words of encouragement, which gave me huge support to my learning. 
After gaining lessons from my unsatisfactory first draft, I almost re-wrote my 
thesis from the very beginning. However, I am confident that my skills of 
conducting research have certainly been further improved through additional 
hard efforts on this assignment. With the knowledge gained from the five 
modules of DBA programme as well as the guidance of my supervisors, I have 
learned how to apply theories and models in the real life business settings and 
how to assess and evaluate management issues critically by a rigorous system 
of inquiry.
In addition to my research and scholarship skills, I realized that my 
communication skills have been enhanced as well. My DBA class consists of a
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small number of research students and I always have sufficient time to 
communicate my ideas and problems with faculty and fellow students. In 
particular, my communication skills have be gained in being able to 
communicate my ideas and conclusions clearly and effectively to specialist and 
non-specialist audiences and in defending research proposals verbally during 
the seminars of presenting research progress. The seminar feedbacks from 
teachers and classmates provided me with an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research in terms of the theories and proposed research 
methods and also helped me to maintain the motivation to complete my next 
phase of the research. The gained communication skills can enable me not only 
to communicate effectively with both the academic and the managerial or 
business communities, but also to act as interpreters between the two. In 
addition, the 20 semi-structured interviews have also offered me good 
opportunities to enhance my communication skills with interviewees.
Furthermore, the experience of this DBA programme has changed me 
professionally as well as personally to be a reflective practitioner by broadening 
my horizon and changing my entire approach to define, analyse and solve 
management problems. While studying part-time DBA programme between 
2009 and 2013, I have always tried to explore the relationship between theory 
and practice and developed an enquiring mind and associated skills needed to 
rigorously analyse the opportunities for and deliver high quality solutions to 
support five interesting business projects, in which I worked as a senior business 
consultant. Firstly, I have read many academic theories regarding supply chain 
management before I helped a Chinese plush toy manufacturer to supply one 
million pounds worth of plush mascots for London Olympic Games. Secondly, 
my deep understanding of organisational theories of strategic alliances enabled 
me to help two western companies successfully set up two international joint 
ventures with their Chinese partners. One IJV was jointly invested between a UK 
printing roller manufacturer and a Chinese paper merchant and the other joint
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venture was established by an American robot technology company and a 
Chinese Fork Lift company. Thirdly, my readings of marketing and branding 
theories were very useful for me when I helped a Chinese wine importer to build 
a sales network in China within a short period and also assisted a Chinese solar 
panel producer to successfully break into European market. The DBA 
programme of Surrey Business School has certainly increased my employability 
and my ways of applying relevant theoretical frameworks to create solutions and 
drive changes have helped me win respects from my employers and customers.
Although completing this programme was highly rewarding, it was highly 
challenging at the same time. I, as a part-time DBA student, have experienced a 
set of difficulties and hardships that those pursuing on on-campus route towards 
a DBA would not encounter. I found it is very hard to balance my full-time work 
life, my private life and my DBA studies. As a business consultant, I often have 
to travel for business with short notice. The time originally set aside for working 
on research was often replaced by time spent on long haul trains or flights. 
Sometimes the work pressure can even make me feel depressed and lose 
interest in any studies. Because of conducting this research and writing up the 
thesis, I had to sacrifice many of my hobbies and reduce time on socializing with 
my family members and friends.
On the whole, this research journey has been a very enjoyable and 
rewarding experience, which not only improved my research and scholarship 
skills, but also the communication skills. I could not have done this research 
without the support from my supervisors, my family and my friends. It is their 
encouragements that give me strength to carry on every step of the studies 
towards DBA qualification and grow up as a qualified practitioner researcher. I 
really enjoyed my DBA studies as well as the research journey of my thesis and 
would definitely recommend it to anyone looking to study in a reputable business
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school that combines both practical and theoretical learning to improve the skill 
and knowledge required for their workplace.
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Appendices
Appendix A: A Case study database 
(Resource: present author)
Case one: a failed IJV formation
1. Transcribed interview material (11 interviews in total 143 pages)
Name Job Position Role in this Project Date o f  Data 
Collection
Case One A  failed aircraft FAL IJV project between Company A  (Foreign  
investor) and Company L (Chinese partner)
Interviewees from  Company A
Mr. FB Senior 
director o f  
Company A
The person who ended 
the JV negotiation with 
Company L
20 Sept. 2012
Mr. SM Senior 
director o f  
Company A
The main decision 
maker o f  all negotiations 
with Company L for three 
years
21 Sept. 2012
Mr. JM Senior 
director o f  
Company A
The key negotiator o f  
Company A  between 
2008-2010
24 Oct. 2012
Mr. PD Senior manager o f  
Company A
The key negotiator 
before 2008
24 Oct. 2012
Mr. GT Senior director o f  
Company A
Leader o f  Company 
A ’s partner selection team
8 Nov. 2012
Interviewees from  Company L
Mr. WM Senior director o f  
Company L
The main decision-maker o f  
Company L for the JV 
negotiation
8 Jan. 2013
M r.ZB Senior 
director o f  
Company L
The key negotiator o f  
Company L
8 Jan. 2013
Mr. MP Senior director o f  
a private-owned 
Chinese Airline
A member o f  brain trust 
team o f  Company L
14 Jan. 2013
Mr. LR Chinese Solicitor 
o f  Company L
The key mentor for the 
Company L’s negotiation 
Team
15 Jan. 2013
Mr. JH Senior director o f  
Local Chinese
Supporting negotiator o f  
Company L
15 Jan. 2013
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Airport Company
M r.ZX Middle manager o f  
Company L
Organizing meetings and 
archiving company files
16 Jan.2013
2. Field notes during the observation of negotiation meetings (52 pages)
3. Minutes of previous negotiation meetings (54 pages)
4. Four different versions of IJV contracts. (516 pages)
Version 1 dated 16^  ^October 2009 in both Chinese and English 
Version 2 dated of 24^  ^March 2010 in both Chinese and English 
Version 3 dated 2 f^  April 2010 in both Chinese and English 
Version 4 dated 20^  ^June 2010 in both Chinese and English
5. Emails and letter correspondences between IJV parties (27 pages)
6. Past financial information of IJV parties (12 pages)
7. Other business documents including Framework Agreement and Letter of 
Intent (25 pages)
Case two: a successful IJV formation
Case Two A  successful aircraft FAL IJV project between Company B 
(Foreign investor) and a Chinese consortium comprising Company T, Company 
V I and Company V2
Interviewees from Company B
Mr. DL Senior director o f  
Company B
The key negotiator o f  
Company B
11 Jun. 2013
Mr. MB Senior director o f  
Company B
The main decision maker o f  
all negotiations with 
Chinese consortium
11 Jun. 2013
Mr. LB Senior director o f  
Company B in 
China
Supporting negotiator o f  
Company B
19 Jun. 2013
Mr. MR Senior manager o f  
Company B in 
China
Supporting negotiator o f  
Company B
20 Jun. 2013
Interviewees from Company T
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Mr. GL Senior director 
o f  Company T
The main decision-maker o f  
Company L for the JV 
negotiation
23 Jun. 2013
Mr. BP Senior director o f  
Company T
The key negotiator o f  
Chinese consortium
23 Jun. 2013
Mr. JK Chinese Solicitor The key mentor for the 
Chinese negotiation team
24 Jun. 2013
Interviewees from Company V I
Mr. SF Senior director o f  
Company VI
Supporting negotiator 25 June 2013
Interviewees from Company V2
Mr. NC Senior director o f  
Company V2
Supporting negotiator 26 June 2013
2. Three different versions of IJV contracts. (375 pages)
Version 1 dated 14^  ^November 2006 in both Chinese and English 
Version 2 dated 2 f^  January 2007 in both Chinese and English 
Version 3 dated 10^ * May 2007 in both Chinese and English
3. Emails and letter correspondences between IJV parties (20 pages)
3. Minutes of previous negotiation meetings (34 pages)
4. Past financial information of IJV parties (26 pages)
5. Other business documents including Framework Agreement and Letter of 
Intent (19 pages)
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Appendix B: Interview Guide
(Resource: present author)
University of Surrey
Surrey Business School 
Interview Guide
By Yiran Zhu
Project Name: IJV Partner Selection in China’s HEM Sector
Name of interviewee: 
Company:
Position:
Date of the interview:
Introduction
I would like to thank you for spending the time on meeting with me today. My name is 
Yiran Zhu and I am a DBA (Doctor of Business Administration) student at University of 
Surrey. I am inviting you to participate in a research study, which is part of my doctoral 
degree requirements. The topic of my study is “IJV Partner Selection in China’s High-end 
Equipment Manufacturing (HEM) Sector”, which falls under the broad umbrella of strategic 
alliance management associated research. I am interested in learning more knowledge 
about how to select right IJV partners in China’s HEM sector from your experiences 
participating in the aircraft FAL project. The benefit of this research is that you will be helping 
us to have a better understanding of the complexity and dynamism of IJV formation process 
in China’s HEM sector and capture lessons that can be used in future strategic alliances 
with Chinese business partners. There are no known risks associated with your participating 
in the study. The interview will take approximately 30-45 minute of your time and I will be 
taping the interview because I do not want to miss any of your precious comments. All tapes 
and transcripts from the interview will be kept both anonymous and confidential. I will use a 
made-up name for you and your company, so that your identity will be concealed in any 
reports written from the interview and the interview data cannot be attributed or associated 
with any company. Please feel free to ask any questions that you may have about the 
research and don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to. If you do not wish to 
continue, you may end the interview at any time. Thank you sincerely!
Are you willing to participate in this interview?
If you agree to join this study, please sign your name on the “informed content” page.
264
Part one: Details of the interviewee
1. What is your role in this IJV project?
2. How long have you been involved in this IJV formation?
Part two: Research questions 
If foreign investors,
Question 1
Can you tell me why your company had interest in investing this IJV project in China? 
Question 2
Can you tell me what are the contextual factors influencing the partner selection 
process in this IJV project?
Question 3
Can you tell me how your company identified the Chinese partners in this IJV project? 
Question 4
Can you tell me what v>/ere the partner selection criteria used by your company to 
evaluate the potential Chinese IJV partners?
Question 5
Can you tell me what the obstacles in the partnership were during the negotiation 
process in this IJV project?
Question 6
Can you tell me why the IJV formation was unsuccessful (in Case one) or successful 
(in Case two)?
Question 7
Can you make any final comments on the partner selection process of this IJV project, 
especially something you feel important which might not have covered so far?
If Chinese IJV partners,
Question 1
Can you tell me why your company had interest in investing this IJV project in China? 
Question 2
Can you tell me what are the contextual factors influencing the partner selection 
process in this IJV project?
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Question 3
Can you tell me what the obstacles in the partnership were during the negotiation 
process in this IJV project?
Question 4
Can you tell me why the IJV formation was unsuccessful (in Case one) or successful 
(in Case two)?
Question 5
Can you make any final comments on the partner selection process of this IJV project, 
especially something you feel important which might not have covered so far?
If third party involved in this IJV project,
Question 1
Can you tell me what are the contextual factors influencing the partner selection 
process in this IJV project?
Question 2
Can you tell me what the obstacles in the partnership were during the negotiation 
process in this IJV project?
Question 3
Can you tell me why the IJV formation was unsuccessful (in Case one) or successful 
(in Case two)?
Question 4
Can you make any final comments on the partner selection process of this IJV project, 
especially something you feel important which might not have covered so far?
Part three: Other evidence
Is there someone else in your organization that I could talk to about these issues? 
Is there any material to collect for the documentary evidence?
Thoughts of the interviewer immediately after the interview:
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Appendix C: Informed consent
(Resource: present author)
Informed Consent:
agree to be interviewed by Yiran Zhu of University of Surrey for the project
entitled “IJV Partner Selection in China’s HEM Sector”.
I have been told that the information collected for this project is confidential and my 
participation in this project is anonymous.
I agree that the interview can be electronically recorded, but I am free to discontinue 
participation in the project at any time without prejudice.
I have been advised that the results of such interviews may be published and I agree that 
the information collected from the interview may be used in any way thought best for this 
research.
Date
Signature of Interviewee
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Appendix D: One example of a full transcript of interview
(Resource: present author)
Name of the interviewee: Mr. LB 
Company: Company B
Position: senior director of Company B in China
Date of interview: 19 June 2013
Place of interview: Company B ’s Beijing offiee
Language: Chinese (Translated into English by the present author)_______________________
Interviewer: Thanks a lot Mr. LB for giving me the time for this interview. I would 
just like to ask you if you can share with me something about your experiences of 
forming this FAL IJV project with Chinese partners.
Mr. LB: Sure, where to start?
Interviewer: any experiences that you would like to share. Like, you know, what is 
your role in this IJV project?
Mr. LB: I used to be responsible for all the Company B’s business activities in 
China....and I was also one of the negotiators with Chinese Partners in this FAL 
project.
Interviewer: So how long have you been involved in forming this IJV project?
Mr. LB: Almost 2 years, I reckon.
Interviewer: Can you tell me why your company had interest in this IJV project in 
China?
Mr. LB: Hmm...This FAL project is a strategic project for Company B. We hoped to 
increase sales in China and also ramp up the production capacity of our best-selling 
aircrafts to meet the growing demand of Chinese market. All the recent three large 
orders of over 500 aircrafts placed by Chinese airlines would have been possible, 
but not likely without the Tianjin FAL project.
Interviewer: Do you think this IJV project will reduce the production cost of your 
aircrafts?
Mr.LB: Yeah...the Tianjin FAL project is part of our Power 8 restructuring program 
and we hoped to achieve a targeted reduction of 3 billion USD in overhead and 
costs by bringing more outsourcing suppliers and new risk-sharing partners. At the 
beginning of the FAL project, it cost Company B more to assemble the same aircraft
in China because of the longer lead time and higher transportation cost to bring
the aircrafts from Europe in sections ready for assembly although the freight
costs for shipment from Europe to China might be cheaper due to many empty 
containers available.
Interviewer: Is there any other motives of Company B in investing this FAL project?
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Mr. LB: Yeah I think the establishment of a FAL in Tianjin has significantly
promoted the Company B’s image and brand in China and also brought the
Company B closer to the clients in this fast developing aircraft market Company
B is committed to a long-term development in China and the Tianjin FAL project, is a 
significant milestone for the cooperation between Company B and China and.... is 
also a part of Company B’s strategy of internationalization.
Interviewer: OK, my next question is what are the contextual factors influencing the 
partner selection process in this IJV project?
Mr. LB: The percentage of Chinese local suppliers in the FAL project has always 
been the main factor influencing the purchase of Chinese government and Chinese
airlines For a long time, the percentage of Chinese local suppliers in Company
B’s aircrafts has been maintained at less than 6%, but we made a promise with 
Chinese government that this percentage will be gradually increased to above 15%
in this FAL project We planned to increase its purchase in China from 34.5
million USD in 2005 to 450 million USD in 2015 and 1 billion USD in 2020
and hoped that such an increase of purchase from Chinese suppliers will be
paid off by the increased orders of aircrafts from China....The FAL project also 
attached great importance to the cultivation of local suppliers in order to reduce 
costs from the initial stage of the project.
Interviewer: Could you please tell me how your company identified the Chinese 
partners in this IJV project?
Mr. LB: okay...We relied on the NDRC to find the suitable IJV partners for us the
NDRC persuaded the Company VI to give up the intension of being the majority
shareholder after both parties have entered a stalemate for five months After
Tianjin was finally selected as the most ideal FAL site, the NDRC encouraged the 
Tianjin local government to form a special Chinese consortium with both Company
VI and Company V2 for this FAL project The leaders of Company T, owned by
the Tianjin local government, approached the directors of Company VI and 
Company V2 only two months before the cooperative framework agreement was 
signed....it think....it was on March 26, 2006 and the negotiation then started to 
develop smoothly after this third Chinese partner was involved.
Interviewer: So why did your company select Tianjin as the FAL site?
Mr. LB: Among the four site candidates, Shanghai cannot be considered because 
the FAL site would have been located at a busy international airport and it would be
hard to get sufficient airspace for aircraft test flights  Xi’an was ruled out
because Xi’an is the inland city and too far away to the port and most of the
aircraft parts have to rely on sea freight in order to reduce the transportation cost. 
Although Zhuhai, is a sea port and offers advantage of saving transportation cost, its 
local area is often affected by the typhoon weather. We finally selected Tianjin over 
three other Chinese cities mainly due to its unique geographical advantage of 
having an international sea port and a new international airport with enough
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airspace for aircraft test flights. Zhuhai and Tianjin were initially both considered by 
Company B as the suitable candidate sites because both of these cities are close to 
the port with sufficient airspace for test flights. However, it was Tianjin’s advantage 
in enjoying preferential government policies that attract Company B to make final 
decision on investing the FAL project in Tianjin. In addition, the Tianjin local 
government committed to finance the investment on land and buildings and lease 
them to the FAL project at a low cost in order to attract Company B’s interest.
Interviewer: Ok....Can you tell me what were the partner selection criteria used by 
your company to evaluate the potential Chinese IJV partners?
Mr. LB: Company V1 and Company V2 were the two compulsory IJV partners, 
which Company B must choose for the FAL project, otherwise it will be very difficult 
for the NDRC to grant business license to the joint venture. Furthermore, we were 
happy to be in partnership with both these Chinese state-owned aircraft 
manufacturers, because they have experience in aircraft manufacturing and both of 
them have already been important components suppliers for Company B in the past 
20 years.
Interviewer: Ch.. So were there any obstacles in the partnership during the 
negotiation process in this IJV project?
Mr. LB: Okay....I can recall that Chinese parties expected us to move the 
manufacturing process of the aircraft’s main body into China. However, we will not 
be able to duplicate its investment on manufacturing the aircraft’s main body in 
China at that stage of cooperation with China. The Chinese parties also requested 
us to reduce the number of expatriates, but we insisted that it is mandatory for the 
start of the FAL operation to have so many expatriates in order to ensure the quality 
of our aircrafts. These expatriates are quality inspectors who will pass their 
knowledge to the local Chinese engineers. Finally, we promised to the Chinese 
parties that the total percentage of expatriates will be reduced to around 20 once the 
production becomes stabilized.
Interviewer: all right, So what do you think about the reasons why the IJV formation 
was successful?
Mr. LB: Ermmm...the aircraft, assembled in China, is the most popular model of 
Company B’s products. The global sales of this popular model accounts for 70% of 
the total sales order of over 10,000 aircrafts, which Company B has ever sold. The 
most important reason for this successful IJV formation is that our products are 
popular in Chinese market. I can recall that the Company B’s single-aisle aircrafts 
only accounted for only 23% of the total number of aircrafts operated in China in the 
early 2000s, largely because Company B entered into Chinese market 7 years late 
than its American competitor. However, the sales figure had climbed to 37% before 
the FAL project was established. This IJV project can help us increase sales in 
China and also help Chinese clients to reduce cost of purchase and receive the 
aircrafts quicker.
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Interviewer: Can you make any final comments on the partner selection process of 
this IJV project, especially something you feel important which might not have 
covered so far?
Mr. LB: I feel that foreign investors should learn how to do business with Chinese 
government because most of the Chinese manufacturers in HEM sector are owned 
by the Chinese government. In order to increase sales in China, we must pass on 
some of our key technology to China, otherwise we would fail in this important 
market.
Interviewer: Is there someone else in your organization that I could talk to about 
these issues?
Mr. LB: Yeah... You may get in touch with Mr. MR. He should be able to assist you 
further with your research.
Interviewer: Is there any material to collect for the documentary evidence?
Mr. LB: Emm...You may find these documents are useful for your research.
Interviewer: Ok....Thank you so much. Anything else you like to share?
Mr. LB: Emmmm.... That’s about it.
Interviewer: Ok, thank you very much for your time, Mr. LB.
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Appendix E: Extracts from the Participant Observation Data
(Resource: present author)
Appendix E presents some extracts from observation and documentary data collected during the 
period when the researcher was employed as an interpreter for Company L in Case one.
1. Aug. 2008 -  Nov. 2009 (Contract Drafting Period)
During this period of drafting contract, both parties have sent their representatives to 
discuss the clauses of joint venture contract in five official negotiation meetings. The original 
contract with 56 pages and 25 chapters was written in English by French solicitors, mainly to 
protect Company A’s interest in this joint venture. Based on referring to the minutes of 
negotiation meetings written by the researcher and the Company L’s manager, Mr. ZX, the 
researcher compared the draft contract, which Company A proposed to Company L at the end of 
2008 with the revised version of contract drafted at the end of 2009 after the five negotiation 
meetings and identified the following issues, which have been added in the new contract to 
safeguard the Company L’s interest after the continuous efforts of Company L’s negotiators.
1. Type of Aircraft:
In the Preamble chapter, the contract originally specifies that the joint venture activity 
would consist of the final assembly of Company A’s 72-600 aircraft in the area of the airport of 
Hefei. Company L asked Company A to add “ including other types of aircrafts according to the 
market demand”, because Company A is developing new model of Company A 72-700 and this 
joint venture should catch up the technology development and should be able to assemble the 
latest model of Company A’s aircrafts in China. Another change has been made in this section is 
that putting “without limitation” in the range of business activities, so the revised sentence is as: 
the establishment of the FAL of the aircrafts in Hefei, includes without limitation also the painting 
of Aircraft, round and flight tests of Aircraft, marketing, sales, the delivery of the Aircraft and the 
after-sales services to the final customers as further provided for in this contract. This added
phrase helped the joint venture to have more flexible business activities.
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2. Government Assurances:
In the definition and interpretation chapter, the original Claus regarding the “Government 
Assurances” requires Company L to obtain a certificate of airworthiness for the Aircraft by the 
Civil Aviation Administration of China and the EASA before the establishment of the joint venture. 
However, according to the Chinese governmental regulations, the airworthiness certificate can 
only be issued after the company registration. Therefore, this new Claus has been changed to 
“requiring Company L to obtain a validated process for the issuance of a Certificate of 
airworthiness for the aircraft by the Civil Aviation Administration of China and the EASA. 
Furthermore, both parties agreed to add the phrase “ for the Aircrafts produced by the JV 
company” to limit the Company L’s obligations of getting the rights to airspace, conduct flight 
tests, radio licenses, access airport infrastructure and roads, and airport services from the local 
governments. In the original contract. Company L should obtain a concession for a period 
acceptable to the Company A from Anhui Province Government for usage rights of the Hefei 
airport. After the negotiation, the Claus was changed to” the joint venture should obtain a 
concession fro a period acceptable to the parties from Anhui Province Government for usage 
rights of the airport”, because there is an uncertainty of the location of the joint venture. Hefei is 
building a new airport, which will be used in 2013, however, at that time, the local government 
had not decided whether to abandon the old airport or lease the old airport to this joint venture.
3. Sales and Marketing:
In the revised contract, “Company L’s participation” has been added to the definition of 
Sales, Marketing and After-sales agreement”. The new contract specifies that any agreement 
between the JV Company and a member of the Company A group has to involve Company L in 
such activity.
4. Required Approval:
The original sentence “the issue of the Business License in accordance with PRC law.” 
has been changed with “the issue of the relevant forms preceding the Business License in 
accordance with PRC law.” The reason is that business license can only be obtained after 
Chinese government’s approval according to Chinese Commercial Law.
5. Financial Audit:
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Claus 5.1.10 was first written as “the provision by Company A to Company L of financial 
accounts and statements of its two members for the 2006, 2007 and 2008 financial years, 
audited by an internationally recognized auditing firm.” Company L said they might have to ask 
Company A to supply further financial information for the second auditing. If the audit fee is 
under 25,000 euro, the joint venture will cover this cost. If the joint venture failed. Company L will 
be responsible for this audit fee. Any audit fee above 25,000 euro will be paid by Company L no 
matter whether the joint venture is successful or not. The same principle will be applied to 
Company A’s side. However, Company A does not agree to let the joint venture to pay such an 
extra cost and both parties agree in the new draft of contract that in addition both parties shall 
provide any other financial information requested by the counter party under its own cost.
6. Submit Deadline:
Claus 5.7 gave only 60 days to Company L to get all the conditions specified in Clause 5.1 
satisfied by Company A before submitting to the central government for approval, otherwise. 
Company A is entitled to declare this Contract null and void without any liability towards the other 
party. Company L believes that 60 days is too short to get all the necessary documents ready for 
submission for approval. In the send draft, it has been changed to 180 days, agreed by both 
parties.
7. Business Objective and Scope:
The original draft specifies that the business scope of the JV Company is the Aircraft Kits 
into Aircraft, painting of Aircraft, ground and flight test of Aircraft, marketing, sales, the delivery of 
the Aircraft and the after-sales services to the final customer. And the marketing, sales and 
after-sales services shall be subcontracted by the JV company exclusively to Company A. The 
parties will review potential extension of the support capacities in China (for training, spare parts 
and maintenance) based upon the needs from a commercial, technical and financial point of 
view. Because Company L is continuously giving pressure on Company A to increase the 
percentage of Chinese suppliers for the Aircraft Kits and source the suppliers globally in order to 
control the cost and maximize the investment returns. Company A added some commitments in 
this section as follows: “The aircraft kits shall be procured by the JV company in accordance with 
the Aircraft Kit Supply Agreement. Aircraft kits procurement shall be in accordance with the
airworthiness requirements and requirements of this Contract, including the overall objective of
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the Parties to ensure that the Aircraft that are in all material aspects identical to the Aircraft 
contemporaneously assembled at Company A final assembly line in Europe while making best 
efforts to deliver a competitive product and maximize the economic and financial return of the 
project.”
Furthermore, Company L is not happy to let Company A control the sales for the joint 
venture all through the joint venture period. Company L expects the joint venture has its own 
freedom to sell the aircraft, however. Company A insists that the first 10 years of sales should 
be subcontracted to Company A. In the second draft of the contract, both parties agreed that 
“The sales, marketing and after-sales Agreement shall be for an initial period of lO(ten) years 
and shall include a sales plan to achieve the production targets in the Business plan and 
provisions for the JV company to participate in those activities and for certain activities to be 
managed directly by the JV company following the initial ten (10) year period. Such agreement 
shall also forecast the possibility to subcontract certain other sales services to other entities as 
mutually agreed even during this initial period.
8. Production Schedule:
Claus 10 clarifies the production schedule of joint venture company, which should be 
ready to take delivery of the first aircraft kit within 18 months after the establishment date and 
assemble and deliver the first aircraft to a customer within 24 months after the Establishment 
date and within six months after receipt of the first Aircraft Kit by the JV company. Company L 
agreed this requirement in principle but asked the Company A to provide a timetable of 
manufacturing process and to be responsible for all the extra cost and penalty caused by delay 
of supplying aircraft kit. Therefore, Company A wrote a new Claus 10.2 in the new draft: 
“Detailed terms and conditions related to rights and responsibilities of Company A and the JV 
Company, including, but not limited to, penalties for delays in delivery, shall be as further 
provided in the Aircraft Kit Supply Agreement.
9. Export Sales:
Company A’s original proposal suggested that the objective for the export sales of Aircraft 
shall not exceed 30%. However, Company L is not happy with this cap and expects higher export
sales for the JV company. In the second draft of contract, Company A agreed to change this
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Claus as; “The Aircraft assembled by the JV company are intended primarily for sale to Chinese 
airlines and other Chinese customers for delivery in China. The parties agree, however, that the 
overall objective for export sales of Aircraft produced by the JV company shall be 30% during the 
Joint Venture term. The actual amount of export sales achieved may be higher or lower and shall 
depend on the market demand, provided that the 50 aircraft subject to the order referred to in 
Claus 5.1.1 of this Contract shall however be delivered exclusively to customers in the PRC and 
not allocated for export out of the PRC.”
10. Change of Control:
In Claus 14.2, Company A requested that “Company L shall not undergo a change of 
Control without obtaining the prior written consent of Company A” Company L insisted that this 
Claus should be applied to both parties, so in the new draft of 2009, this Claus was re-written as : 
“If either party undergoes a change of control, the other party may terminate this contract if, in its 
reasonable opinion, such change of Control of the other Party shall have a Material Adverse 
Effect on the JV Company that cannot be remedied by the Party undergoing the change of the 
control.”
11. Non-exclusive:
In the Claus 15.2, Company A at first planned to grant the JV company a non-exclusive, 
royalty-bearing license (restricted to the PRC) in accordance with the Company A Technology 
and Know-How License Agreement and Company A Trademark License Agreement for the 
Intellectual Property Rights and Know-How. Company L thought the word “Non-exclusive” is not 
good enough to accept, so in the second draft in 2009, Company A compromised this issue by 
changing the wording as: “ Company A shall grant the JV company a royalty-bearing license 
(restricted to the PRC and exclusive to Company L in the PRC,). The similar case happened to 
Claus 45.1, and in the new draft, both Parties agreed that all the Company A’s Affiliates will grant 
to the JV Company a non-transferable, non-sublicensable, royalty-bearing license to use 
(exclusive and restricted to the PRC) in replacement of the previous phrase “a non-exclusive 
license.”
12. Sites and Building:
Company L was not satisfied with the whole Chapter 6, regarding Sites and Building and
suggested to delete it completely, because Company A required Company L to be responsible
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for making the JV company enter into the Land Use Rights Grant Contract within 60 days after 
the Establishment Date of the contract and also requested that Company L shall indemnify 
Company A and the JV company on demand for all costs, losses and liabilities incurred by 
Company A as a result of the Facility not being completed. After negotiation. Company A made a 
compromise and just asked the Company L to assist JV to get the Land Use Rights Grant and 
procure the construction of the Facility on the site without any time limit. Also the costs of the 
delays will be borne by the JV Company instead.
13. The Appointment Period:
In the new version of Claus 25.4, the appointment period of each director has shortened 
from 4 years to 3 years. Company L said it will be in accordance with current Chinese 
Commercial Law. This change applies to all the appointment period of middle-class 
management team.
14. Chairman and General Manager:
In the Claus 27.1-27.3, Company A requires Company L to appoint the Chairman for the JV 
company and should also indemnify, and keep indemnified Company A on demand against each 
loss, liability and cost suffered or incurred (directly or indirectly) by Company A as a result of or 
which arises out of or in connection with the Chairman’s contravention of the Articles of 
Association and applicable law. Company L is happy to take such a joint and several liability, 
however, they want Company A to have the same liability for the General Manager, which 
appointed by Company A. In the new draft. Company A added the same Claus for the 
responsibility of General Manager Section in Claus 34.2.
15. Both English and Chinese:
Company A demanded that the Board meeting shall be conducted in English. Company L 
has successfully persuaded the Company A to add Chinese in the contract, so that both English 
and Chinese have to be used in the Board meeting with an interpreter. Also in the Claus 33.3, 
both parties also agreed that the Supervisors shall cause all resolutions to be recorded 
completely and accurately in meeting minutes in English as well as in Chinese.
16. Report Period:
The both Parties agreed that the General Manager shall be required to immediately report
to the Board if, in respect of the project: there is or it can be reasonable anticipated that there will
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be an overall production stoppage or a significant disruption to the production activities, which is 
forecast by the General Manager to last more than 7 days in the new draft of contract, instead of 
15 days in the original draft, because Company L wants to monitor the General Manager, 
appointed by Company A, more carefully.
17. Second Priority of Buying JV IP Rights:
The Claus 52.1.4 originally specified that unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the JV 
Company will not transfer to any third party the ownership of any asset or property which 
contains, incorporates or otherwise was developed or made under the JV IP Rights and 
Company A shall have a priority right to purchase such JV IP Rights on equal terms and 
conditions provided that any ownership or license of the JV IP Rights referred to in Clauses 45.2 
and/or 52.1.3 shall not result in any right to use any Intellectual Property Rights of Company 
A( or any Affiliate of Company A) without Company A’s prior explicit written consent. Company L 
believes that they have the equal priority to purchase the JV IP Rights, however. Company A 
said equal priority will be not fair for Company A, because most of the JV IP Rights will originate 
from the Company A’s existing IP Rights. Finally the both Parties agreed that Company L shall 
have the second priority to purchase such JV IP Rights on equal terms and conditions.
18. Non-Competition:
Company A requests that Company L shall undertake to Company A that , as from the 
date of this Contract and during the time that it or any of its Affiliates holds any part of the 
Registered Capital of the JV company ( and for a period of five years thereafter), it shall not and 
shall procure that its Affiliates shall not, at any time, without the prior written consent of Company 
A, wither alone or jointly with, through or on behalf of any person, directly or indirectly carry on or 
be engaged or concerned or involved in any business which causes competition to the Company 
A’s aircraft. However, Company A did not put the same the rule of “for a period of five years 
thereafter” for itself, when the Claus 46.1.2 requested that Company A shall not enter into any 
joint venture contract with any other person in PRC for the assembling of the Aircrafts. Company 
L said this Non-Competition Claus should apply to both Parties on the same rules. In the new 
contract, both parties agree that as long as the joint venture contract being signed. Company L 
cannot make any other competitive aircraft and Company A cannot set up another FAL project
with any other third party in China within the contract period as well as for the five-year period
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after not being involved in the JV Company for both Parties.
19. Export Rules:
In the original draft, Company A wrote that the Parties acknowledge that, the Aircraft Kits, 
the aircraft, spare parts, the Company A-licensed Technology Rights, Know-How and/or other 
items may be subject to export laws and regulations as amended from time to time (Export 
Regulations), which include, but are not limited to US and/or European export laws. However, 
Company L suggested that “US and European” is too sensitive to Chinese government. Although 
the phrase “are not limited to” covers all other countries including China, Company A has to 
re-phrase the sentence in the second draft as “Export Regulations include, but are not limited to 
applicable national and international export regulations. The Parties acknowledge that any act 
contrary to the Export Regulations is prohibited.
Through hard efforts of negotiation, the above issues have been agreed by the two 
Parties under new terms and conditions, however, the researcher found out the remaining eight 
major conflicts between both parties have not been solved during that period of negotiation time, 
by analyzing the two versions of IJV draft contracts and minutes of the meeting.
1. Royalty Fee:
Company A requests the JV Company to pay 2% of sales price of every aircraft to 
Company A as technical royalty fee and 66,000 USDs per aircraft on each of the first 150 
aircrafts assembled in China as sales commission. Company A explained to Company L that 
they made no profit on supplying the first 50 Aircraft Supply Kits to the JV company so they have 
to charge the royalty fee and the sales commission is related with the cost of marketing and 
promotion of the aircrafts in China, however. Company L argued that they believe there has been 
a high profitability for Company A to supply the components kits and requested Company A to 
provide necessary supporting evidence. Company L suggest that if Company A wants sales 
commission to cover to promotion cost. Company L should take 49% of this commission as well 
to compensate Company L’s efforts in promoting those aircrafts. Company L is only willing to let 
the JV company pay 1% of the sales price to Company A as royalty fee starting from the 51®*
assembled aircraft and asked Company A to give up its request on any sales commission. After
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several rounds of negotiation, Company A finally suggested to charge 1.5% royalty fee instead, 
however. Company L suggested deleting this disputed issue on the main joint venture contract 
and discussing it further in the Company A Technology and Know-how License Agreement.
2. Chinese Suppliers:
Company A’s original proposal requested the JV company to buy every components from 
their authorized suppliers under a fixed price of 17 million USD. Company L’s negotiation team 
told Company A that Chinese government want to see Company A is trying to help China to 
develop its aviation industry, not just take money away from China. The joint venture should 
indicate the attitude toward more purchase from Chinese suppliers. Under the Company L’s 
requests. Company A added a new content on the contract, Claus 9.5, which says:” with the aim 
to increase the use of Chinese suppliers, reduce costs and increase efficiency, the JV Company 
will identify and propose to Company A alternate suppliers or sub suppliers and sources from 
China.” However, Company L is happy that the JV company only has the right to suggest 
potential suppliers to Company A and the JV Company should has its own autonomy to select 
suppliers globally, especially more suppliers in China based on increasing efficiency and 
maximizing the profitability of JV company.
3. Jigs and Tools:
Company A and Company L have conflicts in purchasing Jigs and Tools, which the JV 
Company has to buy from the Company A exclusively. Company L suggested four conditions in 
this matter: firstly, all the jigs and tools have to be essential for FAL’s production. Secondly, all 
the jigs and tools have to be advanced and competitive in the market. Thirdly, under the same 
price and quality, JV Company shall prefer to buy Jigs and tools in China. Lastly, all the improved 
intellectual property of Jigs and Tools should belong to the JV Company.
4. Training fee:
In the Claus 20, Company A requests the JV company to pay Company A for all initial 
and ongoing training of engineers and technicians provided by Company A based upon 
Company A’s usual preferential rates for such training, however. Company L suggested the 
training fee should be counted into the royalty fee, which Company A requested and should not 
be requested separately. Also the preferential rates should be 30% cheaper than Company A’s
normal rates if there are extra fees. Company A did not agree on Company L’s ideas on this
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issue and said they will consider to give a better preferential rate to JV Company.
5. Price of Aircraft:
Company L insisted that Company A should not ask for a fixed price for the Aircraft 
Supply Kits and Company A should provide a list of supply kits with individual price for each 
component. Company L also suggested that all the prices of the components should be the cost 
price, including without limitation to the transportation, insurance, training and maintenance price. 
If the agreed cost price of any component is cheaper than the market price, the JV Company can 
make the difference to Company A. While if the price which Company A provided is more 
expensive than the market price. Company A should refund the difference to the JV company. 
Company L’s lawyers asked the Company A to accept the above requirements, otherwise 
Company A has to pay penalty to Company L. In response to these requirements of Company L, 
Company A said they can give the detailed list of components but the cost structure of supply kits 
is the confidential issue of the Company A and they have to consider how to dispose the 
information to Company L.
G. Decisions of the Board:
In the Claus 26.3, Company A proposed that decisions of the Board concerning all issues 
with respect to the JV Company, other than those specifically set forth in Clause 26.2, shall be 
adopted only upon the affirmative vote of a simple majority of all the Directors present in person 
or represented by proxy at a duly convened meeting of the Board. Company L is not happy with 
this simple majority principle, because Company A has 3 shareholder positions of the total 5 
shareholders in the JV Company. The simple majority means Company A can make important 
decisions on its own without having to get Company L’s consent, such as approval annual 
budgets, amendments to the business plan, production rate adjustments, salary polices, etc. 
Company L suggested that the simple majority should be changed to at least 4/5 of the 
shareholders.
7. The Authority of Chairman and General Manager:
In the old draft. Company A requested that any execution, termination or amendment of 
any Transaction Document or Project Document relating to any material transaction of the JV 
company with any Party or any of its Affiliates, where a “a material transaction” means (any
agreement for the sale and purchase of any Aircraft assembled by the JV company or) any
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transaction or series of related transactions with an aggregate value exceeding RMB 2,500,000, 
should be adopted by the board of directors. While, this kind of transaction between the JV 
Company with any Person other than a Party or any of its Affiliates, the figure should be 
exceeding RMB 5,000,000. The General Manager will have the daily operation and management 
of the JV Company other than those matters reserved above for decision by the Board, while the 
Chairman has no right in authorizing any level of transaction documents. Company L is not 
happy for such an arrangement and requested that the power of the Chairman, appointed by 
Company L should have a higher power in authorizing transaction documents. The hierarchy of 
power, suggested by the Company L is that the General Manager has the right of authorizing up 
to RMB 500,000 business transaction and the Chairman should have the right of authorizing the 
transaction documents, which worth between RMB 500,000 to RMB 1,000,000. For any 
document above 1 million RMB, the JV Company should report to the Board meeting in order to 
get the permission. Company A argued that the General Manager is responsible for the daily 
practice. The authorization power of RMB 500,000 will slow down the operation of the company, 
however. Company A is willing to re-structure the power of the Board, the Chairman and the 
General Manager.
8. Termination of the Contract:
In Section 51.3, Company A requested that either party may terminate this Contract with 
written notice to the other Party on or at any time after any tax concession is terminated, 
cancelled or revoked and in each case there is a Material Adverse Effect on the JV Company or 
any party. Regarding this issue. Company L suggested that whether Company A can give 
Company L a 12-month period to lobby the Chinese government. In response to this issue. 
Company A said that they will spend some time to consider this issue and come back to 
Company L.
2. Oct 2009-June 2010 (Further negotiation Period)
Between Oct 2009 and March 2010, Company L and Company A have entered into a cold
war period. Both parties have not contacted each other for 5 months until the 25**" March 2010
when Mr. JM, Company A’s senior director sent an email to Company L and told Company L that
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Company A had new thoughts on the remaining issues of previous negotiations. Upon the 
invitation of the Company L, Company A sent its negotiation team with Mr. JW as the lead to 
Hefei on 19th April, 2010 and tried to finalize the contract. The researcher worked together with 
the leading negotiator of Company L side, Mr. ZB and listed 18 outstanding issues to be 
negotiated with Company A during this round of meeting in Hefei. It took both Parties 4 days from 
9 am to 9 pm to go through all the issues with conflicts. Some of those conflicts have been solved 
by mutual compromises, while there are still many unsolved issues at the end of the negotiation. 
The following paragraphs will provide a detailed analysis of each issue where both parties have 
conflicts by comparing the original content of the draft contract with the amended version.
1. Aircraft Kits Supply Agreement:
The old contract says that it means the aircraft kits supply agreement between Company A, 
and/or any Person designated by Company A, as seller and the JV Company as buyer for the 
supply of Aircraft Kits to the JV Company. However, Company L requested that the joint venture 
should be able to source suppliers globally without Company A’s designation. Company A said 
they might be able to amend this term as “between Company A and/or any other qualified 
supplier, which meets the quality requirements of Company A aircraft.”, , but they have to go 
back to the headquarter to make the final decision on this issue.
2. Binding Date:
The original section says that it means the date on which the necessary approval of 
Company A’s board of directors and assembly of members on this Contract is obtained. 
Company L requested that “the approval of Company L’s directors” should be added in the 
section because both Parties should have the equal right to approve the Binding date. However, 
Company A refused to change it and insisted that Company A’s final approval is the starting 
point of this contract. At last. Company L thinks that it is a small issue and allows Company A to 
stick with the original explanation.
3. Competitor Aircraft:
Requested by the Company L, a new definition, competitor aircraft, has been added to the
contract, because Company L might work with other companies in assembling other
non-competitive aircrafts. Company A’s original suggestion is 30 seats to 70 seats, while
Company L’s idea is 70 seats to 90 seats. The definition was finally defined as any aircraft in the
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forty (40) to ninety (90) seat passenger categories in the definition.
4. Government Assurances:
Company A requested that the JV Company shall obtain entitlement to government 
incentives and assistance and agreement on waiver or reduction of applicable fees and charges 
in respect to the setting-up and operation of the JV Company. In response of this, Company L 
said all those incentives should be applicable to the Chinese laws and regulations. However, 
Company A insisted that the Chinese governments have already promised all those incentives 
when Company A first came to inspect Hefei’s investment environment, so Company L has to 
accept the original content on this issue. At last. Company L agreed with Company A on this 
issue.
4. Jigs and Tools Agreement:
Company A claimed that this agreement is between Company A and Company L in 
relation to the Jigs and Tools to be acquired by the JV Company. However, Company L always 
tried to persuade Company A to buy Jigs and Tools on the open tending basis and consider 
Chinese manufacturers. Company L suggested that this section should be re-written as “this 
agreement is between Company A or any third qualified party and Company L”. Company A 
stressed that Jigs and Tools are special equipment with lots of advance technology and IP 
Rights. The JV Company has to buy them from Company A group exclusively. Therefore, the 
original clause cannot be changed. Later on. Both Parties found out that it was very hard to reach 
an agreement on this issue and further discussion was required in next round of negotiation.
5. Tax Concessions:
The original definition given by Company A is that it is the grant by the Chinese 
Government to the JV Company of tax policies satisfactory to Company A and Company L. 
Company L requested Company A to delete the words “satisfactory to Company A and Company 
L”, because those words may make the governments feel offended and might obstruct the 
submission of the signed JV agreement. However Company A hoped to put pressure on the 
government and only was willing to change the sentence as “the grant by the competent PRC 
Government Authority in respect of the application made by the JV Company of favorable tax 
policies acceptable to Company A and Company L.
6. Approval for Export:
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Company A requested that the submission of the contract has to be upon the receipt by 
Company A of any Authorization required for the export to China of Aircraft Kits or parts thereof, 
spare parts and/or other items from any competent Government Authorities. However, Company 
L argued the authorization from the government will only be issued to Company L or the 
proposed JV company, so that both parties finally agreed to change this term as “the receipt by 
Company A of any Authorization required for the export to China or by the JV company for the 
import into China of Aircraft Kits or parts thereof, spare parts and/or other items from any 
competent Government Authorities.”
7. Aircraft Delivery:
Section 10.4 says that the JV Company shall assemble Aircraft that are in all material 
aspects identical to the Aircraft contemporaneously assembled at Company A final assembly line 
in Europe and such aircraft shall meet the same airworthiness and quality standards and have 
the same performance capabilities. Company L asked Company A to add “Company A should 
assist JV Company to assemble aircraft” in order to make the government feel more confidence 
that Company A will give all the best possible supports to make sure quality will be the same as 
in Europe. However, Company A refused to change on this Clause, because they believed it is 
not necessary for re-wording this sentence and Company L eventually made compromise by 
accepting Company A’s original suggestion.
8. Service Companies:
In the section 15.1, the draft contract lists the responsibilities of Company L in this JV 
Company. One of the tasks is to evaluate and develop, together with Company A, the 
establishment of support capabilities in China (for training, spare parts and maintenance) based 
upon the needs of customers from a commercial, technical and financial point of view. However, 
Company L hoped to change those capabilities into developing and building separate service 
companies responsible for training, spare parts and maintenance. Company A rejected this idea 
and insisted that all the after-sales service must be under the same JV Company. After tough 
negotiation. Company L finally accepted Company A’s original terms on this issue.
9. Simple Majority;
Although Company A tried to persuade Company L to accept the rule of simple majority
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(1/2) voting in terms of approving important decisions on board meetings, Company L insisted 
that they would only accept at least “4/5 voting rule”, which means all the listed important 
decisions have to be approved by at least 4 members of the directors with at least one director 
from Company L. Simple majority means Company L will lose all the authority in the board 
meetings and the three directors from Company A side can make all the decisions. Upon the 
request of Company L, Company A then revised contract and agreed that the following three 
types of business transactions should be presented to the board and be adopted upon the 
unanimous vote of all the directors.
Firstly, the approval of the execution, termination or amendment of any documents( or 
written waiver of significant rights hereunder) relating to any material transaction of the JV 
company with any Party or any of its Affiliates, which is not in the ordinary course of business or 
which is not on arm's length basis, where a “material transaction” means any transaction or 
series of related transaction with an aggregate value exceeding RMB 10,0000,000 except that 
any Aircraft Kits order in accordance with the Aircraft Kits Supply Agreement( in any amount) that 
shall be executed by the General Manager without prior approval of the Board.
Secondly, the approval of the execution, termination or amendment of any Transaction 
Document or Project Document or any documents relating to any material transaction of the JV 
Company with any Party or any of its Affiliates, where a “material transaction” means any 
transaction or series of related transactions with an aggregate value exceeding RMB 5, 000,000.
Thirdly, the approval of execution, termination or amendment of any documents relating to 
any material transaction of the JV Company with any Person other than a Party or any of its 
Affiliates, where a “material transaction” means any transaction or series of related transactions 
with an aggregate value exceeding RMB 10,000,000.
However, Company L was still not satisfied with these three new amendments, because
Company L does not trust General Manager will be able to spend the money wisely. Company L
believes that they should be involved in all the decision-making involved in purchasing aircraft
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kits. For the daily practice, Company L also believed that Company A has given too much 
authority to the General Manager by allowing him or her to authorize a transaction under RMB 
5,000,000 with any Party or any of its Affiliates or a transaction under RMB 10,000,000 with any 
Person without having to report to the Board meetings for approval. Company L suggested that 
the General Manager should have maximum authorization power of approving up to RMB 50,000. 
Any amount between RMB 50,000 to RMB 5,000,000 should be approved by the Chairman, 
appointed by Company L. Therefore, both parties could not reach an agreement on this issue.
11. Chairman of the Board:
Section 27.1 specifies that the person serving as Chairman shall simultaneously act as 
legal representative of the JV Company and shall exercise his or her authority as Chairman and 
as legal representative within the limits prescribed by the Board and the Articles of Association 
and cannot exercise the powers of the Board or the powers of the General Manager. Company L 
was against the company A’s suggestion of duty of the Chairman and argued that the Chairman, 
appointed by Company L having 49% of the company shares, should have more power than 
being just a legal representative. Company L also suggested that the JV Company should give 
smaller power to the General Manager. Any power or authority between the Board meeting and 
the General Manager should go to the Chairman. Mr. ZB from Company L said in the negotiation 
that it is a normal practice in China that the CEO should report to the Chairman and the legal 
representative in the Chinese company should have the biggest authority in daily operation of the 
company. However, Company A ignored the Company L’s requests and was not willing to 
compromise on this issue and refused to give any power to the Chairman.
12. Cost Sharing Agreement:
Company A added a new Clause into the Contract during this visit to Hefei by requesting
that certain costs and expenses incurred with the written agreement of the Parties on behalf of or
in favor of the JV Company after the signature of this JV agreement, such as the legal fees, fees
to prepare the Project Application Report, etc. may be advanced by one Party with the written
agreement of the other Party and reimbursed by the JV company after its establishment.
However, Company L was not happy to share the all the costs equally with Company A in the
event the JV Company is not established, because Company A’s European solicitors’ fee is 20
times of that of Company L. Therefore, Company L suggested that both Parties should pay for
287
their own cost and should not share all the costs evenly. However, Company A did not agree on 
Company L’s proposal on this issue.
13. JV IP Rights:
Company A claimed that the JV Company shall own any Intellectual Property Rights 
created or generated by or on behalf of the JV Company which are legally enforceable and valid 
independently from the Company A-Licensed Technology Rights or any other Intellectual 
Property Rights or the same or similar nature. However, Company L requested Company A to 
delete the second half of the sentence, “which are legally enforceable and valid independently 
from the Company A-Licensed Technology Rights”, because Company L said there are three 
types of IP rights in the JV Company including Company A’s IP Rights, Improved Company A’s 
IP Rights by the JV Company and IP created by JV Company. Both Parties have problems in 
classifying whether the JV Company should own the Improved Company A’s IR Rights.
In the original contract. Company A requested that the Parties shall procure that the JV 
Company shall, upon the request of Company A, grant Company A or Company A’s designated 
Affiliates, an irrevocable, non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, worldwide, perpetual and 
royalty-free license to use the JV IP Rights. However, Company L argued that they should have 
the equal right to share the ownership of those JV IP Rights. Company A accepted the Company 
L’s request and changed this Clause into “in such case, the Parties shall procure that the JV 
Company shall, upon the request of one Party, grant the other Party, or the Party’s designated 
Affiliates, a license to use the “JV IP Rights” at conditions to be agreed between the Parties in 
compliance with the Company A Technology and Know-how License Agreement and the 
Company A Trademark License Agreement.”
14. Non-Competition:
Company L accepted the restrictions set by Company A regarding non-competition
Clauses. Firstly, Company L cannot carry on or be engaged or concerned or involved in any
business which designs, manufactures, assembles, markets, sells Competitor Aircraft or
provides Aircraft Services. Secondly, Company L cannot seek to procure orders from, do
business with or procure directly or indirectly any other person to procure orders from or do
business with any person who is or has been a customer of the Company A Group anywhere in
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the world, other than in the ordinary course of its existing business as an aircraft leasing 
enterprise. However, Company L argued that it has already started a charter airline before 
knowing Company A. Therefore, Company A agreed to add a new Clause in this section that it is 
agreed between the Parties that Company L shall be permitted to operate an airline or as an 
aircraft leasing business.
15. Transfer o f JV IP R ights:
Although Company L has already agreed with Company A that Company A shall have a 
priority right to purchase such JV IP rights on equal terms and conditions and Company L shall 
have the second priority to purchase such JV IP Rights on equal terms and conditions. However, 
during this round of negotiation. Company L changed the mind and insisted that both party 
should have the equal right to purchase such JV IP Rights because they have almost the equal 
share in the JV Company.
16. Liquidation Committee:
Regarding this issue. Company A requested that the liquidation committee shall be 
composed of seven members. Company L shall appoint two members and Company A shall 
appoint three members to the liquidation committee. The Board shall appoint one lawyer and one 
certified public accountant registered in China to assist the liquidation committee as the 
members thereof. However, Company L’s lawyer suggested to add another Work Union 
representative in the liquidation committee according to the Chinese practice, however. 
Company A refused to make any changes on this issue.
17. Language:
In the first version of the Contract, Company A claimed that the contract is made and 
executed in eight (8) originals in Chinese and eight (8) originals in English and the two language 
texts shall have equal validity and legal effect. However, Company L argued that the Chinese 
government might not accept the English version document, so the Chinese one should be also 
the legally binding document between both parties. At last. Company A added a new Clause 
upon Company L’s request that “per exception, for the sole purpose of application to PRC 
Government Authorities, the Chinese version of Contract shall be used and treated as the 
reference document.”
On 23rd April 2010, the last day of Company A’s visit, the researcher wrote down a list of
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points remaining open in the JV agreement.
1. Aircraft Kit Supply Agreement
The definition of Aircraft Kit Supply Agreement in the JV Agreement must be verified by 
Company L with its attorneys. The major issue is that Company L requested that the JV 
Company should be able to sign the Aircraft Kit Supply Agreement with Company A or other 
qualified suppliers, which shall meet the quality requirements of the Company A Aircraft Kits. 
However, Company A said they would have to consult their headquarters’ opinion on this issue.
2. Company A Licensed Technology Rights
This definition in the JV Agreement must be verified by Company L with its attorneys. Both 
of the Parties agree that the JV Company will own the IPs created and developed by the JV 
Company itself and any transfer of IP Rights will have to be authorized by the board meeting. 
However, Company L insisted that any improvement, amendment, or add-ons of the IPs 
authorized by Company A shall also belong to the JV Company. Company A said they had to 
re-consider this new request from Company L.
3. Required Approvals
Company L will provide the correct information on the forms and documents. Company A 
requested Company L to get a temporary business license before submitting the signed contract 
for government approval, however. Company L said the official business license issued by 
Chinese Company House will only be granted upon receiving Chinese central government’s 
approval as well as having the registered capital audited. Company A asked Company L to 
provide necessary supporting documents for this.
4. Sales, Marketing and After Sales Service
Section 9.3: Company L did not agree that the JV shall “exclusively” subcontract the sales, 
marketing and after sales service to Company A and requested the right to conduct these 
activities in the JV Company. Company L argued that the JV Company should have its own right 
of sales, marketing and after sales service and the JV Company can ask for help from Company 
A to guide the sales, marketing and after sales service if the JV Company thinks it is necessary. 
However, Company L agrees that if sales and marketing activities are subcontracted, the 
subcontracting would only be to Company A.
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5. Purchasing Manager
Chapter 9/10: There are certain points in the following sections that remain open in section 
26, 27, 28, 30, and 34. Company A will provide a new version of these sections to incorporate 
the proposals of the letter from the senior director of Company A and Company A will also review 
the proposals submitted by Mr. ZB from Company L. Company L requested that a new position. 
Purchasing Manager, to be nominated by Company L, be added to the organization.
6. Licensed Technology Rights and JV IP rights
In Section 45.2, the two parties cannot agree on the difference between Company A 
Licensed Technology Rights and JV IP rights.
7. Termination of the JV Agreement
In Section 51.3.8, there is an issue of time delay for termination of the JV Agreement in the 
case of cancellation of the Tax concessions and a related issue for Export control. Company L 
suggested 12 months, but Company A did not agree on Company L’s request.
After the Company A’s negotiation team left Hefei with these seven open issues. 
Company A’s China office started to put pressure on Company L and suggested that “it is better 
for both parties to settle those conflicts before the new CEO of Company A will be in power after 
June this year.” Company L realized there was only two months left before finalizing everything, 
so the board of Company L decided to send Mr. ZB together with the researcher of this study to 
visit the headquarter of Company A in Toulouse on 14**^  of May in order to settle the remaining 
issues. At the end of this round of negotiation held in France, Company A agreed to compromise 
on the following points:
1. Purchase Manager
Company A agreed to set a purchase manager position in the JV Company upon Company 
L’s request. The purchase manager will be nominated by the Company L and the purchase 
manager’s power will be limited. His or her responsibilities can only be related with purchasing 
the Aircraft Supply Kits and the purchase manager must report to the General Manager and be 
under the General Manager’s supervision.
2. Sales, Marketing and After Sales Service
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Regarding the sales, marketing and after-sales service. Company A agreed to give up the 
exclusive right in sales, marketing and after-sales service from the JV Company. However, the 
JV Company should sub-contract all these services to Company A in the first 10 years of the JV 
period. In response to this, Mr. ZB said Company A should make a sales plan for this 10-year 
period and should commit to sell at least 50 aircrafts as well. Because the sales target for the first 
10 years will be minimum 100 aircrafts. Company L will have to sell 50 aircrafts and Company A 
should be responsible for the other half. Also Company L stressed that the JV Company shall not 
only focus on the Chinese market but also increase the overseas market.
3. IP Rights
In relation with IP Rights, both Parties have finally agreed that the IP Rights given by 
Company A should always belong to Company A but the IP Rights created or developed by the 
JV company can be the JV Company’s IP rights. Company L suggested that there should be an 
IP Right committee led by a third party to clarify which IP should be JV IP rights. Company A 
accepted the suggestion and added the following new Clause in the contract: “an ad hoc 
Intellectual Property Rights committee shall be established as detailed in the Technology and 
Know-how License Agreement. However, it shall be chaired by a nominee of Company A and 
shall provide recommendations to the parties and the JV Company on the independent validity of 
any JV IP Rights.”
3. June 2010-Nov 2010 (Breaking up Period)
On 16*^  September 2010, Company L received a letter from Mr. FB, the New CEO of 
Company A. In the correspondence, Mr. FB said that he is pleased to be back in touch with 
Company L after a long time to renew contact concerning the FAL project under discussion 
between Company A and Company L. He claimed that “Company A remains fully committed to 
developing the market opportunities in China and to pursuing this strategy through the 
establishment of a FAL in China. Although up until now the Chinese regional market has been 
slow to develop, we believe that over time there is a significant potential for the Company A’s 
products in China.”
Mr. FB requested Company L to go back to some of the fundamental elements of this
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project, where remain open. His suggestion is different with the previous CEO of Company A, Mr. 
SM, who hoped to sign the contract with Company L first in order to get the government’s 
approval and then solve the other conflicts between two parties in other supporting documents. 
Mr. FB said those major issues as follows must be settled before both parties move ahead to 
sign this IJV agreement and launch the approval process.
“The main subjects that remain open are 1)Terms and conditions for the aircraft kit supply; 2)The 
role of each partner and of the JV in the sourcing and purchasing of the kits; 3)The Main terms 
and conditions for the firm order of the 50 aircraft; 4)The main details for the licensing of the 
intellectual property and the royalties to be paid by the joint venture; 5)The responsibilities 
between the parties for the sales and marketing and support activities.”
Furthermore Mr. FB requested Company L to confirm the fundamental three conditions for 
the project to succeed are still in effect: 1) Is Company L still committed to this project? 2) Is 
Company L confident to be able to secure the approvals of the Chinese Governments and obtain 
the necessary tax exemptions? 3) Is Company L moving ahead with the airline project in Anhui 
and where will it operate or place the 50 aircraft it is purchasing from the JV ( We have seen 
reports about another airline being established in Hefei with the cooperation of the government 
and Company V1)?
Mr. WM told the researcher that once receiving Mr. FB’s letter, he felt that Company A 
started to distrust Company L’s commitment and ability to move forward on this project. Mr. WM 
relied to Mr. FB on 26*^  September 2010 that “for this project, I have to say that we have once 
missed a golden opportunity in June. If it continues to drag on, the only thing left for us will be, 
once again losing the good opportunity of realizing the strategic objective of opening up China’s 
aviation market by establishing an assembly line in Hefei.”
In response to the Company A’s questions, Mr. WM tried to remind Company A to think 
whether the negotiations between both parties is really based on the fair and equal, and mutually
beneficial basis, and whether Company A still insists on the principles of using technology in
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exchange for the market and maximizing the benefits of the joint venture.
Mr. WM raised two main difficulties, which are in front of the Company L. One problem is 
that the other shareholders of Company L had less confidence of this investment, because they 
were told by Company A that the cost of the final assembly line is only 2% of the total aircraft 
production and the investment return rate is under 8%. Mr. WM explained in his email to 
Company A that although the world economic recovery is still slow and China’s economic and 
social development is experiencing difficulties, China is still full of vitality. If correctly choosing the 
investment projects, private capital can maintain a 35 percent of return ratio in general. It is very 
difficult for low return ratio to raise interest in investment of private capital. The other issue is that 
the other shareholders hope to review the original number of order of aircrafts from the joint 
venture. Company L requested that the number should be about 30, and it may achieve 50 after 
Company L’s continuous efforts.
Mr. WM also answered the Company A’s questions regarding Company L’s guarantees for 
the government approval. Mr. WM said “approving the establishment of airlines is not a simple 
matter in China. Whether the Company A’s aircrafts will able to enter China’s aviation market 
mainly depends on the attitude of the Chinese government.”
This replying letter presented the Company L’s final attitude towards the three main 
questions, asked by the new CEO of Company A. The content of the letter changed the 
fundamental agreement of this project by decreasing the Company L’s promised order of 
aircrafts from 50 to 30. Also Company L expected the return rate of this project to be comparable 
to that of real estate development and also emphasized that Company L cannot influence or 
control Chinese governmental decision. All of those negative responses might discourage 
Company A’s intension to negotiate further with Company L, as what Mr. ZB told the researcher. 
Since the date of this last correspondence, both parties have not contacted each other anymore 
and the whole formation process of this joint venture project finished with a failed ending.
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Appendix F: Codebook (Resource; present author)
Themes (Axial Coding) Phases (Open Coding)
Case one Motives of forming IJVs increasing sales
Increasing market share
meeting market demand
meeting the requirements of industry
over the capacity.
business license
local knowledge
break into Chinese market
occupy market share quicker
protect the national industry
national dignity
increase the profitability margin 
import duty exemption
Case one Motives of allying with foreign 
investors
childhood dream 
rescuing existing business 
promoting other business activities 
meeting market demand 
stimulate local aviation industry
Case one Contextual factors experiencing a difficult time 
popularity in market 
competition from Chinese 
manufacturers
institutional environment of China
Case one Partner identification opportunistic identification
Case one Partner selection confirmed sales order 
acquiring government approval 
acquiring suitable land
Case one Obstacles in the partnership responsibilities for the sales 
purchasing material and equipment 
management control 
termination of the IJV Agreement
Case one Reasons leading to failure overoptimistic with the 
under-developed market 
Completion from Chinese 
manufacturers
wrong approach of partner identification 
choosing an unsuitable IJV partner 
incompatible value 
task-related criteria 
confirmed sales order
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extra time on lobbying
the location of the joint venture
lacks of organizational fit
poor communication between partners
little past experience
deficient preparation
absence of mutual trust
lack of financial fit
Case two Motives of forming IJVs Win a larger market share
sustain Company B’s sales
lower manufacturing costs
old knowledge in exchange for market
a long-term strategic partner
Case two Motives of allying with foreign 
Investors
growing manufacturing skills 
bringing business to Chinese suppliers 
the development of local region, 
attracting investment
Case two Contextual factors nature of aviation sector 
substantial governmental support 
no direct Chinese competitors 
institutional environment 
favorable governmental policies
Case two Partner identification “Top to Down” strategy
Case two Partner selection partner selection criteria
the governmental approval
industrial experience
favorable past business association
suitable FAL site
favorable tax policies
offer suitable land and facilities
Case two Obstacles in the partnership the profitability of project
maintain the quality
purchase from Chinese manufacturers
number of expatriates
Case two Reasons for successful formation the right model of aircraft
the right time
the right approach
the right location
he right Chinese IJV partners
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Appendix G: Deciding on the Research Approach and Choosing a Strategy 
(Resource: adapted from Saunders et al, 2009)
^r
Survey
Realism
Experiment
Deductive Inductive
Positivism
Ethnography Case
Study
Interpretlvism
Sample Secondary
data
Observation
Action
Research
Longitudinal
The Research
Process
Grounded
theory
Sectional
Cross
Questionnaire Interviews
Research
Philosophy
Research
Approachs
Research
Strategy
Time
Horizons
Data
Collection
Methods
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Appendix H: General Procedures for setting up a Joint Venture in the PRC 
(Resource: Wiener and Seewald, 2004)
Approval
Certificate
Business
Lieense
opening
aeeount
Bank Company
ehops
Customs
registration
Residenee 
and work 
permits
Foreign
exehange
registration
Tax
Registration
Certifieate
Proof of PRC 
party’s source 
of funds
Joint Venture 
Agreement or 
draft thereof
Credit report on 
foreign party 
prepared by bank
Application letter to 
establish a JV to 
relevant government 
authority
Approval by MOC
Submission of formal applieation 
to MOC
Tax registration
Parties agree on structure and 
terms of joint venture
Feasibility 
Study signed 
by all parties to 
the joint 
venture
Registration with the State 
Administration for Industry and 
Commerce
Submit Projeet Proposal to loeal 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC) for 
preliminary approval.
298
Appendix I: Overall conditions and timetable following IJV Contract signature 
(Case One) 
(Resource: adapted from research data)
A) JV Agreement — Application to MOFCOM 
(Max Deadline : 180 days from JV Contract signature)
Conditions that are in Clause 5.1 that must be satisfied prior to submission to MOFCOM for final 
Business License. The JV Contract will not be submitted to the MOFCOM for final approval of the 
JV Company until the following conditions have been satisfied:
a) The JV Company has received a firm order for 50 Aireraft from eustomers in the PRC and 
all neeessary government approvals (in partieular fi*om NDRC) are granted for the sale of 
the 50 aircraft by the JV Company
b) All Transaction Documents and Project Documents have been agreed/signed between the 
Parties
Transaction Documents:
-IJV Contract
-Articles of Association
-Company A Technology and Know-how Licence Agreement
-Company A Trademark Licence Agreement
-Sales, Marketing and After-Sales Agreement
-Company A Secondment Agreement
-Sale and purchase contraet(s) in respect of 50Aireraft
-Aireraft Kits Supply Agreement
-ATR Technical Services Agreement
-Training Plan
-Jigs and Tools Agreement
-Facility Design Agreement
Project Documents:
-Land Use Rights Grant Contract 
-Construction Contract
-Any other documents otherwise neeessary for the Project
c) Tax concessions (and all other Government Assurances) are received 
Government Assurances:
-Validated process for the issuance of a Certifieate of Airworthiness for the Aircraft by the 
Civil Aviation Administration of China and the EASA;
-Rights to airspace, conduct flight tests, radio licences, access airport infrastructure and 
roads, and airport services as neeessary for FAL operation
-Agreement for Land Use Rights with relevant government authority to be granted to the JV 
Company and
-A "Pre-approval of Project Site" issued by the Ministry of Land and Resource on the JV
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Company's right to use the Site
-Concession for a period acceptable to the Parties from Anhui Province Government for 
usage rights of the Airport
-Investment Agreement between Company A, Company Land the government District 
granting the various incentives to the JV Company 
-The Tax Concessions
d) Business Plan has been agreed between the Parties
e) NDRC approval of the JV project
f) All government authorizations neeessary for export of Aireraft Kits and parts to China
g) Company L and Company A have agreed on the site and all necessary approvals for the JV 
site received
h) Receipt by each Party of internationally audited accounts from the other Party
i) Agreement on initial Production schedule
j) Receipt of Company A Board and Member’s Assembly approval
Timetable for Clause 5.1:
Once all of the above conditions have been satisfied, within 10 business days the Parties agree to 
submit the JV Contract to MOFCOM for approval. Best efforts to achieve all the above conditions 
and make the submission to MOFCOM within 90 days of signature of JV Contract.
In the event any item is refused, the Parties will try to resolve within 30 days
Either Party may cancel JV Contract if any of the above conditions isn’t satisfied within 180 days of 
JV Contract signature.
B) Conditions precedent to making capital contribution:
Neither Party shall have any obligation under this Contract to contribute any Registered Capital 
unless:
a) All the Required Approvals have been obtained;
Required Approvals means each of the following approvals:
(i) the verification and acceptance in writing of the Projeet Application Report by the central 
level NDRC in accordance with PRC law
(ii) the approval by central level MOFCOM (or its local office if such local office is authorized 
by central level MOFCOM) of this Contract and the Articles of Association on terms 
identical to this Contract or on terms agreeable to all Parties to this Contract and in 
accordance with PRC laws;
(iii) the issue of an approval certifieate by central level MOFCOM (or its loeal office if such loeal 
office is authorized by central level MOFCOM) for the establishment of the JV Company in 
accordance with PRC law;
(iv) the issue of the Business Licence in accordance with PRC law;
(v) the approval of the environmental impact assessment report by the competent Government 
Authority in accordance with PRC law; and
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(vi) the Government Assurances.
b) All Transaction Documents and Project Documents then in effect are being duly performed by 
all parties (other than sueh Party and its Affiliates) in all material respects at that time, ineluding the 
other Party having made or being ready, willing and able to make its contribution of Registered 
Capital as required by this Contract.
C) Termination
13.3.1 (and 51.3.3) Either Party may terminate the JV Contract if any of the Required Approvals 
is not obtained within 240 days of the signature date of the JV Contract
D) The overall timetable for the JV Contract:
- A period of 180 days following JV Contract signature for all conditions (a-j above) to be met so 
that the JV Contract can be presented to MOFCOM;
-An additional 60 days for MOFCOM approval and issuance of the business license.
Thus, the overall plan is:
1) Finalize JV Contract
2) Request NDRC Approval
3) If NDRC approval is granted (and during approval process), finalize Transaction Documents
4) Other key elements to be finalized : Tax Concessions and Import approvals; Investment 
Agreement from loeal government for all incentives; agreement with airport and FAL site selection; 
Due Diligence of financial information of Company L; agreement on final Business Plan.
5) Company A Members Assembly approval
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Appendix J: A Historical Account of the Most Important Events in Case One 
(Resource; adapted from research data)
In July 2001, Company A exported its first batch of four airplanes to Chinese airplanes but it 
had not sold any more aircrafts in China since then.
In May 2006, Company L set up a joint venture charter airline with another Chinese private 
airline, Company O and started to operate an air route between Tianjin-Hefei-Kunming with 
a leased Boeing 737-500 aircraft.
In April 2006, Company A set up a representative’s office in Beijing in order to increase sales 
to China.
In Oct 2006, Company A approached Company L during the China Air Show period in 
Zhuhai, China and made a proposal of establishing an IJV of FAL with Company L to 
assemble and deliver regional aircrafts in China.
In July 2007, both parties have agreed the key principles of cooperation in the signed letter 
of intent in Paris.
From August 2008 to November 2009, both parties have sent their representatives to 
discuss the clauses of joint venture contract in five official negotiation meetings.
Beginning on December 15, 2008, all the Company O’ flights were suspended for one month 
due to a dispute among its shareholders and its joint charter business with Company L has 
been stopped as well ever since.
From 26th August 2009 to the end of September 2010, the researcher was employed by 
Company L as an interpreter and translator for this project and joined all 15 rounds of 
negotiation meetings during this period.
From October 2009 to March 2010, Company L and Company A have entered into a cold 
war period and have not contacted each other for 5 months until the 25th March 2010.
On 8th April 2010, the Company A’s Chinese competitor. Company X, provided Company L 
with a business proposal of setting up an joint venture airline, which should only operate 
the aircrafts produced by Company X.
In June 2010, although the two parties have restarted business negotiation, they did not 
make any further progress.
Since November 2010, two parties have not been in contact and the project eventually 
never took off.
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Since 2012, the Company A has started to design a new 90-seat model, which will be 
launched in 2017.
From September 2012 to January 2013, the researcher has conducted 11 interviews with 
the key informants of this failed IJV project.
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Appendix K: A Historical Account of the Most Important Events in Case Two 
(Resource: adapted from research data)
In December 2005, Company B and the Chinese government signed a MoU for the 
establishment of a single aisle final assembly line in China.
From December 2005 to June 2006, Company B had identified four possible regions for FAL, 
including Zhuhai, Shanghai, Xian and Tianjin and also conducted many rounds of business 
negotiations with potential IJV partners in those respective areas.
On 8^ June 2006, Company B and the NDRC announced that the site for the potential FAL 
in China would be in Tianjin Binhai New Coastal District.
On 26**^  October 2006, a Framework Agreement settling the main details of the 
corresponding joint venture was signed between Company A and a Chinese Consortium 
comprising Company T, Company V1 and Company V2 in Beijing.
In January 2007, the Feasibility Study Report (FSR) was jointly conducted and signed by 
Company B and the Chinese Consortium and was then submitted to the NDRC for approval.
On 9^"^  May 2007, the FSR for the project was approved by the NDRC.
On 15**^  May 2007, the construction of FAL factory started in Tianjin.
On 28'^ June 2007, the IJV contract for FAL project in Tianjin was signed in Beijing between 
Company B and Chinese Consortium in the Great Hall of the People.
In August 2008, the Tianjin FAL project started operation.
In June 2009, the first aircraft assembled in Tianjin was delivered to Chinese Airlines.
From June 2013 to 26^  ^June 2013, the researcher conducted nine semi-structured 
interviews in either Tianjin where the FAL project is located or Company B’s head office in 
Beijing.
By the end of 2013, a total of nearly 153 aircrafts have already been delivered to 11 Chinese 
operators from Tianjin.
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Appendix L: Partner Selection Criteria Categorizations Across Past Studies 
(Resource: Roy and Oliver (2009), P800)
Partner seiection criteria Empirical studies
Gerlnger Glaister Arino et ai. Glaister Tatogiu Nielsen
& Buckiey &Giaister
(1988) (1996) (1997) (1997) (2000) (2003)
Task-reiated criteria
Ability to satisfy host government T
Requirements
Regulatory permits, licenses, or patents T T T T T
Connections to government or nongovernment T T T T T T
Organizations
Raw materials/natural resources, products. T T T T/P
services, and/or technology!
Facilities T T T T
Managerial and/or labor skills T TIP TIP T/P T
Experience in/knowledge of the local market T T T T/P T
and/or culture
Partner-reiated criteria
Trustworthiness P P P P P
Transparency of the firm and/or ethical P P
value/beliefs
Reputation T P P P P P
Firm size P P P P P
Market share/industry position P P
Financial capabilities T P P P P
Goals, objectives, aspirations, or synergy P P P P P P
potential
Commitment, seriousness and/or P P
enthusiasm for the partnership
Successful partnering records with other P
Firms
Favorable past association with the MNE or P P P P P
T: task-related criteria; P: partner-reiated criteria; TIP: treated as both task- and partner-reiated criteria.
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